

WHY WOULDN'T JOE JOHNSTON FIGHT?

NORTH & SOUTH

THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY

VOLUME 5 • NUMBER 6

STEPHEN W. SEARS

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
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NORTH & SOUTH

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The appointment of George Gordon Meade to command the Army of the Potomac, just days before the Battle of Gettysburg, is a dark tale of intrigue, double-dealing, and miscalculation. —*Stephen W. Sears*

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
The ongoing feud between Edmund Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor was a reflection both of divergent approaches to Confederate Trans-Mississippi strategy and of Smith’s quest for glory. —*Jeffery S. Prushankin*

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
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“Lookout Valley 2 A.M. October 29, 1863”
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“Gen. Joseph E. Johnston at the Battle of Bull Run”
 (c. 1862-65) by L.M.D. Guillaume.
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A gunboat passing over the rapids at Bailey’s dam.
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Editorial

Doing the Math

IN VOLUME 5, #2 of *North & South* we published an article by William Freehling entitled "Why Civil War Military History Must Be Less Than 85% Military." This was a riposte to an editorial of mine, in which I stated that the content of the magazine would continue to be 85% military. Actually, Bill and I are not in dispute, in that we both recognize that any understanding of the war—even of events on the battlefield—requires a synthesis of military and social history.


However, having thrown out that "85%" figure without checking, I thought it might be interesting to go back and analyze the breakdown of material published in the first five volumes of *North & South*. In those thirty-five issues (I'm including the next issue, the contents of which are listed on page 70) there have been a total of 195 articles. I divided these into a number of categories, producing the table below. Of course, the categories are an oversimplification. For example, we've published a good deal on strategy, but much of it is buried under the headings "generals" or "campaigns," and there's been a good deal on weapons included in articles on "tactics" and "battles."

ARTICLES BY CATEGORY

Battles	54	Other Lincoln	5
Generals	31	Divided Loyalties	4
Campaigns	17	POWs	2
Miscellaneous	15	Medical	2
General War	8	The Administrations	2
Tactics and Fortifications	8	Prewar	2
Guerrillas/Black Flag Warfare	8	Spies	1
Units	8	General Military	1
Politics	6	Strategy	1
Individuals (other than generals)	6	Jeff Davis	1
Naval	5	Weapons/Equipment	1
Lincoln Assassination	5	Women	1
		Children	1

Nevertheless, the breakdown is instructive. Taking the "non-military" categories—other Lincoln, Davis, politics, prewar, the administrations, women, and children—we have a total of eighteen articles. Add to this half the miscellaneous (eight) and three quarters of the "General War" articles (six), and we have a grand total of thirty-two "nonmilitary." (I'm lumping the Lincoln assassination in with "military," as most buffs seem as interested in it as they are in details of the battlefields.) The thirty-two "nonmilitary" constitute 16.4% of the total, leaving 83.6% military. When you consider that the Knapsack column is primarily military, it becomes clear that my "off the top of my head" estimate that 85% of our coverage is on military topics was pretty close to the mark. And so it will continue.

If there any categories you'd like to see more of, please let me know—it's your magazine.





Crossfire

MISSIONARY RIDGE

Edward Franks' article, "In Defense of Braxton Bragg," states that Bragg was "unlucky" in the collapse of the Missionary Ridge defense line, blaming that collapse not on Bragg but on "improper troop deployment by Bragg's chief of engineers."

Placing the blame on this unnamed engineer officer unfairly shifts the responsibility for the collapse from where it belongs—on Bragg. A commanding general, such as Bragg, is ALWAYS responsible for the positioning and deployment of his troops. But Bragg's errors in the Missionary Ridge fiasco were far greater than the article admits.

First, for at least 2000 years, it has been standard operating procedure for an investing army to construct its own lines of defense. Julius Caesar in Gaul; Washington at Boston; Napoleon at Mantua; and Grant at Vicksburg all did so. Bragg's army occupied Missionary Ridge for two months prior to the Nov. 25th assault. Yet, until the night of Nov. 23rd, nothing was done to construct fortifications along the ridge. Not even a proper survey of a potential line was done. If the Union army had launched an assault at any time in that two months (for example, the proposed November 7th attack Mr. Franks mentioned in the article), that assault would have found the ridge unfortified.

The second error was to wait until the night of Nov. 23rd to begin the works. Waiting until this late, when the Union offensive against Lookout Mountain was already in progress, left too little time to properly site and construct these works. As General Manigault's memoirs make clear, the engineer in charge (not, by the way, "Bragg's chief of engineers," as Mr. Franks states, but rather, Capt. John Green, an engineer officer of Breckinridge's Corps) "appeared to be in a great hurry." There was no need for this hurry—the line should have been laid out weeks before. And with the extra time, proper entrenchments could have been constructed, rather than the shallow works that (due to lack of time and adequate tools) were completed.

The third error was Bragg's failure, after the lines were constructed, to correct the defects. The siting of the line is admitted by all scholars to be faulty; Pete Cozzens calls it "a horribly improvised, sadly neglected patchwork." Bragg's headquarters that day, and for the last

month, was on Missionary Ridge, little more than a stone's throw away from the lines. If there were problems with the line, Bragg was on the spot to order corrections. And since Thomas' assault did not come until around 4:00 p.m. on the 25th, there was time to make at least some corrections. Porter Alexander's memoirs contain a wonderful story about how Robert E. Lee personally intervened at Fredericksburg in the siting of an artillery emplacement. Bragg's "complacency" (to quote Mr. Franks) about the line stands in sharp contrast. Bragg was on the spot and capable of both correcting the lines, and redeploying the troops into those lines and from the rifle pits at the base of the ridge (another error in the dispositions), but failed to order either.

It is perhaps no coincidence that the one successful defense of Missionary Ridge that day came on the right flank, the sector farthest away from Bragg's headquarters and farthest removed from Bragg's control.

In short; (1) Bragg should have constructed works on the ridge the first week of the investment; (2) the works should have been sited and completed long before Nov. 25th; (3) Bragg should have, and could have, corrected the problems in their siting. On all three counts, Bragg is guilty of mismanagement.

—Bruce Allardice, Des Plaines, Illinois

PRISON CAMPS

James M. Gillispie, in his interesting article "Guests of the Yankees," noted that former prisoners at Camp Morton expressed their thanks for Richard Owen's humane treatment of them while he commanded there. This is not an isolated incident. At Fort Lafayette, in Brooklyn, many inmates admitted their prison's cleanliness and relative comfort and took the unusual step of proclaiming the fairness of their treatment in the *New York Times* of February 2, 1862:

"We the undersigned, this day released from imprisonment at Fort Lafayette state publicly that we received at the hands of Lt. Charles O. Wood, Ninth Inf. USA, commanding at Fort Lafayette, every civility, courtesy and kindness. We believe he would have made more provisions for our comfort had it been in his power to do so.

Baltimore papers please copy.

George N. Jones, A.N. Baker, R.W. Rasin, E.E. Cottrell, N.S. Reneau, J.M. Odgen, E.H. Jones, John Hagins, C. Ledwidge, Rutson Maury, Jr.

Best wishes for his prosperity and happiness."


The item regarding Baltimore papers probably had to do with prisoners sent to Fort Lafayette (secessionist police commissioners and legislators) during the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in that city early in the war.

I was disappointed that Fort Lafayette's minor amount of fame did not feature in the article. It did have some interesting guests: former General Roger A. Pryor, William Henry Fitzhugh Lee and Pierre Soule, former minister to Spain and a Confederate agent. Pryor, believe it or not, came to New York City after the war, practiced law and eventually made his way to New York State's Supreme Court, an amazing metamorphosis for a former rebel general.

—Bud Livingston,
Glendale, New York

★ ★ ★

James Gillispie's "Guests of the Yankees: A Reevaluation of Union Treatment of Confederate Prisoners" (Vol. 5, #5) makes a convincing case that high mortality rates in Northern prisoner of war camps were not driven by any program of retaliation or inadequate appropriations for maintenance of the camps. Nonetheless, the number of deaths in the POW camps, North and South, was appallingly high, and the reasons for this need further examination. Undoubtedly, many deaths occurred



because of poorly understood sanitation, nutrition, and medical practices, but the underlying problem was severe overcrowding of facilities by huge numbers of prisoners, and in the case of the Confederacy, a total lack of resources to properly care for large numbers of men, whether it be their own troops in the field or Yankee prisoners.

By 1864, the North, under General Grant, was committed to a policy to use any means to starve the South for manpower. Accordingly, prisoner exchanges were reduced to a mere trickle. Grant would write:

"It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man we hold, when released, on parole

or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at once either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners taken, we win have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught they amount to no more than dead men."

The policy was effective, and by late 1864, the North had as many Southern soldiers incarcerated in POW camps as the Confederacy had troops in the field. Under intense pressure from Congress and the American public, Grant finally opened the floodgates of exchange in late January 1865. Even then, his concern was denying manpower to the South, and he would advise Secretary of War Stanton, "I would like disabled troops (troops from Missouri, Kentucky, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana) sent first, as but few of these will be got in the ranks again...."

Some historians such as James McPherson have argued that Grant's motivation for refusing exchanges was concern for Southern mistreatment of black prisoners and their officers, but it is clear that Grant, along with Stanton and chief of staff Major General Halleck, was primarily interested in denying the manpower resource to the South. As early as August 1864, the South had fully acquiesced to Union demands for man for man prisoner exchanges, to include black POWs, but Grant refused all exchanges until it was clear that the South could no longer benefit from the additional troops. With few exceptions, black prisoners were the last to be exchanged, and there is no evidence that their continued incarceration was of concern to anyone.

Major General Benjamin F. Butler, commissioner of exchange under Grant, offered an apologia for the no-exchange policy, in which he stated:

I have felt it my duty to give with this particular carefulness an account of my participation in the, business of exchange of prisoners, the orders under which I acted, and the negotiations attempted, which comprise a faithful narration, in order that all that was done may become a matter of history. The great importance of the questions, the fearful responsibility for the many thousands of lives by which the refusal to exchange, were lost by the most cruel forms of deaths from cold, starvation, and pestilence in the prison pens of Raleigh, Salisbury, and Andersonville...the anxiety of fathers brothers sisters mothers wives, to know the exigency which caused this terrible, and perhaps as it may have seemed to them useless and unnecessary destruction of those dear to them by horrible deaths, each and all have compelled me, to this exposition so that it might be seen that these lives were spent as part of the system of attack upon the Rebellion, devised by the wisdom of

the general-in-chief of the armies to destroy it by depletion, depending upon our superior number to win it at last.

The number of "horrible deaths" in the POW camps was comparable to the total service-connected American deaths in the Vietnam War, and along with the thousands more deaths suffered by men with broken constitutions within months or a few years of their release from POW camps, a dear price was paid for Grant's policy of manpower depletion.

—David R. Mayhew, Brookline, Massachusetts
ED.: A dear price indeed. But we should not lose sight of what was "purchased"—an early end to the war, and the avoidance of a huge number of battlefield casualties and deaths from sickness in both armies.

* * *

I thought James Gillispie's article on northern prison camps was excellent. It makes two important points. The less glamorous aspects of the Civil War like prison camps deserve further study, and it is often useful to reexamine accepted dogma. I would like to make an additional point that Gillispie touches on only in the most indirect way. Stationary Civil War armies usually had much higher sick and death rates from diarrhea than ones on the move. For example, Sherman's army marching through Georgia and the Carolinas had an exceptionally low diarrhea rate by the war's standards. The main reason for this was that a rapidly moving army did not have enough time to contaminate the local water supply with their excretions. In contrast a prison population is about as stationary a group as one could get.


Civil War public health (though beginning to develop) was not very good. In Greene's 2001 book *Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion*, he has a chapter about the VI Corps in winter quarters. In that chapter he briefly reviews the early regulations for latrines. These were sensible regulations that would have decreased diarrhea in the corps. According to Greene's account, however, only the most disciplined regiments bothered to implement these regulations. The high death rate from diarrhea in this well equipped Union corps tells the rest of the story. It would be an interesting but difficult task to examine regimental histories to try to determine how effective these early public health measures were in the few regiments that actually tried to seriously implement them.

—Glenn Seliger, MD, Professor of
Clinical Neurology, Columbia University

JAMES O. HALL

Kieran McAuliffe's article about James O. Hall ["Portrait of An Historical Detective," vol. 5, #3] was greatly appreciated, and I was happy to read the wonderful things others had to say about him. They are absolutely right about Hall's knowledge and his willingness to share his research. I'd just like to add my two cents, having known Mr. Hall for close to thirty years.

Mr. Hall is so knowledgeable about every aspect of the Lincoln assassination, that whenever I hear him speak about the case, I am convinced that he must have been a fly on the wall observing John Wilkes Booth at every stage of the plot! As for sharing research, Mr. Hall doesn't do it just for the sake of reciprocity—he is a genuinely selfless individual who enjoys sharing the adventure of research with others. I cannot count the number of times he has shared the adventure with me. Long before he began conducting the Booth escape route tours for the Surratt Society (which he did for a number of years), I took the trip with him and four fellow "time travelers"—Harold Goetner, John Brennan, Mike Kauffman, and Bert Sheldon. It was an experience none of us would ever forget. His matter-of-fact retelling of the story gave it such a fresh approach. When I was editing a newsletter called *The Lincoln Log*, Mr. Hall always shared with me and my readers great little tidbits that he had turned up. When I helped make it possible for him to meet a mystery man who claimed to have discovered the so-called "missing" pages of Booth's diary, he insisted I be at the meeting with the man so that I, too, could read a transcript of those alleged pages. (He later proved them to be fakes—just from the transcript.) No one but this 20th century Sherlock Holmes could have found John Wilkes Booth's long-lost "To Whom it May Concern" letter, along with a hitherto-unknown letter Booth had written to his mother on the eve of Lincoln's murder. Did he race to a nationally recognized magazine or newspaper with his find? No. He gave it to me, to announce the find and reproduce it for the readers of my humble little newsletter!



James O. Hall

Such incidents are still standard procedure for James O. Hall. It is a most fitting tribute that the country's premiere Lincoln assassination research center, the Surratt Society, will name their new wing after Hall. My thanks to you for saluting him in your fine magazine!

—Richard Sloan, Massapequa, New York,
former president, The Lincoln Group of N.Y.

HISTORICAL CONFLICTS

Another fine issue, and as a bonus two worthy scholars, Bryce Suderow and Pat Brennan, have conflicting opinions on the intestinal fortitude of General Alfred Pleasonton based on

differing sources of information. What a golden opportunity if these two scholars could be convinced to present their respective sources and evaluate their reliability.

While I am fascinated by the Civil War, I am also frequently frustrated by both conflicting information and misinformation. Once in print a statement takes on a life of its own and becomes gospel. Early gifted writers of the conflict often relied on the O.R. and the personal comments of important participants at face value. Fortunately our new authors try to discover a greater variety of primary resources and resolve their value. Poor memory, bias, jealousy, self-aggrandizement, and the minimization of shortcomings are some of the human frailties that must be dealt with. For instance, I squirm whenever Colonel Rush C. Hawkins is cited, as my readings and studies indicate he was a liar and braggart and the primary source of his valorous deeds and own importance.

In a similar vein Edward Steers, Jr.'s interesting and fine article "Terror: 1860 Style" is lessened when the Dahlgren papers are presented as a fact, without justification or footnote. As I understand, they are a source of controversy as to their origin. Steers jumps from an assumption to a fact that the terror did not demoralize the Union because of its failure in execution. This may be, but historically the burning of Chambersburg, the Battle of Britain, and today's events in the Middle East might indicate terror is not necessarily that effective.

—Bill McCauley, via email

JUDGING MCCLELLAN

In "Crossfire," *North & South*, vol. 5, #3, Maurice D'Aoust wrote that Stephen Sears had "been totally unfair to McClellan," and that at Glendale "McClellan's plan worked; Lee's did not."

Sears responded: at Glendale, McClellan was "a man coming apart at the seams under stress of combat and the pressure of his delusions," and that General Humphreys, after observing McClellan, noted he "was unable to do anything or say anything," suggesting that he was then unfit to command.

Both D'Aoust and Sears make good points in their arguments for and against General McClellan.

Perhaps we should turn to General Lee and General Grant for their opinions on McClellan. Grant commented favorably on General McClellan. When asked about McClellan, Grant stated,

All my impressions are in his favor.... The test which was applied to him would be terrible to any man, being made a major general at the beginning of the war.

It has always seemed to me that the critics of McClellan do not consider his vast and cruel responsibility—the war, a new thing to all of us, the army new, everything to do from the outset with a restless people and congress.

McClellan was a young man when this devolved upon him.... If [he] had gone in to the war as Sherman, Thomas or Meade, had fought his way along and up, I have no reason to suppose that he would not have won as high distinction as any of us.

General Robert E. Lee also commented favorably on McClellan. When asked by a Union officer shortly after Appomattox who was the best Federal general he had faced during the war, Lee answered, "McClellan by all odds." Long after the war was over his son, R.E. Lee, Jr., asked him the same question—his response was the same: "McClellan by all odds." One of Lee's daughters recalled, "General McClellan was the only General Father dreaded."

Any serious evaluation of McClellan has to take into account what these two generals thought of McClellan.

—Joseph Denn, Frederic, Wisconsin

SMALL BONE TO PICK


In *North & South*, volume 5, #4, you have continued your excellent, well balanced coverage of America's Civil War. My good friend, Edward Steers, Jr., one of the foremost authorities on the Lincoln assassination, always impresses me with his superb research skill and keen insight as illustrated in his article, "Terror: 1860s Style." Stephen W. Sears is indubitably the dean of Civil War scholars and I found his "We Should Assume the (continued on page 95)

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
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
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FROM THE GRAPEVINE

- As a young man Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite and the creator of the Nobel Prizes, worked for several years in the United States for his fellow Swede, John Ericsson, the inventor of the U.S.S. *Monitor*.
- In 1860 a majority of the inhabitants of South Carolina, the most vehemently secessionist state, were black: 58.6 percent, of whom nearly 98 percent were held as slaves.
- By 1864 the Chimborazo Military Hospital in Richmond was the largest medical facility in the world, capable of handling forty-eight hundred cases simultaneously, with one hundred and fifty ward buildings, kitchens, a bakery, a dairy herd, an ice house, and various other facilities spread over one hundred and twenty-five acres.
- The twenty years following the Civil War saw the divorce rate in the United States rise by one hundred and fifty percent.
- Braxton Bragg's 1862 invasion of Kentucky sparked the formation of a number of provisional militia units in southern Ohio, which local wags quickly dubbed "squirrel hunt regiments," since their most common firearms were fowling pieces and squirrel guns.
- From 1888, when the first ones were granted, until 1927, when the last was paid, Virginia expended nearly sixteen million dollars on pensions for Confederate veterans.
- The national color carried by the 20th Maine during its famous bayonet attack on Little Round Top on July 2, 1863, found not long ago rolled up in a small wooden box, has been restored after one hundred and forty hours of work and is now on display in the Maine State Museum.

We make every effort to check the accuracy of anecdotes published in "Knapsack," but many were written down years after the event and in some cases are undoubtedly folk tales rather than genuine reminiscences.

➤ Edmund Kirby, West Point '61, had the most meteoric promotion in the Union army, being jumped by direct order of Abraham Lincoln from first lieutenant to brigadier general as he lay dying from a mortal wound incurred while commanding a battery at Chancellorsville with "undaunted courage."



U.S. marines pose with fixed bayonets at the Washington D.C. Navy Yard (c.1864).

SHORT ROUNDS Marine Corps Pay

Neither the U.S. nor the C.S. Marine Corps was very large, the former attaining a peak strength of perhaps thirty-eight hundred men by early 1865, the latter perhaps seven hundred by late 1864. Despite this, and despite some rather lackluster leadership at the highest levels, both brands of marines rendered notable service on a number of occasions.

At the start of the war Union marines received the same pay as did infantrymen in the army at all ranks. This was also the case for Confederate marines, save for lieutenants. Marine lieutenants were paid the same as army cavalry lieutenants; infantry second lieutenants received only \$80.00 a month, and first lieutenants \$90.00.

GRADE	USMC	CSMC
Private	\$13.00	\$11.00
Corporal	13.00	13.00
Sergeant	17.00	17.00
Gunnery Sergeant	21.00	21.00

GRADE	USMC	CSMC
Sergeant Major	21.00	21.00
1st Lieutenant	105.00	105.50
2nd Lieutenant	105.00	105.50
Captain	115.00	130.00
Major	169.00	150.00
Lieutenant Colonel	181.00	170.00
Colonel	212.00	195.00

Figures are for base pay, upon attainment of the indicated grade, without longevity or other allowances. Where different ranks are shown as receiving the same pay, the higher ranking marine was usually the beneficiary of additional allowances for rations, quarters, and so forth. The respective commandants were also given a special allowance above their regular pay.

It is not possible to draw a neat comparison between the purchasing power of the pay of a marine at the time of the Civil War and the modern equivalent, as, despite often heroic and ingenious efforts on the part of some financial analysts, there is no reliable way of accurately equating the value of money over so many generations. At the time of the Civil War a man making \$300 a year was doing rather well. It is worth recalling that prior to becoming president, Lincoln, a fairly successful corporation lawyer, was pulling in about \$1,500 a year.

Note that in 1862 enlisted Confederate marines were given a raise of \$4.00 a month, which put them slightly ahead

***"The mother suffered, and the wife and the child,
and the musing comrade suffered."***

—Walt Whitman

of their Union counterparts. Enlisted Union marines received an additional \$3.00 a month in June 1864, thus once again putting them ahead. Moreover, the Yankee jarheads got their money in greenbacks, which by mid-1864 were worth about eighteen times their equivalent in Confederate money.

The Prince of Wales Flag

Among the numerous treasures on display in the armory of the 69th New York is a flag, six-feet on the hoist by six-feet on the fly, mounted in a hermetically sealed glass case and covered to avoid damage from light and the elements.

The flag displays the thirty-two-ray Fenian sunburst in the center and the words "Presented to the 69th Regiment" in a scroll atop the sunburst. Below are the words "In Commemoration of the events of October 11, 1860." The flag is known as the "Prince of Wales Flag."

This suggests a certain disconnect, an Irish regiment displaying an Irish flag named after the heir to the hated British throne. And thereby hangs a tale.

In 1860 nineteen-year-old Edward Albert, Prince of Wales, heir to the British throne, which he would later mount as King Edward VII, was scheduled to

visit Canada, the first visit of a British Royal to North America. The event prompted an outcry from many Americans. Amazingly, this had nothing to do with traditional American Anglophobia, but rather with a surprising outburst of Anglophilia among some of the leading citizens in the country; in short, there were pleas for the prince to add to his Canadian visit one to the Crown's former colonies farther south. The British government reacted by extending the prince's itinerary to include portions of the United States, though out of deference to republican sensibilities he traveled using one of his subsidiary titles, Count Renfrew.

The prince was given a warm reception by most Americans. His visit to New York, of course, was to be the crowning moment—forgive the pun—of his tour. But something went awry.

The ruling class of both the city and the state were very pro-British, for reasons of commerce, blood ties, and religion. So in anticipation of the young man's arrival in the city, the governor ordered the state militia there to duty to serve as military escort to Count Renfrew. Most of the militia dutifully turned out. But all this was too much for Colonel Michael Corcoran, commanding officer of the 69th Regiment.

On October 11, 1860, Corcoran refused in writing to participate with his regiment. Outraged, the governor levied charges of insubordination against Corcoran, placing him under technical arrest and threatening a court-martial, while rumors circulated that the 69th was to be disbanded.

Preliminary hearings and legal maneuvers delayed Corcoran's court-martial and also a decision on the fate of the 69th. Meanwhile, the Irish citizens of New York, proud of the defiant stand made by Corcoran and the 69th, presented the regiment with a handsome flag that was immediately dubbed "The Prince of Wales Flag."

Of course, while this was transpiring, the nation went through the election of 1860, which was followed by the convulsive "Secession Winter." And then came April 14, 1861.

With the surrender of Fort Sumter, all was suddenly forgiven. Off went Corcoran and off went the 69th, both into the pages of history, garnering glory for American arms and the brave sons of Erin.

POETIC LICENSE

Herman Melville's *The Portent*

Though noted principally as the author of *Moby Dick*, *Typee*, and other great novels of men and the sea, Herman Melville was also a poet of considerable ability. His *Battle-Pieces and Aspects of the War* (1866) includes several important works, among them this short piece on the execution of John Brown.

THE PORTENT (1859)

Hanging from the beam
Slowly swaying (such the law),
Gaunt the shadow on your green,
Shenandoah!
The cut is on the crown
(Lo, John Brown),
And the stabs shall heal no more.

Hidden in the cap,
Is the anguish none can drown;
So your future veils its face,
Shenandoah!
But the streaming beard is shown,
(Weird John Brown),
The meteor of the war.

Arming the Negro Slave

The following anecdote was contained in a letter written on January 23, 1865 by General Alpheus S. Williams, XX Corps, to one of his daughters, when he was seeking shelter from the rain in a slave cabin located on a rice plantation near Savannah:

"A very smart old Negro soon joined in the conversation and about a dozen young ones snuggled close up to their colored people, gaping in wonder at a live Yankee general.... I kept them talking for an hour while I dried my



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

feet. At last I said to the old man, 'Have you heard that they are going to put your people into the Rebel army?' He had heard of it, but he added, 'Massa, they can't make us fight de Yankees, I habe heard de colored folks talk of it. They knowd all about it: dey'll turn the guns on the Rebs.' 'Then,' I said, 'you prefer the Yankees?' 'Ah Massa', and he said it with his hands raised and an expression of earnest feeling and a pious soul, 'Efry night when me and my woman say our prayers we say the biggest part for de Yankees!'"

—Contributed by
Mike Quigley, Garden Grove

Left: General Alpheus S. Williams

FOR THE RECORD

"Why Have You Burned My House?"

In the summer of 1864, Union Major General David Hunter was operating in the Shenandoah Valley, in order to deprive the Confederacy of the rich agricultural resources of the area, not to mention blocking Rebel use of the Valley as a "back door" into Maryland and Pennsylvania. It was a harsh campaign, with much destruction inflicted upon the inhabitants.

On July 19, Captain William F. Martindale led a contingent of the 1st New York Cavalry into Shepherdstown, with orders to burn several houses belonging to Confederate sympathizers. Among those were the dwellings of Colonel A.R. Boteler and of Mrs. Henrietta E. Lee, who on the following day penned

this eloquent and moving letter to Hunter, expressing her outrage not only at the destruction of property and the destitution of families, but also at the liberation of slaves.

SHEPHERDSTOWN, VA.

July 20th, 1864.

General Hunter:

Yesterday, your underling, Captain Martindale, of the First New York Cavalry, executed your infamous order and burned my house. You have the satisfaction ere this of receiving from him the information that your orders were fulfilled to the letter; the dwelling and every outbuilding, seven in number, with their contents, being burned. I, therefore, a helpless woman whom you have cruelly wronged, address you, a Major General of the United States Army, and demand

why this was done? What was my offense? My husband was absent—an exile. He never had been a politician or in any way engaged in the struggle now going on, his age preventing. This fact your chief-of-staff, David Strother, could have told you. The house was built by my father, a Revolutionary soldier, who served the whole seven years for your independence. There was I born; there the sacred dead repose. It was my house, and my home, and there has your niece (Miss Griffith), who has tarried among us all this horrid war up to the present moment, met with all kindness and hospitality at my hands. Was it for this that you turned me, my young daughter and little son out upon the world without a shelter? Or was it because my husband is the grandson of the Revolutionary patriot and "rebel," Richard Henry Lee, and the near kinsman of

RECOLLECTIONS

Gideon Welles Recalls

March 9, 1862

Abraham Lincoln's secretary of the navy, Gideon Welles (1802-1878), was a wealthy Connecticut journalist and politician who administered the department methodically, reducing waste while overseeing an extraordinary expansion of the fleet.

Here, but lightly edited, is Welles' account of what happened in Washington when word arrived of the previous day's exploits of the Confederate ironclad *Merrimac*/*Virginia* drawn from *The Diary of Gideon Welles*, Vol. I (Boston: 1911, pp. 61-64). This provides some interesting insights into his personality, and is also revealing of his opinions of some of his fellow cabinet members:


"When intelligence reached Washington on Sunday morning, the 9th of March, that the *Merrimac* had come down from Norfolk and destroyed the *Cumberland* and *Congress*, I called at once on the President, who had sent for me. Several members of the Cabinet soon gathered, [Secretary of War Edwin M.] Stanton was already there, and there was general excitement and alarm. Although my Department and the branch of the Government entrusted to me were most interested and most responsible, the President ever after gave me the credit of being, on that occasion, the most calm and self-possessed of any member of the Government. The President himself was so excited that he could not deliberate or be satisfied with the opinions of non-professional men, but ordered his carriage and drove to the navy yard to see and consult with Admiral [John Adolph] Dahlgren and other naval officers, who might be there. Dahlgren, always atten-

tive and much of a courtier, had, to a great extent, the President's regard and confidence; but in this instance Dahlgren, who knew not of the preparation or what had been the purposes of the Department, could give the President no advice or opinion, but referred him to me. The inability of Dahlgren to advise seemed to increase the panic. General [Montgomery C.] Meigs, who was of much the same temperament with Dahlgren, was also sent for by the President, Stanton, or [Secretary of State] William Seward. The latter had great confidence in Meigs on all occasions, and deferred to him more than to his superior, in all matters of a military character.

"Dahlgren and Meigs were both intelligent officers and in their specialties among the first of their respective professions, but neither of them was endowed with the fighting qualities of [David Glasgow] Farragut or [Phil] Sheridan, and in that time of general alarm, without information or facts, they were not the men to allay panic or tranquillize the government officials. They were prudent, cautious men, careful to avoid danger, and provide the means to escape from it. But the most frightened man on that gloomy day, the most so I think of any during the Rebellion, was the Secretary of War. He was at times almost frantic, and as he walked the room with his eyes fixed on me, I saw well the estimation in which he held me with my unmoved and unexcited manner and conversation.

"The *Merrimac*, he said, would destroy every vessel in the service, could lay every city on the coast under contribution, could take Fortress Monroe; [Major General George B.] McClellan's mistaken purpose to advance by the Peninsula must be abandoned, and [Major General Ambrose E.] Burnside would inevitably be

captured. Likely the first movement of the *Merrimac* would be to come up the Potomac and disperse Congress, destroy the Capitol and public buildings; or she might go to New York and Boston and destroy those cities, or levy from them contributions sufficient to carry on the War. He asked what vessel or means we had to resist or prevent her from doing whatever she pleased.



Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles

"I stated our vessels were not as powerful or in numbers as extensive as I wished. It was certain, however, the *Merrimac* could not come to Washington and go to New York at the same time. I had no apprehension of her visiting either, and wished she were then in the Potomac, for if so we could take efficient measures to dispose of her. That Burnside and the force in the [Carolina] Sounds were safe from her, because her draft of water was such she could not approach them. That the *Monitor* was in Hampton Roads, and I had confidence in her power to resist, and, I hoped, to overcome, the *Merrimac*.

the noblest of Christian warriors, the greatest of generals, Robert E. Lee? Heaven's blessing be upon his head forever! You and your government have failed to conquer, subdue, or match him; and, disappointed, rage and malice find vent on the helpless and inoffensive.

Hyena-like, you have torn my heart to pieces! for all hallowed memories clustered around that homestead; and, demon-like, you have done it without even the pretext of revenge, for I never saw or harmed you. Your office is not to lead, like a brave man and soldier, your men to fight in the ranks of war, but your work has been to separate yourself from all danger, and with your incendiary band steal unaware upon helpless women and children, to insult and destroy. Two fair homes did you yesterday ruthlessly lay in ashes, giving not a moment's warning to

the startled inmates of your wicked purpose, turning mothers and children out of doors, your very name execrated by your own men for the cruel work you gave them to do.

In the case of Colonel A.R. Boteler, both father and mother were far away. Any heart but that of Captain Martindale (and yours) would have been touched by that little circle, comprising a widowed daughter just risen from her bed of illness, her three little fatherless babes—the oldest not five years old—and her heroic sister. I repeat, any man would have been touched at that sight. But, Captain Martindale! one might as well hope to find mercy and feeling in the heart of a wolf bent on his prey of young lambs, as to search for such qualities in his bosom. You have chosen well your agent for such deeds, and doubtless will promote him!

A colonel of the Federal army has stated that you deprived forty of your officers of their commands because they refused to carry out your malignant mischief. All honor to their names for this, at least! They are men—they have human hearts and blush for such a commander!

I ask who, that does not wish infamy and disgrace attached to him forever, would serve under you! *Your* name will stand on history's page as the Hunter of weak women and innocent children; the Hunter to destroy defenseless villages and refined and beautiful homes—to torture afresh the agonized hearts of the widows; the Hunter of Africa's poor sons and daughters, to lure them on to ruin and death of soul and body; the Hunter with the relentless heart of a wild beast, the face of a fiend, and the form of a man. Oh, Earth, behold the monster! Can I say, "God forgive you?" No prayer can be offered for you! Were it possible for human lips to raise your name heavenward, angels would thrust the foul thing back again, and demons claim their own. The curses of thousands, the scorn of the manly and upright, and the hatred of the true and honorable, will follow you and yours through all-time, and brand your name *infamy! infamy!*

Again, I demand why have you burned my house? Answer as you must answer before the Searcher of all hearts; why have you added this cruel, wicked deed to your many crimes?

HENRIETTA E. LEE.

She should have been there sooner to have destroyed the *Merrimac*, but the contractors had disappointed us.

"Mr. Seward, who had been desponding, contrary to his usual temperament and custom, rendered more timid by the opinion and alarm of Stanton, said my remark in relation to the draft of water of the *Merrimac* gave him the first moment's relief he had experienced.

"Stanton made some sneering inquiry about this new vessel the *Monitor*, of which he admitted he knew little or nothing. I described her, and [said] that it had been our intention, had she been completed within contract time, to have sent her up to Norfolk to destroy the *Merrimac* before she came out of the dry dock. Stanton asked about her armament, and when I mentioned she had two guns, his mingled look of incredulity and contempt cannot be described; and the tone of his voice, as he asked if my reliance was on that craft with her two guns, is equally indescribable. Others mingled in the conversation with anxiety and concern, but on the part of Stanton there was censure, bitterness, and a breaking-out of pent-up malevolence that I could not misunderstand. Others, alarmed by the destruction which had taken place and dreading further disaster, had their fears increased by his harsh manner; but, though unsupported and unassisted, I was not appalled or affected by his terror and bluster. I more correctly read and understood his character in that crisis than he mine. It was the first, and, save a repetition on the following day, the only, occasion when he attempted to exercise towards me that rude and offensive insolence for which he became notorious in the discharge of his official duties.

"That day and its incidents were among the most unpleasant and uncomfortable of my life."

DO YOU KNOW?

Who Wrote the Following Memoirs?

1. *Advance and Retreat*
2. *Ten Years in the Saddle*
3. *Serving the Republic*
4. *46 Years in the Army*
5. *The Citizen Soldier*
6. *Two Wars: An Autobiography*
7. *From Manassas to Appomattox*
8. *Destruction and Reconstruction*
9. *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*



BOTH NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TEASER QUESTION

This issue's article on the Battle of Wauhatchie records the death of General Geary's son Edward. Name another Union general whose son was killed in the war.

THE ANSWERS to questions 1-9 are below. If you know the answer to the teaser question, send it to:

NORTH & SOUTH
33756 Black Mountain Road
Tollhouse, CA 93667

The author of the correct answer drawn from the *North & South* hat will win a free book prize.

WE HAVE A WINNER!

The teaser question in volume 5, #4 was, "Who was Lieutenant Hiram Clark?" We received a flood of correct answers. Clark was the last commissioned officer of the Army of the Potomac killed in action against the Army of Northern Virginia. He was killed by a shell fired on April 9, 1865, as the Confederates were raising a flag of truce prior to their surrender. The name of Tom Brooks of Gravenhurst, Ontario, was drawn from the *North & South* hat. He receives a copy of Jubal Early's *Memoir of the Last Year For the War of Independence*.

DO YOU KNOW? ANSWERS

Edward Porter Alexander
Longstreet; (8) Richard Taylor; (9) Beatty; (6) Samuel G. French; (7) James right; (4) John M. Schofield; (5) John M. (above left); (3) Nelson A. Miles (above left); (2) William W. Averell

STEPHEN W. SEARS

MEADE TAKES COMMAND

"We reached here last night and I was delighted, on the road, to hear that Gen. Meade was in command of the army," Brigadier General John Gibbon wrote his wife from Frederick, Maryland, on June 29, 1863. "I now feel my confidence restored and believe we shall whip these fellows." Gibbon's confident tone was echoed all through the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. Alpheus Williams, commanding a division in the XII Corps, "rejoiced at the change of commanders.... Now with a gentleman and a soldier in command I have renewed confidence that we shall at least do enough to preserve our honor and the safety of the Republic." Marsena Patrick, the army's provost marshal, recorded in his diary, "Of course this has caused great commotion, but as yet I have heard no regret."¹

The appointment of George Gordon Meade to command the Potomac army just three days before the Battle of Gettysburg, and the corresponding fall of "Fighting Joe" Hooker, is a dark tale of intrigue, double-dealing, and miscalculation—intrigue and double dealing on the part of Hooker's numerous enemies, miscalculation on the part of Hooker himself.

THE TALE BEGINS ON MAY 7, 1863, one day after the close of the Chancellorsville fighting. Hooker's beaten Army of the Potomac was barely back across the Rappahannock and in its Falmouth camps when President Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck arrived to appraise the defeat. Conspirators within the army's officer corps wasted no time taking dead aim at Hooker. General Halleck, who had no use for Hooker to begin with, called the corps commanders into council and learned, according to the II Corps' Darius Couch, of "great dissatisfaction among the higher officers at the management of Chancellorsville." Henry W. Slocum, XII Corps, went among his fellow corps commanders proposing a coup—petition the president then and there to dismiss Hooker and put George Meade, commander of the V Corps, in his place.

It is not clear whether Slocum had a full co-conspirator in General Couch, or if Couch was plotting independently. In any event, both Slocum and Couch required Meade's acquiescence for their scheming to have any real weight. Meade, however, balked at the idea. As he explained to his wife, "I told both these gentlemen I would not join in any movement against Hooker. . . ." Without Meade's agreement to stand for Hooker's place, the ringleaders lacked the stomach to make their case to the president. Rather lamely, Couch, Slocum, and John Sedgwick, all corps commanders senior to Meade on the major generals' list, assured Meade they would be pleased to serve under him as army commander if that time should ever come.²



Above : General George G. Meade (*Library and Museum, Military Order of the Loyal Legion, Philadelphia*).

Opposite: General Joseph Hooker (*Library of Congress*).

Joe Hooker now proceeded to play right into the conspirators' hands. Hooker's primary problem as a general had always been his runaway tongue, and in the aftermath of Chancellorsville he talked his way into the bad graces of practically all his senior lieutenants. He began by dictating an ornate order congratulating the army for its achievements in the late battle. "If it has not accomplished all that was expected," he said, "the reasons are well known to the army." That left everyone scratching their heads in puzzlement. What in fact no one in the Army of the Potomac could understand was why they had failed to win at Chancellorsville, and especially why they had retreated back across the river when the struggle seemed in the balance. Hooker's explanation was not much help: "In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents."

Hooker might have left the matter there without much lasting damage—after all, he was hardly the first general in



George Meade was convinced that “these last operations have shaken the confidence of the army in Hooker’s judgment, particularly among the superior officers.”

this war to employ bombast to paper over a defeat—but he then let it be known just who was responsible for the failure to accomplish “all that was expected” at Chancellorsville. The general commanding was heard to lay blame squarely on three of the army’s eight corps commanders—on Oliver Otis Howard, for allowing his XI Corps to be routed by Stonewall Jackson’s surprise flank attack on May 2; on John Sedgwick, for mismanaging command of the army’s left wing during the battle; and on George Stoneman, head of the cavalry corps, for utterly failing to carry out his assignment to destroy Lee’s railroad supply line.

There was in fact considerable truth to these charges—Howard *was* negligent, Sedgwick sluggish, Stoneman incompetent—but at the moment that was not widely recognized or acknowledged by anyone but Hooker. In any case, this outspoken and public attack on three of their own only caused the officer corps to close ranks and the dissidents to stiffen their resolve. By leaks to the press, Hooker also sought to dilute his responsibility for the retreat, serving to further irritate his subordinates. “I see the papers attribute Hooker’s withdrawal to the weak councils of his corps commanders,” Meade angrily wrote his wife on May 10. “This is a base calumny.”³

The officer corps’ nearly unanimous verdict finding General Hooker the sole guilty party for Chancellorsville clearly stemmed in some measure from the general commanding’s ill-judged and intemperate finger-pointing. But it was also the generals’ convenient way of glossing over serious command fail-

ings within their own ranks. Nor did they recognize a major factor in the defeat—the severe concussion Hooker suffered when a Rebel cannon shot hit the Chancellor house and shattered a porch pillar against which he was leaning. He was rendered incapable of acting rationally throughout a pivotal day of the battle. Indeed, the more malicious among his officers attributed the general’s comatose condition that day to liquor.

George Meade, fairer-minded than most, was nevertheless convinced that “these last operations have shaken the confidence of the army in Hooker’s judgment, particularly among the superior officers.” War correspondent George Smalley, sent by the *New York Tribune* to Falmouth to investigate Hooker and the state of the army, confirmed Meade’s opinion. Correspondent Smalley, according to Captain Henry Abbott of the II Corps, “stated the other day at Gen. Couch’s table that he had asked the opinion of every corps commander in the army, & and with one exception, they all stated in the most unequivocal manner, that they had lost all confidence in Fighting Joe.” That one exception was the III Corps’ Daniel Sickles, a long-time ally of Hooker’s—now perhaps his only ally.⁴

Among the clutch of concerned visitors descending on the Falmouth camps in these days were three prominent senators, Benjamin Wade, Zachariah Chandler, and Henry Wilson. Wilson headed the Senate’s Committee on Military Affairs, and Wade and Chandler were leaders of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a body notorious among Potomac army generals for its partisan prying into military affairs. While the visit of Republicans Wade and Chandler was not official—the joint committee was then in recess—they put their investigative noses to the ground. What they came away with was what they had come to find: Their favorite Joe Hooker was not at fault for Chancellorsville; responsibility for the reverse lay with certain of his generals. This finding was soon leaked to the press, providing further evidence, in the minds of the dissenters, of the baneful political influence that overlay the Army of the Potomac.⁵

On May 13 General Hooker sent a planning paper to the president in Washington. After an extended and generally gloomy discussion of the state of his army, and the presumed state of General Lee’s, he announced, “I hope to be able to commence my movement to-morrow, but this must not be spoken of to any one.” Mr. Lincoln was no doubt taken aback by this off-handed declaration of renewed warfare, for he promptly telegraphed, “please come up and see me this evening.”

Hooker left no account of that evening’s meeting at the White House, but the letter Lincoln wrote him the next day suggests a for-the-record summary of their discussion. He had earlier “had an impression,” the president began, that a prompt resumption of the battle might catch the enemy “deranged in position” as a result of the Chancellorsville fighting. “That idea has now passed away. . . . It does not now appear probable to me that you can gain anything by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock.” Lincoln said he would be content simply to see the enemy kept at bay “and out of other mischief” while the Army of the Potomac was gotten in good order again. In recognizing that his general was acting more dutiful than enthusiastic about renewing the offensive, Lincoln had concluded not to push the matter. In closing his letter, the president revealed an important reason for the postponement: “I must tell you that I have some painful intimations that some

of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true. . . .⁶

This bombshell must have come as a surprise to General Hooker, but on reflection he could hardly express himself shocked at evidence of a generals' revolt within his own army. After all, it was not that long since he himself had done his best to undermine the previous general commanding. The other conspirators who plotted Ambrose Burnside's downfall back in January had operated apart from Hooker, and with the goal of seeing George McClellan returned to power. Instead they got Joe Hooker. The chief ringleaders of the Burnside coup had been banished from the army, but others had risen to take their place. Now that defeat at Chancellorsville left Hooker suddenly vulnerable, he became the target of discontented lieutenants.

Hooker soon enough discovered what was behind the president's warning that certain of his lieutenants "are not giving you their entire confidence." Governor Andrew G. Curtin of Pennsylvania, another of those who hurried to Falmouth to appraise the army's condition, had called on the two most prominent Pennsylvanians in the high command, corps commanders George Meade and John Reynolds. "In the familiarity of private conversation," Meade recalled, he spoke frankly to the governor of what he believed were Hooker's mistakes during the late battle. Reynolds apparently delivered a similar message. Curtin, who was something of an alarmist, rushed to the White House to report that both Meade and Reynolds "had lost all confidence" in army commander Hooker.⁷

Hooker picked this up from an acquaintance of Curtin's, and back in Falmouth on May 15 he summoned Meade for an explanation. It was a stormy session. Rumors of the attempted command coup on May 7 must have reached Hooker's ears—the story was already all over Washington—and no doubt he was in a testy mood. Meade tried to explain that what he said to Curtin was during the course of a private conversation, which the governor had no warrant to repeat. In any event, he said, every opinion he expressed he had previously expressed directly to Hooker, as Hooker well knew, during the course of the Chancellorsville fighting. Therefore the general commanding had no cause "to complain of my expressing my views to others."

If General Hooker, in Meade's phrase, "expressed himself satisfied" with that explanation, it was a resolution reached only after the most heated debate. According to Alexander S. Webb of the V Corps staff, Meade's volcanic temper got the best of him and he became so mad that he "damned Hooker very freely." At that Webb hastily left the tent so as not to become the witness required for court-martial charges. Eventually the two generals cooled off and parted without further fireworks, but permanent damage had been done. Afterward, relating the incident to a colleague, Meade was heard to say feelingly, "God help us all." Within a matter of days he was writing his wife, "I am sorry to tell you I am at open war with Hooker"—an admission by


the general who Fighting Joe Hooker had recently assured the president was his best corps commander.⁸

Shortly after this contretemps, *New York Tribune* correspondent Smalley approached Meade "to lay certain matters before him." During Smalley's round of visits to the various corps headquarters, the chief dissidents—almost certainly including at least Couch, Slocum, and Sedgwick—prevailed upon him as a civilian and a neutral to present their case to Meade. The correspondent, as he put it, was to "lay before him what my friends declared to be the wish of the army, or of a great part of the army." The moment the drift of the conversation became clear, Meade interrupted to say, "I don't know that I ought to listen to you." But Smalley said he was not there as a negotiator but simply to tell the general "what others thought." At that he was allowed to continue. "From beginning to end, General Meade listened with an impassive face . . .," Smalley reported. "He never asked a question. He never made a comment. When I had finished I had not the least notion what impression my narrative had made on him." But simply by agreeing to hear his visitor out, Meade revealed how strained his relationship with the general commanding had become.⁹



Above: Stonewall Jackson's men storm Union breastworks near Chancellorsville.

Hooker responded disingenuously to the president's letter of warning, saying he had no idea of the identity of his disaffected lieutenants, and certainly he did not want any of his officers to think he suspected them of disloyalty. He preferred, he said, to leave it up to the president to investigate the matter. Officers who applied to him for permission to go to Washington would be urged to call at the White House. As he later testified, "I desired the President himself to ascertain their feelings . . . and he could then learn their views for his own information." Joe Hooker was himself a veteran intriguer, yet he had never operated in the shadows. He saw no merit in conducting a witch-hunt among his lieutenants, as Burnside had vainly attempted in his last days of command. (Burnside's first



Darius Couch

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

candidate for dismissal had been Joe Hooker.) Hooker thought it best to force the disaffected into the open. Make them voice their opinions and take their stands in front of their commander-in-chief.

By Hooker's account, most of his corps commanders did indeed visit the capital over the next two weeks or so, although he claimed he never learned the results of any interviews with the president. But the message these generals delivered was clear enough. "No one whose opinion is worth anything has now any confidence in General Hooker," John Gibbon wrote on May 25, "and the President has been told so. . . ." Darius Couch was one of those White House visitors, and he told Lincoln he would serve no longer under Hooker and submitted his application for transfer. Couch was the most senior of the corps commanders, Hooker's second-in-command at Chancellorsville, and the president sounded him out about his availability to command the army should it come to that. Couch excused himself by claiming his health was too fragile for the responsibility, but he took the opportunity to push George Meade for the post.¹⁰

Other high command soundings, more indirect and informal, were taken by the administration. John Sedgwick, another of the senior major generals, was certainly discussed for the army command, as he was well aware. "I think I could have had it if I had said the word," Sedgwick later wrote his sister, "but nothing could induce me to take it." Winfield Scott Hancock, a well-thought-of division commander in the II Corps, was also given a look. He wrote his wife soon after Chancellorsville that he had been approached "in connection with the command of the Army of the Potomac." Like Sedgwick, however, Hancock thought there were too many strings tied to the position. "I do not belong to that class of generals whom the Republicans care to bolster up. I should be sacrificed," he declared.

January. A *Herald* correspondent, asking about Hooker's tenure, reported Lincoln's response that, having tried General McClellan "a number of times, he saw no reason why he should not try General Hooker twice." In any case, the president did not want to be perceived as so unimaginative that he had to continue changing generals after every battle.

It proved impossible to keep this high command turmoil under wraps, and every day seemed to generate a new rumor about Hooker's fate. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commanding the Washington defenses, was ever alert to the latest gossip about the high command. "All sorts of rumors of changes in the command of the Army of the Potomac, and who shall command it," he recorded in his diary on May 15. Two days later he heard the capital's newsboys giving voice to the latest unfounded rumor as they cried, "General Hooker removed!" On the 18th, Marsena Patrick, the army's provost marshal, observed in his diary that "Hooker stock, in Washington, is rather low at present."¹¹

At the core of Hooker's command problems, after Chancellorsville, was his lack of a constituency among his chief lieutenants. The only generals who owed their corps postings to Hooker were Dan Sickles of the III Corps, Otis Howard of the XI, and George Stoneman of the cavalry, and after publicly criticizing Howard and Stoneman for their Chancellorsville failings Hooker lost whatever good will they might have retained. The others had climbed the ladder of command under General McClellan. Couch of the II Corps and Slocum of the XII were the earliest avowed advocates of Meade for the army command. Sedgwick of the VI Corps, already leaning toward the Meade camp, took his place there after what was described as "a stormy scene" with Hooker over Sedgwick's role at Chancellorsville. John Reynolds of the I Corps was the least vocal on the various controversies, but in time he too would take his stand behind

Meade. And now Meade's professed neutrality toward Hooker was compromised by mutual antipathy. Of the eight, then, only Dan Sickles remained a loyal supporter of the general commanding.

Joe Hooker's inability to keep his mouth shut contributed greatly to the mess he was in. He might have ridden out the storm by quietly accepting responsibility for his defeat, but that was not his way, and it lost him respect as well as friends. At the same time, the intrigues hatched by his lieutenants, designed to unseat a superior officer, were in blatant violation of military order and indeed subject to court martial under the Articles of War. All in all, it was an ugly situation without precedent in a Northern army, posing the gravest threat not only to Hooker's ability to lead but to the very heart of the military command structure. Lincoln's warning to

his general—"This could be ruinous, if true"—proved to be only too true.¹²

It was in this poisoned atmosphere that word came of the Confederate army preparing to take the offensive. On May 25 Hooker was called to Washington for a council of war to discuss this new threat. The meeting did not go well. Hooker was frustrated in his efforts to obtain reinforcements from Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and General-in-Chief Halleck. For his part, the president received no assurances that Hooker had regained the confidence of his lieutenants. That disappoint-



Daniel Sickles



Henry W. Slocum.

To be sure, General Hooker was not entirely friendless during all this infighting. The *New York Herald* reported that Dan Sickles, the high-powered New York politico in command of the III Corps, "has been closeted for two hours today" with the president, who was no doubt treated to a recital of Joe Hooker's military virtues by the loyal Sickles. But in truth, Joe Hooker's best friend just then was Mr. Lincoln. The president genuinely liked the general and admired his fighting skills, and he appreciated how solidly Hooker had reconstructed morale in the Army of the Potomac since taking over its command in

ment, and word that the Rebel army was stirring, persuaded Mr. Lincoln that he must seriously consider making a command change before the next battle. Shortly thereafter, Major General John Reynolds was summoned to Washington and offered command of the Army of the Potomac.

Previously, when Lincoln had sounded out the most senior of Hooker's generals, Darius Couch, on the army command, he phrased it hypothetically; Couch excused himself, citing poor health. Indirect soundings, apparently through intermediaries, were then made to another of the senior generals, John Sedgwick, and to Winfield Hancock; neither expressed interest. One notch below Sedgwick on the seniority list was John Reynolds, and now that it was Reynolds' turn the president determined on a more direct approach. At the White House, on June 2, the commander-in-chief spoke straight out to Reynolds about heading the army.


The previous January, during the last generals' revolt, against Ambrose Burnside, John Reynolds had unburdened himself in a private letter about the critical problem he saw in the high command. "If we do not get some one soon who can command an army without consulting 'Stanton and Halleck' at Washington," he wrote, "I do not know what will become of this Army." That was still a widely held view within the army's old guard, and reflected General McClellan's corrosive legacy. Repeatedly, to any of his generals who would listen, McClellan had blamed all the troubles of his troubled regime on "interference" from Washington—on Secretary Stanton for putting radical Republican schemes ahead of what was best for the army, on General Halleck for forcing his foolish, outdated military notions on those who would lead on the battlefield. Everyone in Washington, said McClellan (he included the president and congressional investigators in his indictment), was guilty of selfishly playing politics with the Army of the Potomac.

Reynolds' response to the president was that (as he later phrased it) he "was unwilling to take Burnside's and Hooker's leavings." He wanted assurances that there would be no more interference from Washington in the running of the army. Whether he had thought it through or not, what John Reynolds was in fact insisting on, before he would take the command, was the suspension of the network of civilian control over the military. He was calling for an end to "interference" from the president, his commander-in-chief; from Secretary of War Stanton, the army's chief civilian overseer; even from General Halleck, his immediate superior officer. There is no record of the form Lincoln's reaction took, but obviously he did not—could not—accept such a bargain. In that case, said Reynolds, he could not accept the command.


During the conversation Reynolds seems to have spoken bluntly of Joe Hooker's shortcomings, and to have promoted General Meade (next on the seniority list) for head of the army. Yet there must have been something disturbing enough about Reynolds' expressed attitude toward the command that hardened Lincoln's own attitude on the subject. These various generals were all condemning Hooker as unfit, yet none of them

would step up to take his place. Rather than continuing this discouraging search through the seniority list, the president determined, at least for the time being, to stay with Joe Hooker. Reynolds quoted him as saying he "was not disposed to throw away a gun because it missed fire once; that he would pick the lock and try it again." The word was soon around the capital that the president had resolved to "re-try" General Hooker.¹³

Ten days later Reynolds would relate this episode to Meade, but only after recasting it. As he now told it, he learned from a Washington acquaintance that he was being considered for the army command, and had marched straight to the White House to tell the president he did not want it and would not take it. Such a pre-emptive performance would have required a good deal more gall than John Reynolds was known to possess. Clearly he told it this way to spare his friend Meade from being backed into a corner—from having to set parallel conditions for accepting the command—if (as Reynolds expected) it was offered him. Later, after there was no need for such subterfuge, Reynolds explained to his artillery chief, Colonel Charles Wainwright, that he had indeed been summoned to Washington and offered the army command, and refused it because he would have been under the same constraints as Burnside and Hooker. Reynolds confided much the same story to his aide Stephen Weld: that he had been called in and offered, and had refused, the army command.



John Sedgwick



South side view of the White House, reproduced from a daguerreotype.

Here then was the Army of the Potomac, awash in internal turmoil, by all reports on the eve of a new campaign, commanded by a general who nearly all his lieutenants regarded as unfit. And here was President Lincoln, deeply disturbed by this dissension in the officer corps, who could not seem to find a qualified general who actually wanted to lead that army. It was obvious to Lincoln that should he dismiss Joe Hooker now, he would have to order rather than ask another general to take his place. That was not a happy prospect. He had gone on record

as supporting Hooker; to dismiss him would be a further sign of dissension and weakness. The president could only wait and watch—and hope that General Lee gave him time enough to resolve the dilemma somehow.¹⁴

As it happened, the dilemma would be resolved from another direction. May turned to June, and a campaign of pursuit was opened against Lee's invading army. Simultaneously, Joe Hooker found himself at war against General-in-Chief Halleck. The stake in their behind-the-scenes battle was nothing less than Hooker's continued command of the Army of the Potomac.

Halleck and Hooker were enemies of long standing, dating back to their California days in the old army, and when Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac in January he insisted on a special arrangement with the president. Hooker expressed his opinion of the general-in-chief bluntly: neither the Army of the Potomac "nor its commander expected justice at his hands." Hooker's one stipulation in taking the command was that he not have to deal with Halleck, but only with

the president. This awkward arrangement had worked well enough (from Hooker's perspective) up through Chancellorsville. Now, however, Halleck sensed that confidence in Hooker's generalship had slackened enough that here was his opportunity to erase the special arrangement. His mistrust of Hooker ran deep, and he set as his goal, using whatever means came to hand, to maneuver Fighting Joe out of his place with the Army of the Potomac.

Three issues dominated the

Potomac army's relations with Washington in these critical mid-June days, and General Halleck left his mark on General Hooker in each of them.

The first issue was manpower. Since April the Potomac army had been steadily losing men by the thousands due to the expiration of two-year enlistments and nine-month call-ups. By July 1, unless reinforced, the Army of the Potomac would be down to 89,200 men of all arms. Henry Halleck was a master of bureaucratic subterfuge and paper-shuffling, talents he now displayed in frustrating Hooker's efforts to build up his army from other commands. In due course, there would be reinforcements for the Potomac army, but not all in time to be put to use, and none in time for Joe Hooker's benefit.

The second issue between general and general-in-chief was the question of unified command. At the first sign of a Confederate offensive, Hooker had spoken of "the necessity of having one commander for all of the troops whose operations can have an influence on those of Lee's army." Any march northward by the enemy was bound to affect Samuel Heintzelman's Department of Washington and Robert Schenck's Middle Department in addition to the Army of the Potomac, and a unified command, even if only temporary, had the force of logic. Halleck's reply sidestepped around the issue without touching it. Department heads would be directed "to forward military

information" to General Hooker, and any movement of their troops "you may suggest" would be ordered—"if deemed practical." General Halleck rarely deemed a Joe Hooker suggestion practical.

The third issue involved the exercise of command. "Your army is entirely free to operate as you desire against Lee's army, so long as you keep his main army from Washington," Halleck assured Hooker, but with each new report from Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley beleaguered by Lee's advance, Washington pressed Hooker to take immediate action. Mr. Lincoln noted that if the head of Lee's army was reported in Maryland and the tail of it west of Fredericksburg, "the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?" Halleck took that generality and made it into specifics. He urged that any Confederate raiding party be pursued, and he insisted that Hooker do something to save Harper's Ferry from capture. In short order Harper's Ferry became a bone of contention between the two men—and the issue Halleck was looking for to bring down Joe Hooker.¹⁵

Hooker grew petulant. All his plans for meeting the enemy threat had been rejected, he told a colleague, and he could detect little evidence of support from any direction. Henceforth he would only act on direct orders from Washington, taking no responsibility for the consequences. In one of his dispatches to Lincoln, he remarked, "I do not know that my opinion as to the duty of this army in the case is wanted." Whether intended or not, Fighting Joe began to radiate an impression of indecisiveness. Navy secretary Gideon Welles, after a talk with the president one evening, entered in his diary, "I came away from the War Department painfully impressed. After recent events, Hooker cannot have the confidence which is essential to the success, and which is all-important to the commander in the field." Still, Welles closed his entry by remarking that the president "has a personal liking for Hooker, and clings to him when others give way."

On June 16 General Hooker unburdened himself. "You have long been aware, Mr. President," he telegraphed, "that I have not enjoyed the confidence of the major-general commanding the army, and I can assure you so long as this continues we may look in vain for success, especially as future operations will require our relations be to more dependent upon each other than heretofore."

Joe Hooker was surely expecting too much if he thought this declaration would result in Halleck's dismissal as general-in-chief. What he apparently intended by it was to force a show-down, an acknowledgment by the president that their special arrangement for cutting General Halleck out of the Potomac army's decision-making process was still in force. Or perhaps Hooker was simply going on record, building a case in the event he needed to defend his tenure as general commanding. However that may be, he challenged his commander-in-chief—a challenge the president could not and did not ignore.¹⁶

Mr. Lincoln first sought to reason with his troubled general. He explained, in regard to General Halleck, "You do not lack his confidence in any degree to do you any harm," which may or may not have reassured General Hooker. The president then appealed for understanding at this critical time: "If you and he would use the same frankness to one another, and to me, that I use to both of you, there would be no difficulty. I need and must have the professional skill of both, and yet these



John Reynolds

suspicions tend to deprive me of both.” Finally, he spoke of what he saw as a rare opportunity: “As it looks to me, Lee’s now returning toward Harper’s Ferry gives you back the chance that I thought McClellan lost last fall. . . . Now, all I ask is that you will be in such mood that we can get into our action the best cordial judgment of yourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added. . . .”

Late that June 16 evening, after reading an exchange of less-than-enlightening telegrams between Halleck and Hooker over the defense of Harper’s Ferry, Lincoln determined to lay down the law. “To remove all misunderstanding,” he telegraphed Hooker, “I now place you in the strict military relation to Gen. Halleck, of a commander of one of the armies, to the General-in-Chief of all the armies. . . . I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them.”

Possibly the president’s letter of earlier in the day, delivered by hand, softened the blow somewhat, yet Fighting Joe Hooker could hardly doubt he had now lost his private war with the general-in-chief, and that his days as general commanding might well be numbered.¹⁷

Nevertheless Hooker went ahead to formulate a campaign plan to counter Lee’s movements. He told the president that if Lee chose to cross the Potomac “to make an invasion, . . . it is not in my power to prevent it.” He went on to explain: “If they are moving toward Maryland, I can better fight them there than make a running fight” in the Shenandoah or in the constricted areas of the Blue Ridge. In fact, although he did not choose to mention it to his superiors, Hooker was anxious for Lee to cross from Maryland into Pennsylvania.


Colonel George Sharpe, Hooker’s intelligence chief, said in a private letter that it was the current view at Hooker’s headquarters that if Lee headed toward Pennsylvania, “we propose to let him go, and when we get behind him we would like to know how many men he will take back.” Chief of Staff Dan Butterfield would recall a conversation about this time with Hooker on the same subject. The administration in Washington, Hooker said, was “finding great fault with me” for not preventing Lee from crossing the Potomac; “Why, I would lay the bridges for him” to ensure that he did cross. In that event, he went on, “if Lee escapes with his army the country are entitled to and should have my head for a football.”

However confident in his mind Joe Hooker may have been of his own course, he quite failed to convince Washington of that fact. Nor did he take his restless and discontented lieutenants into his confidence. Marsena Patrick, the army’s provost marshal, surely typified the majority view within the officer corps. General Hooker, Patrick entered in his diary on June 17, “acts like a man without a plan and is entirely at a loss what to do, or how to match the enemy, or counteract his movements. Whatever he does is the result of impulse. . . .” The general commanding, he summed up, was merely a Mr. Micawber, “‘waiting for something to turn up’ . . .”¹⁸


On June 23 Hooker made a hurried visit to Washington to discuss reinforcing his army. General-in-Chief Halleck was in Baltimore just then, forestalling any opportunity for the two men to sort out their differences, had they been so inclined. It appears that neither Hooker nor the president gained much

from their meeting that day. Lincoln appeared afterward at a Cabinet meeting, and Gideon Welles noted in his diary, “His countenance was sad and careworn, and impressed me painfully.” According to another Cabinet member, Montgomery Blair, the president remarked that he had dismissed McClellan the previous fall because he let Lee “get the better of him in the race to Richmond.” Now Lincoln seemed to have it in mind that if Hooker was beaten in the present race, he “would make short work of him.” The president’s confidence in his general was clearly waning.¹⁹

By June 26 both armies were across the Potomac. Halleck in due course released four brigades from the Department of Washington, but none would reach the Potomac army while Hooker commanded it. Increasingly the focus fell on the nagging issue of Harper’s Ferry. Hooker was now determined to gain the ten thousand-man garrison there for the manpower edge he felt he had to have. As he later put it, “with all the additions I could receive” the two armies would be essentially equal in strength. He might go on to win the coming battle, but to prevent his opponent from escaping afterward “required, in my judgment, a little superiority of one over the other.”



Edwin M. Stanton



Henry Halleck

Hooker developed a plan for using these Harper’s Ferry troops. On June 25 he ordered the garrison commander, William French, to prepare “to march at a moment’s notice.” Henry Slocum’s XII Corps would move up the Potomac, combine with French’s force, cut Lee’s communications by destroying his Potomac bridges, and finally take up a blocking position in the rear of the Rebel army. Should Lee turn back to strike at Slocum’s blocking force, John Reynolds, in command of the Potomac army’s left wing (I, III, and XI Corps) would be in position to launch a flank attack.

Orders went out to French and Slocum and Reynolds, yet Hooker told Washington nothing of his plan. This had to be deliberate. He had decided to challenge General Halleck over the question of exercising command as he believed the situation warranted; or, as he later put it, was the army “to be maneuvered from Washington.” His was a bold and aggressive plan, and certainly one easy enough to justify. Instead, on the evening of June 26, he telegraphed Halleck and asked simply, “Is there any reason Maryland Heights”—the main defensive position overlooking Harper’s Ferry—“should not be abandoned. . . .”

He said nothing of how he intended to use the garrison, only that he would go to Harper's Ferry the next day to inspect the place. He reminded Halleck that he "must have every available man to use on the field."²⁰

Halleck replied sharply on the morning of the 27th. Harper's Ferry had always been regarded as an important point; much labor and expense had been expended on the works there: "I cannot approve their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity."

Hooker promptly accelerated his challenge—and the stakes. He and the army's chief engineer, Gouverneur Warren, were at Harper's Ferry and had inspected the place and both realized what a liability it had now become. "I strongly urged the abandonment of Harper's Ferry," Warren recalled, "and this was so apparent to both of us that my views were only a confirmation of his." Hooker responded to Halleck that the garrison at Harper's Ferry was now "of no earthly account there." There was nothing worth defending; the enemy would never take possession of the fortifications. The troops should be marched to where they could be of service. "Now they are but a bait for the rebels should they return." He closed by asking that his tele-

quired him to cover Harper's Ferry, he began. "I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy."²¹

Halleck's reply was bland: "Your dispatch has been duly referred for Executive action." Mr. Lincoln seems to have conferred with no one except Halleck on the matter, and to have hesitated not at all in accepting Hooker's resignation. At a Cabinet meeting the next day, Gideon Welles recorded Lincoln's sparse comments on the matter: "The President said he had, for several days as the conflict became imminent, observed in Hooker the same failings that were witnessed in McClellan after the Battle of Antietam—a want of alacrity to obey and a greedy call for more troops which could not and ought not to be taken from other points." When Halleck opposed him on abandoning Harper's Ferry, "Hooker had taken umbrage at the refusal, or at all events had thought it best to give up the command." Lincoln did not mention the dearth of confidence in Hooker displayed by his lieutenants, but it surely weighed heavily in his decision.

Nor did Lincoln hesitate about naming a successor. The Potomac army's chief officers had left no doubt they wanted George Meade for the post, and in any event four other eligible generals had already turned it down. That evening General Orders No. 194 was drawn up, relieving General Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac and appointing General Meade in his place.²²

That night a special train sped James Hardie, of the army's adjutant-general's office, through Maryland to Frederick, and at 3 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, June 28, Hardie awakened General Meade at his V Corps headquarters outside town. "At first," Meade would tell his wife, "I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear. . . ." After reading the orders Hardie had brought, Meade stifled his misgivings and (he told

his wife) "as a soldier, I had nothing to do but accept and exert my utmost abilities to command success. This so help me God, I will do. . . ."

At daybreak Meade and Hardie rode to the camp of the general commanding. Hooker had learned of Hardie's arrival and surmised his mission, and was dressed in full uniform to meet them. He and Meade conferred in the headquarters tent for some time. In due course Meade, looking grave, emerged and found his son, an aide-de-camp, waiting for him. With "a familiar twinkle of the eye, denoting the anticipation of surprise at information to be imparted," he announced, "Well, George, I am in command of the Army of the Potomac."²³

Beyond any doubt, by his miscalculations and intemperate talk and his too-mistrustful attitude toward his lieutenants, Joe Hooker alienated his fellow generals and helped to precipitate his own downfall. Yet at the same time, these fellow generals were plotting within a climate of military disloyalty they themselves had created, beginning in the Burnside regime and reaching fruition in the Hooker regime. The disreputable generals' revolt critically wounded Hooker in the eyes of Mr. Lin-



William French



Winfield Scott Hancock

gram "may be presented to the Secretary of War and His Excellency the President" for a decision.

With the telegraph battle thus joined, Hooker proceeded with his plan. He ordered the cavalry to push northward into Pennsylvania to the town of Gettysburg, his predicted point of possible collision, "to see what they can of the movements of the enemy." Hooker then handed march instructions for the Harper's Ferry garrison to General French. Because this superseded his standing orders, French telegraphed the general-in-chief for confirmation. Halleck had not yet received Hooker's morning telegram calling for the case to be laid before Lincoln and Stanton, and his response fully displayed his contempt for the Potomac army's commander. "Pay no attention to General Hooker's orders," he told French.

This was not only an insult but a calculated one, for Halleck well knew that French would have to show this countermanding order to Hooker. As Halleck hoped, Joe Hooker—perhaps impulsively—treated it as the last straw. Without waiting for Washington to respond to his earlier dispatch, Hooker dashed off a brief telegram to the general-in-chief. His instructions re-

coln. Henry Halleck then provided the excuse to push Fighting Joe over the edge. Afterward Halleck preened himself on his job well done; his chief of staff boasted of his part in the general-in-chief's manipulations: "I did my share in getting rid of Hooker. . . ." Had Hooker remained in command, Halleck assured U.S. Grant, "he would have lost the army and the capital." Nothing in Joe Hooker's fighting record with the Army of the Potomac, not even his Chancellorsville defeat, justified such a judgment.²⁴

On balance, however, the change of command would serve the Army of Potomac triumphantly in the coming battle. The dissonant generals, having proclaimed Meade their choice of leader, and having gained their point with no small measure of conniving, now had no choice but to support him with complete fealty in the fast-developing crisis. General Meade himself rose to the challenge, of course, and the three days of Gettysburg would restore the shine to the badly tarnished Army of the Potomac. □

STEPHEN W. SEARS' most recent books are *Chancellorsville and Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac*. This article is adapted from his forthcoming study of the Gettysburg Campaign.

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
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PROLOGUE

WRITING YEARS LATER, Edward Porter Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, called the Battle of Wauhatchie "one of the most foolhardy adventures of the war." This strange and confused battle was fought on the night of Thursday, October 28, near an obscure rail junction in Lookout Valley, Tennessee. The only significant engagement fought in the area between the battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, it was one in a series of events that culminated in the Union's uncontested control of the vital Chattanooga area. To understand why this battle came about, and the manner in which it was fought, it is necessary to understand the events of the summer of 1863 and how they influenced command decisions, particularly in the Confederate Army of Tennessee.¹

After the Battle of Murfreesboro, fought on December 31, 1862, and January 2, 1863, General Braxton Bragg withdrew the Army of Tennessee to the vicinity of Tullahoma, Tennessee. The Federal Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Major General William Starke Rosecrans, remained in the vicinity of Murfreesboro. So positioned, lower middle Tennessee, containing the rich "breadbasket" of the Duck and Elk River Valleys, was still controlled by the Confederacy.

Tullahoma lay astride the Nashville and Chattanooga rail line on a point roughly equidistant between Nashville, which the Federals held, and Chattanooga, which would be their objective in the upcoming campaign. Situated on the Tennessee River in the great valley between Walden's Ridge and the Appalachian Mountains, the city of twenty-five hundred residents was a critical rail junction: from Knoxville ran the line of the East Tennessee and Georgia, which was the continuation of the line that ran to Richmond, Virginia; the Western & Atlantic line connected Chattanooga with Atlanta; the Memphis and Charleston Railroad joined the line of the Nashville & Chattanooga at Stevenson, Alabama, and ran north to Chattanooga. Three miles southwest of Chattanooga,

In the painting above by William Travis, Federal troops under General Geary (rear right) fight off a Confederate attack.



POINT BLANK

the Nashville & Chattanooga was joined by a small spur line, the Wills Valley or Trenton Railroad. This spur line joined the main road at a junction named Wauhatchie.²

By 1863, the Confederacy's production of iron, gunpowder, small arms and artillery was chiefly centered in this region. Along with Tredegar in Richmond, the South's war machine relied upon the industrial complex in Georgia and Alabama. Additionally, east of Cleveland, Tennessee (twenty-five miles east-northeast by rail from Chattanooga), at the head of the Oconee River gorge, rich deposits of copper were discovered in the 1840s at Ducktown. Ninety percent of the Confederacy's raw copper was mined in this area. This metal was essential for the production of percussion caps and the casting of bronze field artillery. Chat-

ta- nooga had become the bastion that protected the South's resources west of the Appalachians.

Rosecrans resisted pressure from the Lincoln administration to launch an offensive until he felt his army was ready, but after numerous, acrimonious exchanges with the War Department, he finally did so on June 24, 1863. In a well planned and executed campaign, which lasted a little over a week, Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg out of the Shelbyville-Wartrace-Tullahoma area. This represented phase one of the movement to take Chattanooga. Heavy and prolonged rain, however, slowed the Federal movement enough to allow Bragg to withdraw without serious material loss. Although the loss of the Duck and Elk River Valleys was a serious blow to the Confederacy, Rosecrans' failure to bring Bragg's army



BUSINESS

James R.
Furqueron

to battle gravely disappointed the Lincoln administration. Coming as it did, simultaneously with Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Rosecrans' accomplishment at Tullahoma was overshadowed. He again exchanged bitter correspondence with Washington as he fended off criticisms and prepared for the second phase of his campaign.

In the meantime, Bragg had retreated and concentrated his army in and around Chattanooga. The Federal Army of the Cumberland lay close by, behind the Cumberland Mountains in the vicinity of Winchester, Tennessee. Another six weeks passed before Rosecrans felt his army was ready to resume the offensive. Rosecrans and the War Department continued to exchange terse correspondence. On July 24 General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wired Rosecrans that "The pa-

tience of the authorities here has been completely exhausted...." Rosecrans, however, doggedly defended his "supposed inactivity," summarizing his position in an unofficial letter to President Lincoln in which he cited, among other things, the logistical problems he faced, geographical obstacles, and the need for more cavalry. Finally, on August 16, Rosecrans began to move the bulk of his army against Bragg, sending a force to make a demonstration upriver from Chattanooga while he moved the bulk of his army downriver and crossed there.³

The feint upriver worked well, fixing Bragg's attention on that area. In fact Bragg expected Rosecrans to make his main effort upriver from Chattanooga and positioned Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry there. The job of picketing downriver was assigned to

Major General Joseph Wheeler's cavalry, and he had sent most of his mounted force back to Rome, Georgia, and Alexandria, Alabama, to refit. This left one regiment to guard fifty miles of river from Bridgeport to Stevenson, Alabama. Rosecrans' main force, two infantry corps and the cavalry, crossed the Tennessee downriver, undetected by the inadequate Confederate cavalry screen; Bragg learned of the crossing from a civilian from Stevenson.

Having crossed the river, Rosecrans advanced on a broad front southeast toward the Western and Atlantic Railroad, which was Bragg's supply line to Atlanta. The Davis administration authorized reinforcements for Bragg from General Joseph Johnston's army in Mississippi, and from Major General Simon B. Buckner's force in Knoxville. As Rosecrans moved, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside marched his smaller Army of the Ohio from its camps in Kentucky toward Knoxville.

It was not until Burnside captured Knoxville on September 3 that the Davis administration gave its full attention to Tennessee. After the fall of Knoxville, Davis authorized an additional reinforcement of Bragg's army from General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia—Hood's and McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's First Corps. Bragg evacuated Chattanooga on September 8 and that day Longstreet's men began their trek to reinforce the Army of Tennessee. Bragg attempted to strike against Rosecrans' attenuated line on September 10, but this failed, due to the deteriorating state of the Confederate high command. Rosecrans, alerted to the danger, concentrated his army along the west Chickamauga Creek. The Confederates, reinforced by three of Longstreet's brigades, attacked throughout the 19th without making significant headway, though both sides suffered heavy casualties. At sunset, the Federals still held the Lafayette Road, which was their lifeline to Chattanooga. Longstreet arrived that evening with two more of his brigades, and Bragg placed him in command of the left wing of the army. The attack was to resume at dawn.

In the ensuing battle, a gap was mistakenly opened in the Federal line just as Longstreet sent forward his main assault column. The attack struck the gap and shattered the Federal line. Elements of the Federal right managed to rally and pre-

vent a complete rout, and the Army of the Cumberland withdrew from the battlefield during the gathering darkness. The Federals deployed a line centered on Rossville Gap, and then withdrew into Chattanooga after dark on September 21.

Upon learning of the defeat at Chickamauga, the fear of losing Chattanooga was paramount in the minds of President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. Charles Anderson Dana, assistant secretary of war, was assigned to the Army of the Cumberland in early September, charged with reporting directly to Stanton. It was he who sent the first report of the Federal disaster at Chickamauga: "My report to-day is of deplorable importance. Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run." This and subsequent dispatches did much to undermine the administration's confidence in Rosecrans.

THE SIEGE

At 9:00 a.m. on Monday, September 21, Rosecrans telegraphed the president that "We have no certainty of holding our position here." This was of grave concern to Lincoln, who understood the importance of Chattanooga. Later that day, the president wrote Halleck: "I think it very important for General Rosecrans to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, because if held from that place to Cleveland...it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and also breaks one of his most important railroad lines. To prevent these consequences is so vital to his cause that he cannot give up the effort to dislodge us from the position, thus bringing him to us, and saving us the labor, expense, and hazard of going farther to find him and also giving us the advantage of choosing our own ground...." The president concluded with a vintage Lincolnism: "If he [Rosecrans] can only maintain this position...the rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals." The whole matter really turned on the administration's confidence in Rosecrans. Lincoln later commented to his secretary, John Hay, that since Chickamauga Rosecrans had acted "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head." Actually, Rosecrans recovered his composure very quickly, but the perception of a confused and stunned general persisted in some circles. In fact, on September 27 Dana had wired Stanton,



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General Braxton Bragg (left) and Major General William Starke Rosecrans.



HARPER'S WEEKLY

Federal troops assault Smith's Hill.


"If it be decided to change the chief commander also, I would take the liberty of suggesting some Western general of high rank and great prestige, like Grant, for instance...." For the time being, however, the president would sustain "Old Rosey."⁴

The immediate need was to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland, and on September 24 orders went out for the XI and XII Corps of the Army of the Potomac to proceed to Chattanooga. The transfer involved four divisions of infantry: the Second and Third Divisions of the XI Corps (the First Division had been sent to North Carolina) and the First and Second Divisions of the XII. This force of some 14,000 officers and men was placed under the overall command of Major General Joseph Hooker.

For some of the soldiers of the XI and XII Corps, the departure from Virginia and the journey to Tennessee was a vacation. The regimental historian of the 111th Pennsylvania documented the feeling: "'This flank movement suits me,' said one man, as he ate his way through a huge pie; 'livin' on the top shelf like a nabob, and divil a step to walk. Why didn't old Joe think of it before?' 'From this day forward,' chuckled another, as he lighted his pipe, 'I do my marchin' on wheels and my fightin' by proxy.' 'Goodbye to yez, Misther Lee,' shouted another, as the train pulled out and he waved his hand in the supposed direction of General Lee's headquarters. 'Tell Misther Ewell to mind Culp's Hill, and kape away from Pennsylvania. The gran' campaign is movin'.



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MUSEUM OF THE CONFEDERACY



Left to right: Lieutenant General Daniel H. Hill, Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk, and Major General Thomas C. Hindman.

South.” From Bealton, Virginia, the men rode the rails through Washington and Baltimore, up through Grafton, then through Columbus, Ohio, to Indianapolis, south through Louisville and Nashville, finally ending the journey at Bridgeport, Alabama. The grand campaign was indeed moving south.⁵

Among the troops bound for Tennessee were men of Brigadier General John White Geary’s “White Star” division—so-called because of its badge, a five pointed white star. Private David Monat, Company G, 29th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, noted the reaction of the provost guards to the badges worn by the men: “Where did all the Brigadier Generals come from,” they growled. While the men of the XI and XII Corps made their way southward, the Federal troops in Chattanooga hung on. Having made the decision to reinforce Rosecrans, the abiding question remained: could Rosecrans hold Chattanooga until help arrived?⁶

Whether or not the Confederates could have taken Chattanooga with an all out push on September 21 is a point still debated today. Bragg’s army had suffered twenty-five percent casualties at Chickamauga, and the percentage of losses in line officers and NCOs was greater still. Reinforced by the remainder of McLaws’ division and Jenkins’ brigade of Hood’s division, he had approximately a 10,000-man advantage on the 21st, but initiated only a very cautious pursuit. In addition to his casualties, Bragg’s army was hampered by a critical shortage of transportation. Slowly he moved his army into position on Lookout Mountain and across the valley in front of Missionary Ridge. His plan was to force the Federals to retreat by blocking all of their available supply routes save

the long and tortuous road from Chattanooga over Walden’s Ridge, which could be interdicted by cavalry.

CONFEDERATE COMMAND

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, General Bragg had a higher immediate priority than the recapture of Chattanooga. Bragg instead concentrated on finding scapegoats for the failures prior to and at Chickamauga, as well purging the army of dissidents. His immediate targets were Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk, Major General Thomas C. Hindman, and Lieutenant General D.H. Hill. Bragg blamed Hindman for the failure to destroy an isolated part of the Federal army at McLemore’s Cove on September 10, and Polk and Hill for the failure to attack at sunrise on September 20. In Polk’s case, Bragg simply used the incident as a convenient excuse to move against an old enemy, suspending him on September 29. Not to be outdone, Bragg’s senior subordinates started a campaign for his removal. Although their dissatisfaction with Bragg was of long-standing, the movement now had as one of its leaders a man of immense prestige: the army’s senior lieutenant general, James Longstreet. All of this boded ill for the Army of Tennessee.

The central figure in the controversy, Braxton Bragg, was forty-six years old at this time. Appointed a full general to rank from April 6, 1862, Bragg was faultfinding, acerbic, generally tactless, and in poor health. One officer noted that Bragg “possessed the faculty of alienating every able man with whom he came in contact.” Various descriptions of Bragg have given us a man who “suffered for years from a collection of ailments ranging from dyspepsia to severe migraine headaches.” These had colored his

personality, and “he had dullness and sourness which often made him quarrelsome.” Although Bragg’s unpopularity with the rank and file has been exaggerated, his poor relations with his senior commanders and their distrust of him was a fact. Therein lay the major problem of the army.⁷

James Longstreet’s problems with Bragg started on the afternoon of the second day’s fight at Chickamauga. That Sunday, while the troops of his command pressed the retreating Federals, Bragg dismissed Longstreet’s request to shift troops from Polk’s wing to reinforce Longstreet’s successful left. Bragg, still angry with Polk for not attacking at sunrise, told him the right wing had no fight in it. After instructing Longstreet to communicate with him back at his headquarters, he rode to the rear. Longstreet later wrote, “From accounts of his former operations I was prepared for halting work, but this, when the battle was at its tide and in partial success, was a little surprising.” Surprise soon turned to a lack of respect on Longstreet’s part, a feeling eventually reciprocated by Bragg.⁸

Old Pete found a willing ally in Leonidas Polk, the army’s second ranking lieutenant general. Polk, who considered Bragg “an imbecile,” arranged a meeting with Longstreet, Hill, and Buckner, so that they might discuss ways to bring about Bragg’s removal. Following this meeting on September 26, Longstreet wrote to James Seddon, Confederate secretary of war: “To express my convictions in a few words, our chief has done but one thing that he ought to have done since I joined this army,—that was to order the attack upon the 20th. All other things that he has done he ought not to have done. I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander. Now to our wants. Can’t you send us General Lee?...You will be surprised to learn that this army has neither organization nor mobility, and I have doubts if its commander can give it to them.” Polk reiterated these sentiments in a letter to Lee the following day: “General Longstreet informs me he has written you on the subject on coming to our help in the West. Allow me to unite with him in an earnest appeal to you to give us the benefit of your skill and judgement and experience at this most important crisis.” On September 29, Polk was sus-


pended by Bragg and departed for Atlanta. That day, Brigadier William W. Mackall, Bragg's chief of staff, wrote to his wife about the problems of the army. Mackall thought that General Joseph E. Johnston should be placed in command, but he anticipated Jefferson Davis' reaction to this critical situation: "With an empire at stake and the happiness of the whole people, he will indulge like a spoiled child his prejudices."⁹

The day before, Bragg had sent an order to Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest, requiring him to turn over just about his entire command to Joe Wheeler, a man for whom Forrest had little use. Forrest learned on October 5 that he had been placed under Wheeler's command. On or about October 7, Forrest stormed into Bragg's headquarters and told him, among other things, "I have stood your meanness as long as I intend to. You have played the part of a damned scoundrel, and are a coward, and if you were any part of a man I would slap your jaws and force you to resent it. You may as well not issue any more orders to me, for I will not obey them.... You have threatened to arrest me for not obeying your orders promptly. I dare you to do it, and I say to you that if you ever again try to interfere with me or cross my path it will be at the peril of your life." Shortly thereafter, Forrest requested a transfer, which was approved by Bragg and then Davis. Thus the Army of Tennessee lost the services of one of the war's most effective cavalry generals.¹⁰

Disturbed by the suspensions of Polk and Hindman, Davis dispatched an aide, Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., to investigate the situation. On October 3 the Colonel stopped in Atlanta, where he conferred with Polk, then proceeded to the Army of Tennessee, where he talked with Longstreet. What Chesnut heard disturbed him, and he wired Davis on October 5, "Your immediate presence in this army is urgently demanded." Davis left promptly, and by October 8 was in Atlanta, where he visited with Polk. Polk refused to consider ever serving again under Bragg, whom he proclaimed to be "a weakling, an imbecile, and feeble-minded." On October 4 the remaining corps commanders of the Army of Tennessee—Longstreet, Hill, and Buckner—had met secretly to discuss the best way to remove Bragg. One result of this meeting was the drafting of a petition to



MUSEUM OF THE CONFEDERACY



MUSEUM OF THE CONFEDERACY

Colonel James Chesnut, Jr. (left) and Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest.


Jefferson Davis asking for the army commander's removal. They were careful not to criticize Bragg's military capacity, but made the point that "the condition off his health unfits him for the command of an army in the field." Buckner was probably the author of the document, which twelve general officers signed.¹¹

After leaving Atlanta Davis travelled to the troubled army, accompanied by, among others, Brigadier General George Washington Custis Lee, the eldest son of Robert E. Lee and an advisor to the president. Davis arrived on Friday evening, October 9. General Mackall made some very pointed and instructive observations about the men upon whom the life of the Confederacy would turn at this critical point, and wrote to his wife: "I heard yesterday that Longstreet had signed the petition for the removal of Bragg, and if he has not, at all events he is talking about him in a way to destroy all his usefulness.... I am satisfied that Bragg cannot usefully command this army and that I can do no good, for if Mr. D. sustains him, he will be too elated to listen to reason. I do not know a single contented general in this army; a very sad fact in the presence of the enemy."¹²

When he arrived, Davis called for a meeting of the corps commanders at Bragg's headquarters. After a discussion of military options, Davis asked for opinions. It was at this point that James Longstreet spoke up and suggested that Bragg be removed. This was seconded by the other generals. Davis had probably anticipated this sort of expression, and his response was characteristic and immediate. He not only sustained Bragg, but

made a public show of his support. Mackall reported: "In his speech this evening, the President told the audience that he had ridden over the battlefield [Chickamauga] and that the General who could drive a foe from such a field, the hardest he had ever seen, was worthy of all confidence, and the shafts of malice had been hurled harmlessly against him." Of Davis, Mackall wrote: "Poor man, he is an enigma to himself." And in a letter to Joe Johnston on October 13: "He [Davis] has decided to retain Bragg, though he must have been fully satisfied of his unpopularity and the decided opposition of the mass of his generals. I think Longstreet has done more injury to the general than all the others put together. You may understand how much influence with his troops a remark from a man of his standing would have to the effect that B. was not on the field and Lee would have been." Davis supported Bragg, and labelled his critics as "wholly wrong," but this did little to correct the problem.¹³

Bragg did as Mackall predicted: having been sustained by the president, he moved against the generals who had opposed him. Brigadier General St. John Liddell recollected a meeting with Bragg shortly after Davis' visit: "There being discontents, I saw, would ruin the best general in the world. What arbitrary authority was there to stop them? I at once sought the opportunity to see Bragg and talk with him upon the propriety of making friends and quieting this dissatisfaction among his general officers. But to my distress, *his* mettle was also up and beyond the control of dispassionate reason. He said with emphasis, 'General, I want



Left to right: Major General Joseph Wheeler, Brigadier General William W. Mackall, and Colonel Edward P. Alexander.

to get rid of all such generals.” Polk and Hindman had previously been relieved; now Bragg also relieved Daniel Harvey Hill. Buckner was relieved from his independent departmental command and reassigned as a division commander.¹⁴

This sort of high level friction did not escape the attention of the Confederate Congress. On October 24 Senator Gustavus Adolphus Henry of Tennessee wrote to Secretary of War Seddon: “General Bragg, it seems, is on very bad terms with his officers. No matter whose fault it is, such a total want of harmony between a commander and his officers must lead to disaster.” Senator Henry’s observation was indeed prophetic. Some sort of action by the Confederates was in order, but as one of James Longstreet’s biographers so aptly wrote: “A consequence of this feuding was the paralysis of the army’s high command.” Bragg could neither suspend nor relieve Longstreet as he had Polk and Hill, because of Old Pete’s prestige and political connections. The increasingly strained relations between the two, however, held grave consequences for the life of the Confederacy.¹⁵

UNION COMMAND

Meanwhile, the Lincoln administration’s full attention was on Chattanooga. Reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac were en route, but the prospects for the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga looked bleak. Bragg had positioned his army so as to close off the Tennessee River and the wagon road paralleling it, as well as the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. Supplies had to be brought by wagons from Bridgeport, Alabama, over poor roads through the

Sequatchie Valley, then over rugged Walden’s Ridge down into Chattanooga. The distance by road was sixty miles. On October 1 Bragg sent his cavalry under Wheeler on a raid against Rosecrans’ line of communications. Although Wheeler’s men intercepted a large train in the Sequatchie Valley and destroyed approximately five hundred wagons and one thousand mules, this did not close the route. It did, however, scare the Federal high command badly enough to cause them to order a division of XII Corps to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. The raid also caused an immediate supply problem in Chattanooga, where Rosecrans reduced rations to two thirds. By the middle of October, the Federal troops were down to half rations, with some getting no more than a quarter. An Illinois artilleryman wrote in his diary on October 20, “No hard bread for 12 hours, and scant prospects ahead.” Sergeant Isaac Doan of the 40th Ohio wrote, “This was starvation camp.... We soon cleaned the cornfield down to the last sprouted nubbin on the ground.” Additionally, the supply of forage for the horses was so limited that many perished or became unfit for work. Eventually, all the surviving horses, except one hundred for the artillery in each division, were sent to Stevenson, Alabama, in order to keep them alive. The army was all but immobilized, though still a viable force.¹⁶

Ironically, the so-called “siege” was as hard on the Confederates overlooking Chattanooga as on the hungry Yankees down below. Heavy rains and poor work by Bragg’s staff made issuance of rations sporadic. Lieutenant Richard Lewis of the 1st South Carolina wrote to his mother

on October 15, “We have never experienced such a crisis in the way of rations since our trip to Yorktown, it being now three days since the men have had a full issue of rations. It is the first time I have ever seen them come down to eating roasted acorns, cracking them on yesterday like hogs.... The consequence of all this starvation is from the incessant rains...causing all the water courses to become so much swollen as to become impassable....” As with the Federals, the scarcity of forage took a toll on the horses and mules of the Army of Tennessee. On October 25, Longstreet sent a note to Colonel George W. Brent, assistant adjutant general on Bragg’s staff, which stated, “Our animals are starving. I presume that commanding Gen’l is not aware of our distress in this respect. Col. Alexander reports that his horses have been eating forest trees....”¹⁷

It was the Federals who finally took the initiative to break the impasse. Plans for lifting the siege were discussed by Rosecrans and Brigadier General William “Baldy” Smith, who had taken over duties as the Federal army’s chief engineer on October 3. Smith developed the plan that was finally adopted. On a reconnaissance ride to the Williams’ Island area, Smith took notice of Brown’s Ferry, and particularly the “sharp range of hills” on the opposite (Confederate controlled) shore. There was a gap in the hills through which a road ran from the ferry back south through Lookout Valley. Smith observed, “The valley between this ridge of hills and Raccoon Mountain was narrow, and a lodgement effected there would give us command of the Kelley’s Ferry road, and seriously interrupt the



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Left to right: Charles A. Dana, Brigadier General James A. Garfield, and Brigadier General William "Baldy" Smith.

communications of the enemy up Look-out Valley and down to the river." Occupying Brown's Ferry and clearing the Confederates downriver at the base of Raccoon Mountain would open Haley's Trace, a more direct wagon road that had been shut down by Confederate sharpshooters. Smith's plan called for fifteen hundred men in fifty boats to drift down the river at night and seize the heights. Reinforcements would be brought over using the same boats, after the high ground had been secured.¹⁸

Smith's reconnaissance of the Williams' Island area had been ordered by Rosecrans, "with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing." The commanding general accompanied Smith for part of the ride and returned to his headquarters later that day, the 19th. Unfortunately for Rosecrans, his action had come too late. When he arrived, he found a telegram from Washington D.C. on his table: it was General Orders No. 337, relieving him from command and assigning General Thomas in his place.¹⁹

This order resulted from the erosion of the administration's confidence in Rosecrans, and Washington's recognition of the need for a unified command in the West. Stanton had been urging the president to remove Rosecrans for some time, but Lincoln had resisted. But two pieces of correspondence, one from Dana, the other from James A. Garfield, changed the president's mind. The letter from Garfield, who had served as Rosecrans' chief of staff prior to his election to Congress, written to Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase on July 27, 1863, was most damaging. In it Garfield wrote of


Rosecrans' delays before the Tullahoma Campaign. He ended, "If this inaction continues long, I shall ask to be relieved and sent somewhere where I can be part of a working army." Chase showed the letter to Lincoln on October 16.

At noon on that same day, Dana wired Stanton what proved to be the deciding factor. He sent a long missive, the operative part of which read, "Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight...except the opening of the river." He continued, "In the midst of all these difficulties General Rosecrans seems to be insensible to the impending danger, and dawdles with trifles in a manner which can scarcely be imagined.... Meanwhile, with plenty of zealous and energetic officers ready to do whatever can be done, all this precious time is lost because our dazed and mazy commander cannot perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us...." This was unfair to William S. Rosecrans, but time had run out for Old Rosey.²⁰

Ulysses S. Grant, the victor of the Vicksburg Campaign, had previously been ordered to Cairo, Illinois, by Stanton, and received there on October 17 a telegraph from Halleck directing him to proceed to Louisville, Kentucky, with "your staff, &c., for immediate operations in the field. Wait at Louisville for an officer of the War Department." Grant later wrote that "no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg...." He travelled via Indianapolis, and as his train was leaving, a messenger came running up and stopped the train. The "officer of the War Department" had arrived by special train: it was Stanton.²¹

The secretary of war, who had never before met Grant, boarded the general's train and immediately rushed up to a staff surgeon. He shook the man's hand and said, "How do you do, General Grant? I recognize you from your pictures." After this was cleared up and Stanton had been introduced to the real Grant, the two men travelled together to Louisville. En route, Stanton showed Grant two sets of orders, identical except for one thing: one authorized Grant to retain Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland, the second authorized him to replace Rosecrans with Thomas. Grant promptly chose the latter. Of greater importance, the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were consolidated into the Military Division of the Mississippi, and placed under Grant's command.

The creation of the new Military Division meant that all Federal armies from the Mississippi River to the Alleghenies were now under the direction of one proven, experienced commander. Also contained with the president's orders were instructions from Halleck for Grant to "immediately proceed to Chattanooga...." Just before Grant arrived, Thomas had taken steps of his own, ordering Joe Hooker to concentrate his force at Stevenson, less one division of the XII Corps, and move on the south side of the river. Grant arrived in Chattanooga on the evening of October 23 and met with Thomas and other senior commanders. Captain Horace Porter, chief of ordnance of the Army of the Cumberland, later wrote of the new commander: "General Grant sat for some time as immovable as a rock and as si-



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GENERALS IN GRAY

Brigadier General Evander McIvor Law (left) and Brigadier General St. John Liddell.

lent as the sphinx but listened attentively to all that was said. After a while, he straightened himself up in his chair...and in a tone of voice which manifested a deep interest in the discussion, he began to fire whole volleys of questions at the officers present.... His questions showed from the outset that his mind was dwelling not only upon the prompt opening of a line of supplies, but upon taking the offensive against the enemy." Grant surveyed the terrain the next day and approved Smith's plan for seizing Brown's Ferry.²²

BROWN'S FERRY

The defense of Brown's Ferry and Lookout Valley was the responsibility of James Longstreet, a friend of Grant's from their West Point days and a cousin of his wife Julia. Isolated, frustrated, and depressed, Longstreet detested his association with an army commanded by Braxton Bragg. He did not believe that the Federals would make any move into Lookout Valley, but was convinced that any enemy force advancing from the direction of Bridgeport and Stevenson would move onto Lookout Mountain from the south and attack his rear. On October 9 Bragg ordered him to move troops into position along the river to close Haley's Trace as a supply route. Longstreet wrote in his after-action report that he "thought it best to send a brigade...." This was a misrepresentation. He, in fact, sent only two regiments of Brigadier General Evander M. Law's Alabama brigade to the area. Law believed, however, "that an effort would be made to reopen communication in this direction," and wrote to Longstreet "that a division would be required to render the

position safe...." Law conceded "the inconvenience of sparing so large a force from the lines in front of Chattanooga," and asked that his remaining three regiments be sent to him.²³

Longstreet acceded and sent the three regiments. Law later wrote, "With this disposition I felt that my position was secure and that no attempt of the enemy to throw a force across the river could be successful." Law was satisfied that his position was secure and obtained a leave of absence to visit his friend, Major General John B. Hood, in Rome, Georgia. Hood was recovering from the amputation of his right leg, the result of a wound received at Chickamauga. Longstreet, however, did not believe that the Federals would make their main effort in Lookout Valley. On the 26th he wrote to Colonel George W. Brent, assistant adjutant general on Bragg's staff, "I have no doubt but the enemy will cross below and move against our rear." Again, on the 27th, Longstreet thought that the Federals would try to seize Johnson's Crock, a pass leading onto Lookout Mountain, some eighteen miles south of Longstreet's position.²⁴

When Law returned on the night of October 26 he found that "three of my regiments had been withdrawn from the brigade—beyond Lookout...." This move was ordered by Brigadier General Micah Jenkins, temporarily commanding Hood's division, and approved by Longstreet. Law reflected: "The withdrawal of these troops without 'rhyme or reason' for there was no earthly necessity for them on the east side of Lookout... opened an easy way for the enemy to throw a force across the river into Lookout Valley...."²⁵

The following morning, before sunrise, an amphibious expedition of thirteen hundred men in fifty boats, under the command of Brigadier General William B. Hazen, floated silently downriver and occupied Brown's Ferry. The two regiments of Law's brigade that were in the vicinity—the 4th and 15th Alabama—made a gallant fight, but had to withdraw. Liddell wrote shortly after the war, "Feeling restless and disturbed one night, I was very wakeful. About the middle of the night...I heard heavy volleys of musketry in the Moccasin Bend, near the foot of Lookout Point. My camp was on the top of Mission Ridge.... Listening attentively, I knew a contest for some object was going on, and my apprehensions led to the quick conclusion that it was injurious to our lagging efforts." Bragg, upon hearing of the Federal landing at Brown's Ferry, inquired what Longstreet intended to do. Longstreet, entirely misreading the situation, replied, "The enemy's designs seem to be to occupy this bank of the river for the purpose of shortening his lines of communication, and possibly, for the purpose of creating a diversion near the point of Lookout Mountain whilst he moves a heavier force up to occupy the mountain via Johnson's Crock."²⁶


Evander Law labored under no illusions as to what the Federals were about. After seizing Brown's Ferry, the Federals laid a pontoon bridge. At 5:00 p.m. he learned from his scouts that a large enemy force was moving up from the direction of Bridgeport toward Chattanooga. He sent this information to Longstreet. Law surmised that the intent of the two operations was to open a Federal line of communication through Lookout Valley, not to attack the Confederates on Lookout Mountain. At 11:00 p.m. on the 27th, Bragg sent Longstreet orders to move that part of his corps which was east of Chattanooga Creek to the west bank. Bragg's orders were, however, discretionary regarding an attack on the Federals at Brown's Ferry. The communication stated, "Should you ascertain in the morning that the enemy is not advancing on Trenton the Gen'l Comdg. deems it highly important that you should dislodge the enemy from the position taken today at or near Brown's Ferry. The Gen'l Comdg. will call at your HQ to see you." In the meantime, Longstreet did nothing. At 6:00 a.m. on



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Left to right: Major General John C. Breckinridge, Brigadier General Micah Jenkins, and Colonel John C. Bratton.

the 28th Bragg reiterated to Longstreet that he could use his entire corps against the enemy. Longstreet did not act on these "suggestions."²⁷

On the 28th Bragg ordered Longstreet to meet him atop Lookout Mountain. As they conferred, an officer rode up and reported that a large Federal column was marching north through Lookout Valley. Neither Longstreet nor Bragg believed the report, so the young officer offered to show them. Moving to a vantage point to the west, they clearly saw the report was correct. The dense blue columns were two divisions of the XI Corps of the Army of the Potomac. General Liddell sent word to Colonel Edward P. Alexander about the Federal approach. Alexander "immediately afterwards made his appearance with several of his rifle pieces and tried their range upon the column, at least 1,400 feet below and one mile...." The effect at such extended range was negligible.²⁸

The Federal column proceeded up Lookout Valley and joined with the force at Brown's Ferry. Bragg appeared "very restless" and again ordered Longstreet to attack the Federals at Brown's Ferry. Bragg then departed complaining to Liddell of Longstreet's inactivity and lack of ability, and asserting that he was "greatly overrated." Longstreet remained on the mountain and contemplated his dilemma. He had not felt that an attack against the Federal force at Brown's Ferry was feasible even before the reinforcements had arrived. He certainly felt that no attack now against the substantial Federal force at the Ferry would succeed, but Bragg's orders were peremptory. About an hour after the main body of

Hooker's force joined the Brown's Ferry contingent, a relatively small body of Federal troops appeared and halted at Wauhatchie Station, several miles from Brown's Ferry. Longstreet wrote in his after-action report that he put this force at fifteen hundred men with a battery of artillery. His estimation was very close to the mark.²⁹

These troops were the Second and Third brigades of the Second Division, XII Corps—the "Whitestars." They were accompanied by two sections of Battery E, Pennsylvania Light Artillery. Their commander, General Geary, had orders to guard the intersection of the Brown's Ferry and Kelley's Ferry roads, near Wauhatchie. Just to the north of Geary's position was the Rowden farm, which included a one thousand square foot cornfield filled with stubble. To the east ran the Wauhatchie Pike, paralleled by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. Geary's two brigades had a total of ninety-three officers and fourteen-hundred men. Geary's command was isolated and exposed, several miles from the nearest Federal units at Brown's Ferry. Dana reported to Stanton, "General Hazen... went to General Hooker and endeavored to get him to take up a compact line across the valley, and to bring all his forces together. But being confident the enemy would not disturb him, Hooker refused to change his dispositions."³⁰

FIRST CONTACT

Longstreet, as noted, did not want to attack the combined Federal force at Brown's Ferry, yet was being urged to do so by Bragg. At 7:20 p.m. on the evening of the 28th, Bragg again emphasized that

Longstreet had the use of his entire corps, with Breckinridge in support. The appearance of Geary, however, gave Old Pete the chance to fulfill Bragg's attack order without committing to a large scale offensive. Longstreet met with Jenkins, who was in command of Hood's division, and subsequently sent him orders "to attack the detachment, which had halted at dark with an interval of some two and a half to three miles from Brown's Ferry, and to endeavor to capture the accompanying trains, and in case this rear guard had passed and effected a junction with the main body, I was then to feel up towards Brown's Ferry and to take advantage of any confusion that might be caused and, if opportunity was offered, to seize the position held by them by an attack in force." Longstreet then sent orders to Evander Law "to cross the lower bridge over Lookout Creek, near its mouth, at dark, and advance cautiously until I commanded the Brown's Ferry road at its junction with the road leading across the lower bridge to Chattanooga; to blockade that road and capture any trains that might attempt to pass...." Law had no intimation of the whole operation at that time. Late that afternoon he received a dispatch from Jenkins that stated "Let me know where to meet you after dark with the rest of the division."³¹

The two generals met just before nightfall, and Jenkins explained the entire operation to Law and requested information about the terrain, roads, and so forth. When he learned the details of the proposed movement, Law commented that "the enemy should have been attacked at or near Shellmound at daylight that morning...and that the op-



Major General Carl Schurz (left) and Major General Oliver O. Howard.

portunity for making such a movement was lost." Law put the total force of Federals in and around Brown's Ferry at 13,000, and considered the 4,500 men of the division then under Jenkins wholly inadequate for the work at hand. Jenkins dismissed his objections, told him that he had "positive orders to proceed," and requested two guides, who were furnished by Law. Not only did Law think the operation foredoomed, he wrote as much in his after-action report. It is worth noting here that both Jenkins and Law aspired to a major generalcy and the assignment to the command of Hood's division. Their rivalry was well known throughout Longstreet's corps, and by Longstreet himself, who favored Jenkins. Later that evening, Law and Jenkins began their movement. Longstreet had one last meeting with Jenkins. He wrote, rather curiously, in a dispatch to Bragg's headquarters the next day, "When I left the railroad, there seemed to be no prospect of doing anything."³²

Just after nightfall, the other three brigades of Jenkins' division—Robertson's, Benning's and Jenkins' own, under Colonel John Bratton—began moving across Lookout Mountain toward Lookout Valley. Major Clinton M. Winkler of the 4th Texas wrote to his wife, "As we had to pass a point commanded by one of the enemy's batteries, we did not march until after dark, when we climbed the mountain.... In passing the mountain we had one of the grandest night views I ever beheld. Looking to the north, the whole encampment of the enemy was plainly marked by the light of a thousand camp fires, while to the eastward, in a semi-circle form, an equal number of

these primeval luminaries disclosed the position of the greater portion of the Southern army, the whole covered with a cloud of smoke, as with a pall." Law, whose brigade was positioned on the west side of the mountain, moved his command across the bridge over Lookout Creek around 7:45 p.m. Law's men took possession of the ridge that commanded the Brown's Ferry-Wauhatchie Road (Wauhatchie Pike), closest to their crossing point. While he waited for the balance of the division, Law sent out an advance guard from the 48th Alabama to scout the area around the road. They captured a "very drunk" Federal, who, when sent to Law, managed to tell his captors that he belonged to Howard's XI Corps.³³

To the south, General Geary had established a camp just north of Wauhatchie, and ordered pickets posted. Colonel William Rickards, Jr.'s 29th Pennsylvania, of the Second Brigade, Colonel George A. Cobham, Jr., commanding, got this duty. The colonel deployed his regiment in a continuous line around the camp. As part of this deployment, Rickards sent Companies C and G a half mile north down the Wauhatchie Pike in the direction of Brown's Ferry. Private David Monat of Company G wrote in a letter shortly afterward, "We went out about 3/4 of a mile, our company posted on the right of the wagon and rail road in a woods above Lookout Creek and Company C on the left. Our post was in charge of Elisha Jones, acting Corporal, and along with Dan Kane, Jack MacLauchlan and myself we took our position."³⁴

About a mile and a half north down the Wauhatchie Pike from Private

Monat's position, at around 10:40 p.m., a patrol of one hundred and fifty men from the 141st New York under the command of Major Charles H. Clanharty started south on a scout toward Wauhatchie. These men were from the Second Brigade of Carl Schurz's Third Division, XI Corps. The New Yorkers ran into skirmishers from the 48th Alabama who were picketing the road in front of Law's position, and a short fire fight ensued. Brief though it was, this encounter was important, for it alerted Geary and his command that something was afoot. Clanharty's patrol moved back toward Brown's Ferry, while the Alabamians maintained their position close to the road. Geary deployed his men as a result of this firing and fronted his line to the east, facing the dark silhouette of Lookout Mountain. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Walker, commanding the 111th Pennsylvania, reported, "We remained in line for about fifteen minutes, when were again ordered to our bivouacs, but cautioned by the general commanding division to turn out and take the same ground should there be a repetition of the firing."³⁵

Just after the brush between Clanharty's patrol and the Alabamians, Robertson's Texas brigade reported to Law, who sent the 3rd Arkansas and 1st Texas to the left to extend his line. The 5th Texas remained to guard the bridge over which they had come, and the 4th Texas was ordered by Law to the right of his main line on the ridge. As Law now had command of two brigades, Colonel James Sheffield took over Law's brigade as he had done at Chickamauga. Just as Law was completing his deployment of the Texas brigade, Jenkins' brigade, under the command of Colonel John Bratton, was completing its crossing of Lookout Creek a little upstream from Law's position.³⁶

Jenkins' men began moving across the creek around midnight and, after the inevitable delays of any night march, began moving south down the Wauhatchie-Brown's Ferry Road. Jenkins' brigade was under the command of Colonel John Bratton, a thirty-two-year-old physician from Winnsboro, South Carolina. The "Palmetto Brigade," as it was called, consisted of the 1st South Carolina Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Franklin Whitner Kilpatrick, the 2nd South Carolina Rifles under Colonel Thomas

Thomson, the 5th South Carolina commanded by Colonel Asbury Coward, the 6th South Carolina under Major John M. White, the Hampton Legion commanded by Colonel Martin Witherspoon Gary, and the Palmetto Sharpshooters under Colonel Joseph Walker—in all, approximately eighteen hundred men.³⁷

Colonel Bratton deployed six companies under the command of Captain Robert Bowen of the 6th South Carolina as skirmishers, with the remainder of the regiment in reserve. From right to left, Bratton's line of battle consisted of the 5th South Carolina, the 1st South Carolina Volunteers, and the 2nd South Carolina Rifles. The Palmetto Sharpshooters deployed to the left (east) of the railroad and constituted the left regiment of the line. The Hampton Legion remained behind guarding a gap between Law's command and Bratton; upon being relieved by Benning's brigade they followed Bratton's line as a reserve. With the skirmish line very close to their main battle line, the South Carolinians moved south toward Wauhatchie Station. It was a little after midnight.³⁸

WAUHATCHIE

The Federal defenders, alerted by the earlier firing, were ready for the approaching enemy. Private Monat of the 29th Pennsylvania had just relieved a comrade on picket post. He later wrote, "I had taken my place at a big tree...when I thought I heard troops moving. I called to Elisha Jones to come up. We listened and nothing occurring he left me, saying 'Keep a sharp look out.' I had my gun cocked and shortly after heard the command towards my left of 'Forward, guide center.' A challenge was made by Jos. Strang of Company C whose voice I recognized of 'Who goes there?' Sergeant Johnny Green of his company called out 'If they don't answer give it to them Stangy!'" Strang fired and immediately became the target of an enemy volley. Strang was hit and managed to get away but died the next day. A bullet clipped a tuft of hair from Sergeant Green's head. Monat continued, "I remained on post and shortly I heard Jack MacLauchlan come running up and say, 'For God's sake, Dave, come on. The woods are full of Rebs.' We ran down the slope to the Rail Road and up the embankment to the top where we could see on the other side of the road a large party of men. I shouted

UNION ORDER-OF-BATTLE WAUHATCHIE, SMITH'S HILL, AND TYNDALE'S HILL

XI & XII CORPS

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER

XI CORPS

 Major General
Oliver Otis Howard

SECOND DIVISION

 Brigadier General
Adolph von Steinwehr

FIRST BRIGADE*
Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck
134th NY, 154th NY, 27th PA, 73rd PA

SECOND BRIGADE
Colonel Orland Smith
33rd MA, 136th NY, 55th OH, ** 73rd OH

THIRD DIVISION

 Major General
Carl Schurz

FIRST BRIGADE
Brigadier General Hector Tyndale
101st IL, 45th NY, 143rd NY, 61st OH,
82nd OH

SECOND BRIGADE
Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski
58th NY, 119th NY, 141st NY, 26th WI

THIRD BRIGADE
Colonel Frederick Hecker
80th IL, 68th NY, 75th PA

CAVALRY: 1st Alabama,
5th Tennessee, Co. G

*First Brigade in reserve.

** 55th Ohio on picket duty at Brown's Ferry.

 = infantry; xxx = corps; xx = division

'Who are you?' They answered 'Don't shoot, we's you'uns.' I replied, 'You'uns be damned—come on Jack, they're Rebs.'" The three regiments of Bratton's main line were headed straight for the center of the Federal position.³⁹

The Pennsylvanians who were not killed, wounded, or captured quickly fell back toward their camp. The exchange of fire had put Geary's command in motion once again. At the first sound of firing, both the 111th and 109th Pennsylvania had returned to their former positions facing east toward Lookout Creek and the mountain beyond. As the sounds of gunfire continued to roll down the valley

XII CORPS

 (Major General
Henry W. Slocum)

SECOND DIVISION

 Brigadier General
John White Geary

SECOND BRIGADE
Colonel George A. Cobham, Jr.
29th PA, 109th PA, 111th PA

THIRD BRIGADE
Brigadier General George S. Greene (w)
Colonel David Ireland
78th NY, 137th NY, 149th NY

ARTILLERY (Knap's Battery)
Pennsylvania Light, Battery E (two sections)



Joseph Hooker

from their left (north), everyone from general to private realized that they needed to change their front from east to north. The 109th Pennsylvania moved by its left flank to a position on the southern edge of the Rowden cornfield behind a rail fence, about midpoint on the three hundred yard long field.

As the 109th was settling in their new position, the 111th, which still faced east, performed a tactical evolution taken from Casey's *Manual of Infantry* called "Regiment, Change Front to the Rear, On the First Company." This maneuver involved first an about face by the regiment, second, a wheeling movement with the

CONFEDERATE ORDER-OF-BATTLE WAUHATCHIE, SMITH'S HILL, AND TYNDALE'S HILL

FIRST CORPS*

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET

HOOD'S DIVISION

XX
Brigadier General
Micah Jenkins

JENKINS' BRIGADE

Colonel John Bratton

1st South Carolina, 2nd South Carolina, 5th
South Carolina, 6th South Carolina, Hampton
Legion, Palmetto Sharpshooters

BENNING'S BRIGADE

Brigadier General Henry L. Benning
2nd Georgia, 15th Georgia, 17th Georgia, 20th
Georgia

LAW'S DIVISION

XX
Brigadier General
Evander McIvor Law

LAW'S BRIGADE

Colonel James L. Sheffield
4th Alabama, 15th Alabama, 44th Alabama,
47th Alabama, 48th Alabama

ROBERTSON'S BRIGADE

Brigadier General Jerome B. Robertson
3d Arkansas, 1st Texas, 4th Texas, 5th Texas



James Longstreet

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* Longstreet's Corps:

First Corps, Army of Northern
Virginia, temporarily assigned to the
Army of Tennessee.

southernmost company as the pivot. This movement continued until the flank connected with the right of the 109th Pennsylvania. The 111th then about faced once again. They were now facing north and in line with the 109th on their left and their right resting near the railroad. This was a difficult enough maneuver on the parade ground. The fact that these volunteer soldiers performed it in the darkness, across a stubble corn field, and with the enemy closely approaching speaks well of the discipline and training instilled by Colonel Cobham and Lieutenant Colonel Walker. In the meantime, General Greene was moving the 137th and 149th New York of his brigade, in order to prolong the Federal left. It was about 12:30 a.m.⁴⁰

As the South Carolinians closed with the Federal line, Colonel Bratton noted, "A hasty observation showed that there was considerable commotion in their camp. Whether it was of preparation to receive or leave us, I could not tell, but the hurrying hither and thither could be seen by the light of their camp fires, which they were then extinguishing."

First Lieutenant Richard Lewis of the First South Carolina wrote the next day to his mother, "All now began to realize soon some Yankee picket would raise the battle cry. Sure enough, as we advanced nearer the camp a volley from them disputed our ground any further. After a very sharp contest between our line of skirmishers and the Yankees, the whole line raised a yell, and moved up to within a few hundred yards of the enemy...."⁴¹

Geary wrote in his after-action report that "the moon was fitful and did not afford light sufficient to see a body of men only 100 yards distant, and during the fight their whereabouts was mostly revealed by the flashes of the firearms." Colonel Cobham wrote to his wife three days later, "I had just time to draw up the brigade in line when the Rebels advanced directly on our front, it was dark, but I could hear them advancing, and ordered the men to lie down. As soon as the advancing lines of the enemy could be seen through the darkness I ordered the men to fire." It was about 12:40 a.m. when the main battle lines began to fire volleys at one another. A good portion

of the fire delivered by the Pennsylvanians tore into the ranks of the 2nd South Carolina Rifles, who halted and fell back. As they did so, the 1st and the 5th South Carolina also stopped, the 5th advancing somewhat farther before halting. After stopping his 1st South Carolina and ordering the men to lie down, Colonel Kilpatrick was shot through the heart and instantly killed. The 1st and 5th then held their ground and exchanged fire with the Federals. Added to the Federal small arms fire was that of the four ten-pound Parrotts of Knap's battery, commanded by Captain Charles A. Atwell and assisted by Lieutenant Edward Geary, son of General Geary.⁴²

On the Federal left, the 137th New York, followed by the 149th, was moving to get into position. As the 137th marched into place on the left of the 109th Pennsylvania, the New Yorkers took fire from Asbury's 5th South Carolina. This staggered them, but under the supervision of Generals Greene and Geary they took up position and began to return fire. While moving the 137th New York into place and steadying his men, General George Sears Greene was wounded in the face, the ball passing through his upper jaw. The 149th, following about twenty-five yards in the rear of the 137th, also came under this fire. Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Randall, commander of the 149th, estimated the fire was delivered from a distance of "about 100 yards." Colonel Randall reported, "In an instant the mounted men attending the generals, forming a cavalcade of some 20 horsemen, became very much scattered and broke to the rear, passing through my regiment in a dozen different places. In addition to those, two or three ambulances and wagon teams, attached to headquarters, also passed through my lines. The regiment was thus entirely broken to pieces and disorganized, with no company formation whatever, and all exposed to a terrific fire." It would take Randall and his staff some time to reorganize the New Yorkers.⁴³

THE FEDERALS REINFORCE

This firing was heard in the camps of the XI Corps, three miles to the north near Brown's Ferry. After establishing their camps near the ferry, the two divisions of the corps had settled in for a much needed rest. After the initial brush between Major Clanharty's patrol and the

Alabamians, the camp settled down. Joe Hooker reported, "An hour after, the mutterings of a heavy musketry fell upon our ears from the direction of Geary." What ensued well illustrates how communications can go awry and orders be misunderstood or misinterpreted. It also illustrates what can happen when the commanding general is in an agitated and excited state of mind. Hooker testified at the subsequent court of inquiry that he was "in a state of great anxiety." William Hazen wrote after the war that Hooker sometimes exhibited a "strange want of prescience." In fairness to Hooker, men's recollections of things that occurred in the crisis of battle do vary, but Hooker's after-action report in which he censured Carl Schurz tends to support General Hazen's observation.⁴⁴

hatchie, Schurz got his division under arms and ready to march. Schurz recalled, our men were, on this occasion, in good spirits, indulging themselves in more or less jocose on the enemy who had disturbed them. Soon General Hooker rode up—as it seemed to me in a somewhat excited state of mind—and ordered me to hurry my division to the relief of Geary. This was the order I had expected.... Instantly I put myself at the head of Tyndale's Brigade, which was the nearest at hand, and marched off on the road to Wauhatchie, sending my chief of staff to my other two brigades, with the order to follow me. The moon shone brightly, only now and then obscured by passing clouds. We could


line, wrote, "A detail of two men from my regiment was made to survey the ground from the right of the 15th Alabama to the Tennessee River...and report to General Law at the bridge, the distance and nature of the ground...the object was to ascertain the number of men necessary to fill the space or vacuum. The moon was about two and a half hours high, shining very brightly. I stepped it as best I could, and as well as I now remember, it was a fraction over half a mile."⁴⁷

Schurz and his men had only marched about a half mile when they came under fire from the Alabamians posted on the eminence that would come to be known as Smith's Hill. Sergeant R.T. Coles of the 4th Alabama recollected, "Our position along the ridge overlooking the road was within about thirty yards of the road on our left and about one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards from it on the right." Schurz recalled, "we received a heavy volley of musketry from one of the darkly wooded hills on our left." Schurz by-passed Law's troops, leaving these Confederates to the attention of von Steinwehr's Second Division.⁴⁸

As Schurz's men took fire, the fight between Bratton's South Carolinians and Geary's Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers was reaching its decisive moment. Both sides were running low on ammunition, and their casualties were mounting. While the 2nd South Carolina Rifles was rallying in the rear, the 1st and 5th remained in the cornfield and exchanged fire with the 109th Pennsylvania and 137th New York. Bratton now proceeded to bring the full weight of his available manpower to bear. The 6th South Carolina under Major White arrived, and Bratton sent them to fill the space vacated by the 2nd Rifles. Walker continued his advance with the Palmetto Sharpshooters on the left of the railroad. He moved his men forward to a small hillock which gave him a field of fire on the right flank of the Federals. He reported, "I advanced with the brigade until the right and center encountered the enemy and opened fire upon them, there being no enemy in my immediate front. I continued my advance for some 200 or 300 yards, when I found myself on the enemy's flank. I changed front forward on my right company and advanced as far as I could without exposing my flank to the fire of the brigade, when I opened on them...."⁴⁹



DOUGLAS R. CURRISSON COLLECTION



JOHN R. BOYLE, "SOLDIERS TRUE, 111TH PA"

Colonel George A. Cobham, Jr. (left) and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Walker.

When the sustained and heavy firing erupted in the direction of Wauhatchie, Hooker sent Howard, the XI Corps commander, orders to dispatch a brigade "to the position of the skirmish of the day before, and another to the assistance of General Geary." The position referred to was a hill located where the Brown's Ferry Road split from the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and from the Chattanooga Road. It lay about two miles from the XI Corps' encampment and a mile from Wauhatchie. Howard reported that he first sent the orders to the XI Corps' Second Division under Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr. Howard then joined Hooker, who ordered him to send the troops closest to the points designated. This was the Third Division under Major General Carl Schurz.⁴⁵

As the sound of heavy firing continued to echo from the direction of Wau-


see ahead on the open ground tolerably well. But the shadows of the dense woods we entered were all the darker...the musketry fire ahead of us at Wauhatchie grew more lively and was punctuated with occasional discharges of artillery.... Evidently, Geary was hard pressed and we accelerated our speed."


As the troops of the XI Corps pressed their march toward Wauhatchie, the men from Alabama waited on a hill to the east of the road.⁴⁶

The Alabamians of Law's brigade occupied the "wooded slope," being the northernmost of the two eminences on either side of the road leading from Look-out Creek to the Brown's Ferry-Wauhatchie Road. As Law reported, "Here I remained nearly an hour." William C. Jordan of Co. B, 15th Alabama, which occupied the far right of Sheffield's

Micah Jenkins, commanding Hood's division, crossed the base of Lookout Mountain with 4200 men. He sent Bratton's brigade (1800 men) by the left fork of the Chattanooga Road to attack Geary's men at Wauhatchie. The remainder (less one regiment left to guard the rear) occupied the range of low hills fronting the Wauhatchie Pike, their task to interdict the road and prevent Union reinforcements from Brown's Ferry reaching Wauhatchie.

Neither force was strong enough to achieve its objective, and Longstreet may justly be criticized for not using enough men. On the other hand, one can understand Longstreet's negative feelings about the operation; the window of opportunity—such as it was—for the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland had already passed, and no local tactical success could gainsay that fact.





"CHARGE OF THE MULE BRIGADE"

Half a mile, half a mile,
Half a mile onward,
Right through the Georgia troops
Broke the two hundred.
"Forward the Mule Brigade!
Charge for the Rebs," they neighed;
Straight for the Georgia troops
Broke the two hundred.

"Forward the Mule Brigade!"
Was there a mule dismayed?
Not when their long ears felt
All their ropes sundered;
Theirs not to make reply;
Theirs not to reason why;
Theirs but to make Rebs fly.
On! to the Georgia troops
Broke the two hundred.

Mules to the right of them,
Mules to the left of them,
Mules behind them
Pawed, neighed, and thundered.
Breaking their own confines,
Breaking through Longstreet's lines,
Into the Georgia troops
Stormed the two hundred.

Wild all their eyes did glare,
Whisked all their tails in air,
Scattering the chivalry there,
While all the world wondered.
Not a mule back bestraddled,
Yet how they all skedaddled!
Fled every Georgian,
Unsabred, unsaddled,
Scattered and sundered,
How they were routed there
By the two hundred!

Mules to the right of them,
Mules to the left of them,
Mules behind them
Pawed, neighed, and thundered;
Followed by hoof and head,
Full many a hero fled,
Fain in the last ditch dead,
Back from an "ass's jaw,"
All that was left of them,
Left by the two hundred.

When can their glory fade?
O! what a wild charge they made!
All the world wondered.
Honor the charge they made,
Honor the Mule Brigade,
Long-eared two hundred!

As Walker's men engaged the Federals, Colonel Gary was marching the Hampton Legion up the road. He received orders "to go in on the right." Elizah T. Tollison, a private in the Hampton Legion, was seeing action for the first time. He later wrote, "We were marching along undecided whether we would find any Yankees or not when all at once the battle broke loose in front of us. I thought every man was killed up there and that it would only be a matter of time until we would be killed. Col. Gary began cursing. We went on in road, and neared battle, and Col. Kilpatrick of the 1st regiment was killed. They were bringing him out as we came up. We lay down in the road, and the Yankees began shelling and muskets were being shot. I believe if my hat had been iron I could have caught it full of bullets. Col. Gary ordered us to fall in, but all men refused to obey on account of danger, and he finally ordered us to crawl on all fours to the woods where we formed." Gary's men then moved to the right of the cornfield, beyond the right flank of the 5th South Carolina, and advanced and drove the Federals through their wagon yard.⁵⁰

As the Hampton Legion moved through the parked wagons and tethered mules, they lost some cohesion. Some of the men found the temptation of "easy pickins" too alluring, and fell out of line to loot the wagons. Some of the mules broke loose and ran amuck, while others were killed where they stood, and most just stayed uneasily in place. This episode was later translated into one of the Civil War's more colorful pieces of mythology, "the charge of the mule brigade." (See sidebar.) When Hampton's Legion emerged from the wagon park they began slowly to work their way around the left flank of the 137th New York. Colonel John Bratton maneuvered his troops in a text book style double envelopment, fixing the enemy in front and then moving on both his flanks. He had now committed all the troops he had except for the brigade skirmishers under Lieutenant Colonel Logan, who had just crossed Lookout Creek.⁵¹

It is instructive here to note that Longstreet wrote in an endorsement to the after-action report submitted by Micah Jenkins, "I endeavored to impress upon the minds of the officers the fact that one musket at night would make more noise than fifty during the day." Old

Pete was correct, but the perception worked both ways. Private Frank M. Mixson of Company E, 1st South Carolina, recollected being "under a galling fire of musketry from 10,000 guns." Private Mixson's perception was born out by numerous others. One man in the Palmetto Sharpshooters wrote to his wife that they fought "a whole corps of Yankees."⁵²

Although Geary's line was stretched thin, there was enough manpower to refuse both flanks and still maintain a solid front. On the left, where the Hampton Legion was advancing, adjutant James Mix moved Companies B and G of the 137th New York back at right angles and delivered fire against the South Carolinians as they emerged from the wagon park, forcing them to drop to the ground. On the right, Colonel Walker sent two companies of the 111th Pennsylvania to the railroad embankment to reinforce the one company of skirmishers who were opposing the Palmetto Sharpshooters.⁵³

Although their flanks were temporarily secure, the White Stars were taking fire from three sides. It was a little before 2:00 a.m. and the volume of fire on both sides now reached a crescendo. The four Parrott rifles were the linchpin of the Federal defense, and the Confederates knew it. First Lieutenant Albert R. Greene of the 78th New York recalled, "the way that battery was worked this night was enough to immortalize it if it had never on any other occasion fired a gun. Its flashes lighted up its own position and half the rebel line. We could hear the devils shout, 'Shoot the gunners! Shoot the gunners!'" Sergeant David Nichol of Knap's battery wrote in his diary, "It was the most trying fire I was ever in, you could not find protection any place." Lieutenant Greene noted, "It was point blank business."⁵⁴

The fire from the Palmetto Sharpshooters against the Federal right was particularly deadly to the Union artillerists and the 111th Pennsylvania. Atwell shifted one of his pieces to the right in order to fire more effectively on the Palmettos. Lieutenant Edward R. Geary, son of General John Geary, took command of the Parrott, which was manhandled partway down the knoll to a level area on the eastern side. The piece commenced firing, but the first few rounds were fired too low, resulting in shells

striking or exploding in the ranks of the 111th Pennsylvania, inflicting numerous casualties. Among those killed was Lieutenant Marvin D. Pettit of Company B, who was decapitated by one of the shells. The elevation was corrected and the shells began finding their mark along the line of the South Carolinians. While directing the fire of this gun, Lieutenant Geary was hit in the forehead by a minié ball and died instantly. A short time after Geary went down, Captain Atwell was

shot through both hips. He was carried from the field and died four days later. Major John A. Reynolds, commander of the XII Corps' Artillery Brigade, took command of the battery. Casualties among the gunners caused Reynolds to order one piece to the rear and the men to take position with the others. During the course of the fight the battery fired 224 rounds.⁵⁵

Concerned about the lack of infantry on the line fronting east toward the

railroad, Geary committed his last available manpower to that sector. After rallying the 149th New York, Colonel Randall moved his regiment to the right, extending the line of the three companies of the 111th Pennsylvania. The 78th New York, which had been positioned behind the knoll as a reserve, was then ordered to the right of the 149th New York, extending this part of Geary's line farther to the south. Geary's men were running low on ammunition, and officers stripped the dead and wounded of their cap and cartridge boxes and carried them to the men on line. A captain of the 109th Pennsylvania gathered ammunition from the casualties and put them in his hat. He then, bent over and bareheaded, went along the line calling out, "Give them Hell, boys, I've got another hat full of kill seed."⁵⁶

By this time only two of the artillery pieces were still in action. With ammunition running low, their casualties mounting, and no certainty of reinforcements, Geary's men prepared for the worst. Lieutenant Colonel Walker of the 111th Pennsylvania knelt behind Rowden's log house and built a small fire



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RICHARD ROLLINS COLLECTION

Brigadier General John White Geary (left) and Lieutenant Edward R. Geary.



JOHN R. BOLL, "SOLDIERS TRUE, 111TH PA."

A single field piece hurls case shot into the attacking Confederate ranks at point blank range across the Wauhatchie Pike, while the remainder of Knap's battery, fuses shortened to two seconds, fires over the heads of the Federal infantry. (In actual fact, by the time the one gun had been moved to the foot of the knoll, two others had been withdrawn for lack of ammunition.)

upon which he destroyed his official papers so as to deny them to the Confederates in the event of his capture. General Geary issued orders that they would hold their position with the bayonet if their ammunition ran out.

The time was close to 2:00 a.m. when Colonel John Bratton decided that "the position of things at this time was entirely favorable to a grand charge." While making preparations for the charge, Bratton sent word for Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Logan, commanding the brigade's pickets, to bring forward his command, which had followed the brigade across Lookout Mountain. The answer to this order came from Micah Jenkins. He sent word to Bratton that Logan's pickets, along with the other units of Jenkins' division, were engaging the enemy in the rear and in his dispatch he instructed Bratton, "I must withdraw and move back at once." Bratton believed his attack was on the brink of success, but nevertheless promptly obeyed the order to withdraw. The 6th South Carolina moved to its left and took position behind the railroad, and continued to fire into the enemy in order to cover the withdrawal of the brigade. The 5th South Carolina and the Hampton Legion moved out first, then in turn formed a line of battle to cover the retreat of the 6th.⁵⁷

THE ROAD

The order to retire came as a result of the advance of the XI Corps. Law sent word to Jenkins that the enemy was attacking him in front and "that it was possible for him to pass troops in rear of those engaged...to the point at which I supposed Colonel Bratton to be." Jenkins reported that, "Some time after Colonel Bratton had become engaged and while matters on that side were progressing very satisfactorily, I heard a sharp volley or so towards the right but not continuous, and soon received a message from General Law that the enemy were pressing down his front towards the left." Jenkins sent word back to Law that he (Law) was put there to prevent such a movement, "and, if necessary, that he must attack." Very shortly thereafter, the Federals were reported as having reached the position of Benning's brigade, which was deployed on Tyndale's Hill farther south, closer to Wauhatchie. As mentioned, Bratton's brigade pickets, who



FR. TODD, "AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPAGES 1861-62"



WAR LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, PHILADELPHIA

Sergeant Valerius Cincinnatus Giles (left) and Brigadier Jerome B. Robertson.

had just crossed Lookout Creek, also skirmished with these Federals. These troops were the First Brigade (Tyndale's) of the Second Division. Carl Schurz rode at the head of the column with Tyndale. The time was approximately 2:15 a.m.⁵⁸

After bypassing Law's position on Smith's Hill, Schurz had continued his march in the direction of Wauhatchie. He had only gone a short distance when he received word that his Third Brigade had been halted near Smith's Hill, and that the Second had halted there as well. Just as he reached Tyndale's Hill, Lieutenant Paul A. Oliver, aide-de-camp on Hooker's staff, rode up. There was some sporadic firing coming from the Georgians on the hill, and Oliver indicated to Schurz that the position should be taken. Schurz, who had been ordered to take the hill and press on to Geary, now had only one brigade at hand. After some further conversation the lieutenant, representing General Hooker, told Schurz to attack the hill.⁵⁹

Schurz gave Tyndale the order and observed as Tyndale's men took their objective with very little resistance. He then rode north to locate his other two brigades. It did not take Schurz long to locate his troops, who were halted in the vicinity of Smith's Hill. He also found Joe Hooker there. Schurz remembered that he expected a word of commendation and was surprised when Hooker angrily asked him, "What were your orders?" Schurz explained that, using the one brigade he had, he had obeyed orders and taken Tyndale's Hill. The other two brigades had been held back by superior orders. He then asked Hooker if the two brigades were now at his disposal. Hooker

curtly replied that they were and rode away. Carl Schurz later wrote, "I doubted, and my officers, too, doubted, whether he was in his senses."⁶⁰

At approximately the same time that Bratton received his orders to disengage, General Benning received orders from Jenkins to retire from Tyndale's Hill and take a position back closer to Lookout Creek. As Tyndale advanced, Benning was withdrawing. There was some skirmishing, but very few casualties. Just a half a mile to the north, however, the fight between Orland Smith's brigade and Law's troops was every bit as ferocious as the fight down at Wauhatchie. Von Steinhewer's Second Division, following Schurz, was ordered to the Ellis House along a road that branched off the Wauhatchie Pike to the east. Von Steinhewer was instructed to take the hill from which the Federals had been receiving fire, and this task he gave to Smith's Second Brigade. Smith deployed the 33rd Massachusetts on the left and the 73rd Ohio on the right to take the hill by a bayonet charge. This hill would afterward bear his name.

Law's command was deployed from south to north as follows: the 3rd Arkansas of Robertson's brigade was positioned to the left of the Chattanooga Road (which runs roughly east to west and intersects the Wauhatchie Pike); the 1st Texas (Robertson's brigade) was in support, deployed to the right of the Chattanooga Road in a field behind the southern end of Smith's Hill; Law's brigade, under Colonel Sheffield, had the 48th Alabama to the right of the Chattanooga Road with the 47th, 4th, 44th, and 15th Alabama in succession on the hill itself.


The 4th Texas was later moved to the extreme right of the line on an adjacent hill. Sergeant Valerius Cincinnatus Giles of Co. B, 4th Texas, wrote shortly after the war, "Off to our left, we could see the flash and hear the roar of artillery and musketry. There was not a man among us who knew where he was or what he was there for. I don't believe the officers knew. The night was cold and clear and the moon shone brightly.... Owing to the manner in which we were deployed out on the ridge, we were little more than a strong skirmish line."⁶¹

To the left of the 4th Texas the Alabamians waited on the hogback ridge, as Orland Smith's men moved out. The two Federal regiments were not in a contiguous line, each commander being told they would join with the other as they advanced. Major Samuel Hurst of the 73rd remembered, "We immediately began the ascent of the hill, which was indeed very difficult. The hill was some three hundred feet high, and it was about two hundred and fifty yards from its foot to its summit. The hillside was covered with heavy timber and underbrush, and, in many places, we could only advance by holding on to or pulling ourselves up by the underbrush.... Finally, about forty paces from the hill-top, we came into more open ground; and by the clear moonlight they could see our line advancing...their whole line now opened on us a most murderous fire." In spite of their increasing casualties, the Ohioans continued their advance to "within 2 or 3 rods of the enemy's breastworks," when fire from the right enfiladed their line. Major Hurst ordered his regiment to retire a short distance and lie down. He then dispatched an officer to try and locate the 33rd Massachusetts.⁶²

Over to the left, the 33rd was having its own problems. As it began the ascent, "The line advanced in good order, under fire of the enemy's skirmishers, until it reached a crooked ravine some 20 feet deep running parallel with the hillside, the sides of which were almost perpendicular, slippery with leaves and clay, and covered with brush...its appearance rendered even more formidable by the deceptive moonlight." After emerging from this chasm, the 33rd "halted in some disorder. Here the enemy opened a deadly fire from the whole length of their line." Opposing them were the right companies of the 4th, the 44th, and the left com-

panies of the 15th Alabama. Unable to locate the position of the 73rd Ohio, and believing themselves without support, the Massachusetts men fell back to the road. They then reformed and moved up the hill again.⁶³

As the 33rd was regrouping, Smith ordered the 136th New York back from its position on the left to support the main attack. Before the New Yorkers began their ascent, General von Steinwehr rode up. Private George P. Metcalf of Company D recalled the general's impromptu speech: "He came to our front and in broken English said, 'What regiment is dat?' He was told, 'Dat is a good line,' he said. 'We want you to take dat hill. The Rebels are on top of it. You go up. Don't you fire a gun. If you do, dat vill give them the range to shoot you. Don't say one word until you get right onto them, and then holler like the tuyfel. They vill think the whole corps is behind you.'"⁶⁴



Left to right: Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr, Brigadier General Hector Tyndale, and Brigadier General Henry L. Benning.

The 33rd Massachusetts launched a new assault on the Confederate line, making a lodgement near where the left of the 44th joined the right of the 4th Alabama. A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued in the crude breastworks. Private Howard H. Sturgis of Co. H, 44th Alabama, remembered the struggle as "a regular 'Kilkenny catfight,' a very bad one.... Once when we recaptured our works a Federal and a Confederate were seen with their left hands in each other's collar, grasping their guns with their right hands, neither being willing to surrender." The standoff was broken when a Confederate lieutenant shot the Federal.⁶⁵

When Law received word that Bratton was retiring, he ordered his command back from Smith's Hill and the hill adjacent. On that hill to the north, the

attenuated line of the 4th Texas received an attack from two detached companies of the 136th New York. These two companies, advancing together, made an impressive appearance. Sergeant Giles remembered, "About two o'clock in the morning we discovered a solid line of infantry advancing up the hill.... When we saw that heavy column coming against our weak line, every private on the hill knew as well as the officers that we had to skedaddle. The muskets and bayonets of that advancing host flashed and gleamed in the cold moonlight." When they received the order to retire, Sergeant Giles wrote,

Major Winkler, on the right, either did not hear or understand the order. Some officious private sang out, "By the right flank." Major Winkler repeated the order. It was not necessary for him to add the word march, for we were already going. My old regiment was not in the

habit of running, but experience had taught the boys that it was folly to fight against such odds. We were going down-grade now, splitting underbrush and moonshine wide open.

Instead of retiring to the east, Giles and some of his comrades filed to the north. He remembered, "The result was that those of us who were on the extreme right ran into the One Hundred and Thirty-Sixth New York—all Germans.... I ran squarely against a great, big, fat Dutchman and both of us came down in a heap, his gun going off in the air as we tumbled." Giles was captured along with a number of Texans and Alabamians.⁶⁶

Law retired from his position and he, Bratton, and Benning recrossed Lookout Creek, Law taking position in the works

on the east side. At first light on the 29th, Hecker's brigade of Schurz's division reached Geary's position near Wauhatchie. Captain George Collins of the 149th New York remembered the scene in the morning: "When the rays of the sun came over Lookout Mountain, they fell with a mellow light upon the tall and portly figure of Gen. Geary, standing with bowed head on the summit of the knoll, while before him lay the lifeless form of a lieutenant of artillery. Scattered about were cannon, battered and bullet marked caissons and limbers, and many teams of horses dead in harness. And there were many other dead, but none attracted his attention save this one, for he was his son. The men respecting his sorrow stood at a distance in silence while he communed with his grief. At a moment like this how hollow seems the glory of military honors and how priceless the privilege of a free and united country, which cost so much to attain."⁶⁷

EPILOGUE

General Geary reported his losses as thirty-four killed, 174 wounded, and eight men missing, for a total of 216 casualties. Included in this total were ninety men of the 137th New York (15 killed, 75 wounded), the highest loss of any regiment in Geary's command. The total XI Corps casualties were reported as 204. Of these, 164 were in Orland Smith's brigade, the 33rd Massachusetts having the highest total with eighty-eight (26 killed, 62 wounded) out of 230 engaged. The total casualty figure for the Federals was 420. Bratton reported his loss as 356 (31 killed, 286 wounded, 39 missing). This figure is almost certainly far too low. Geary reported that his burial parties counted 153 dead Confederates, and that his command captured fifty-five wounded prisoners and fifty-three "with arms." Using Geary's figure for killed, and estimating the number of wounded carried off or ambulatory, Bratton's loss could well have been nine hundred or more, roughly fifty percent of his troops engaged. Colonel Asbury Coward, commanding the 5th South Carolina, reported 102 casualties (9 killed, 85 wounded, 8 missing) out of 218 engaged, or 46.8 percent of his force. This represents the highest reported casualty rate of any regiment engaged at either Wauhatchie or Smith's Hill. Sheffield put his loss at forty-three, and Robertson reported one wounded and

eight missing. Total Confederate casualties were most likely near one thousand.⁶⁸

Following the battle there were recriminations on both sides. Hooker, in his after-action report, wrote a none-too-subtle condemnation of Carl Schurz: "I regret that my duty constrains me to except any portion of my command in my commendation of their courage and valor. The brigade dispatched to the relief of Geary, by orders delivered in person to its division commander, never reached him until long after the fight had ended. It is alleged that it lost its way, when it had a terrific infantry fire to guide them all the way." Schurz later wrote, "When I read this I was utterly amazed and indignant. I had often heard a murmur among the generals of the army that 'Joe Hooker's character for truth and veracity was not good.' But how he could have put into an official report statements so palpably false and so malicious was beyond my comprehension." Schurz requested a court of inquiry, which was convened in January. Schurz, a learned man and a scholar, later wrote, "having the privilege of summing up the case in my own behalf, I availed myself of the opportunity to give General Hooker a piece of my mind. I did this to my heart's content in a written statement which I read to the court." The court, composed entirely of officers from Hooker's command, completely exonerated Schurz, but was also careful not to censure their commanding officer. The court ruled that Schurz's Second and Third Brigades, in the confusion of the hour, were halted by officers from Hooker's and Howard's staffs. The exoneration of Schurz was, in effect, a censure of Hooker, and he took it as such. In a February letter to his parents, Schurz wrote: "When Hooker comes to read my defense before the court of inquiry he will be convinced that it is dangerous to play with sharp instruments."⁶⁹

Longstreet would depart the Army of Tennessee within a week, bound for Knoxville and hard times. Both he and Micah Jenkins, when they came to write their reports, blamed Law for the Confederate failure. In his report Jenkins claimed that Law's failure to prevent Federal reinforcements from moving toward Wauhatchie, caused him to break off his attack. He wrote, "The movement would have been completely successful...had the troops from Brown's Ferry been kept

from interfering." He reported that when Law notified him that the enemy were pressing down his front, "I replied...that he must prevent it and, if necessary, that he must attack." Longstreet concurred: "As soon as General Law yielded his position it became necessary to recall Colonel Bratton.... The loss sustained by the two brigades under General Law was probably one-tenth of the loss sustained by the single brigade which claims a victory. As General Law's troops were veterans, I can only attribute the want of conduct with his troops to a strong feeling of jealousy among the brigadier-generals." In his endorsement of Jenkins' report, Longstreet wrote, "The officers do not seem to have appreciated a night attack. It should have been made with great vigor and promptness, and completed before the enemy could have time to know our purposes. When the order was given it was supposed by myself that it would be executed by 12 o'clock at latest. Had we succeeded in that time we should have been in good condition to follow up the first repulse of the enemy by General Law.... Had we been able to execute promptly, or had Law pressed his advantage, after the first or second repulse of the enemy, we should have had a great success at a very light cost and trouble."⁷⁰



Colonel Orland Smith

Jenkins' assertion that the attack did not succeed because of Law's failure to prevent the movement of the XI Corps toward Wauhatchie supposes that Law could have done so. In fact, given the numbers, roughly 5,000 Federals in Schurz's and von Steinwehr's divisions, to approximately 1,700 men in Law's and Robertson's brigades, this was not feasible. Benning had about 700 men, but he was not under Law's immediate command. Given the disparity in numbers, Law did exceptionally well in delaying the

Federal advance (with some help from Hooker) for more than two hours. As earlier indicated, Law sent Jenkins a message during the fight, telling him that it was possible for the Federals to engage him (Law) and still pass troops around the position to Wauhatchie. Had Law attacked, his command would probably have been destroyed. In fact it was Jenkins who erred, leaving over half his command back down the Wauhatchie Pike, denying Bratton a numerical advantage that might have allowed him to overcome Geary. As it was, neither the attacking force nor the blocking force was strong enough to do its job. Longstreet's reports border on fantasy. His assertion that Bratton was recalled as a result of Law's abandonment of his position is untrue. Bratton was recalled *before* Law retired; even Jenkins granted that. Longstreet's favoritism toward Jenkins occasioned a grave injustice to Law, who was a very fine brigade commander. His comments about "not executing promptly" and "officers not appreciating a night attack," are nothing more than dissembling. The only officer who appears not to have appreciated the real situation was Longstreet. Perhaps his feud with Bragg and his isolation on Lookout Mountain produced his recalcitrant, obdurate, and myopic mental state.⁷¹

When Longstreet joined the Army of Tennessee in September, it was already in a state of command turmoil, and he exacerbated the situation. No matter what opinion he held of Bragg's ability, James Longstreet owed that commanding general and the Confederacy the same cooperation and support he demanded from his own officers. Moreover, he owed the brave men in his command better than he gave them that last week of October. Wauhatchie was arguably James Longstreet's worst performance of the war.

Three different observations—one Federal and two Confederate—serve to sum up the night fight at Wauhatchie. Montgomery C. Meigs, quartermaster-general of the United States Army, wrote of the "valor and steadfastness of the troops, which in a night attack accomplished one of the most brilliant feats of the campaign. Only after walking over the ground to-day do I fully appreciate the exploit." John Bratton, on October 29, wrote to his wife, "Last night I was ordered over Lookout Mountain to attack and capture, if possible, a wagon train.

We tried honestly and fought hard but did not succeed." The best summation from the Confederate perspective probably was penned by Evander Law: "The chances of success may be calculated by any one at all conversant with military affairs—and he would be quite safe in estimating them at zero."⁷² □

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
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
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


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WHY WOULDN'T JOE JOHNSTON FIGHT?

STEVEN H. NEWTON

In what almost certainly represented a postwar addition to her diary, Mary Boykin Chesnut placed a now-famous anecdote about General Joseph E. Johnston in the mouth of her uncle, Hamilton Boykin, around Christmas, 1861. Comparing the general to his deceased brother Algernon Sidney, Boykin reportedly allowed of each man that “never in his life could he make up his mind that everything was so exactly right, that the time to act had come.” As a colonel in the U.S. Army, Johnston had once gone hunting with Boykin and Wade Hampton: “He was a capital shot,” but “as to hunting, there he made a dead failure.”



Mary Boykin Chesnut

According to the edited Chesnut diary, Boykin regaled the ladies by describing Johnston's repeated failure to fire his weapon, because “the bird flew too high or too low—the dogs were too far or too near—things never did suit exactly.” Johnston was “too fussy, too hard to please, too cautious, too much afraid to risk his fine reputation for a crack shot,” and returned home with an empty bag.

“Unless his ways are changed,” Boykin is quoted as concluding, “he'll never fight a battle—you'll see.”¹

For Johnston's modern day critics the Boykin anecdote captures the Virginian's inherent incapacity as a military commander. “Reminded of the story of Joe Johnston on the prewar hunt,” Stephen Davis strongly castigates Johnston “for strategic and tactical hyper-cautiousness....” Johnston's campaigns, writes Richard McMurry, were “characterized by extreme caution. He simply was reluctant to take any major risk.” Steven Woodworth portrays him as ready to “fearlessly expose his person to enemy fire but...paralyzed by fear at the thought of exposing his reputation to mishap in the ultimate test of an army commander's skill—pitched battle.” For Joseph Johnston, Woodworth concludes, “tomorrow was always a better day for fighting than today, and the day after was better still.”²

Johnston's record appears to bear out the proposition that the Virginian—for all his strategic, administrative, and logistical skills—had a demonstrable aversion to initiating battle. During four years of war that saw him command every major Confederate army east of the Mississippi River, Johnston conducted major attacks only twice: at Seven Pines outside Richmond on May 31, 1862, and at Bentonville, North Carolina, on March 19, 1865. At Manassas, in July 1861, Johnston found himself embroiled in a fight that someone else had started, while the following May he presided over rather than controlled the rear guard action at Williamsburg. In 1863 the Virginian fought a small defensive action at Jackson, Mississippi, and advanced too late to raise the siege of Vicksburg. Commanding the Army of Tennessee in the Atlanta Campaign, Johnston saw a planned attack misfire at Cassville, and (he later claimed)

lost his command just prior to delivering a crushing blow to the Yankees along Peachtree Creek.³ Compared to Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, or John B. Hood, this hardly constitutes a record of pugnacity, and partisans defending Johnston's record as a “fighting general” often resort to speculative arguments about the extent to which his genius had been bridled by Jefferson Davis' disdain. The discomfort inherent in such a position is captured in Gamaliel Bradford's comment in *Confederate Portraits*: “And yet, I confess that I wish the man had accomplished something.”⁴

The purpose of this article is not to revisit old arguments about Johnston's combat record, but to examine the reasons *why* “Old Joe” attacked his enemies so infrequently. The Virginian's personality is usually offered as the sole explanation to this conundrum, and there is certainly truth in the observation that Johnston was cautious, conservative, and concerned with his reputation. He possessed a neck stiff enough to rival that of his president (no small accomplishment); a temper that sometimes manifested itself in outright rage; and a disquieting paranoia regarding his civil and military superiors. All in all, coupled with his memorable features and noticeable lack of height, Johnston's personal quirks make him an easy subject to caricature, and few historians have bothered to peer beneath the veneer. That Johnston's consistent pattern of behavior regarding offensive battle might have stemmed from *intellectual* as well as *psychological* roots is a possibility that has heretofore lacked any serious examination.

General Joseph E. Johnston (right): “I especially recommend for this course three little works by Frederick the Great....”



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Such inattention is remarkable, considering that Johnston enjoyed a prewar reputation as an intellectual in the small world of the U.S. Army. Unlike many West Point graduates, Johnston developed a fascination for reading military history. "One of the important objects of education is to give habits of judicious reading," the Virginian reminded the Academy's Board of Visitors in 1860; Dabney Maury contended that "it is not probable that any man in our country had ever studied the histories and biographies of wars and warriors as had Johnston." Johnston carried on a protracted correspondence with George McClellan during that officer's tenure as an observer of the Crimean War, asking his friend to bring home books on cavalry tactics in English or French. Throughout the 1850s, Johnston championed reforms in drill and changes in accoutrements based on European examples. Historian Jay Luvaas characterized him as a profound student of war, concluding that he was one of the best prepared professional soldiers to go South, having "served with each of the three combat arms, and with the Topographical Engineers and as Quartermaster General."⁵

There were, in hindsight, indications that Johnston's breadth of knowledge may not have been matched by an equal depth of thought. He did not like to be put in a position that would expose the slightest ignorance. Traveling with Johnston through Texas and observing a creek cutting a channel through the Guadalupe Mountains, Maury asked him to explain "the power of that little stream to make a way for itself through the great mountain barrier, expecting some profound geological solution." Instead, Johnston brusquely replied, "I presume the Power that could make the stream could make a way for the stream to pass, sir."⁶ His service on the Cavalry Board in 1859 also revealed a lack of mental flexibility; one witness noted that when Johnston had come to a conclusion, no evidence or argument, however persuasive, would alter his original position. The Virginian appeared to possess the kind of mind that, once having assimilated information, rarely if ever subjected those data to additional critical scrutiny, but rather reduced them to maxims and applied them thereafter with a bland confidence usually reserved for certainties like



At Seven Pines Johnston planned to catch his opponent astride the Chickahominy. Pictured is a charge by the 71st New York Infantry during the battle.

the law of gravity. This being the case, it becomes critical to understanding Johnston as strategist, tactician, and general, to ferret out the sources of his military knowledge.

In "ranking Napoleon above all great commanders since Caesar," as Maury reported, Johnston appears to have had much in common with many other Military Academy graduates. "The American Civil War," argue Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, "was influenced by the military developments of the era of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the interpretation made of these developments by the military historian and theorist, Baron Henri Jomini, and by the West Point curriculum through which most of the higher commanders passed." That West Point curriculum to which Connelly and Jones refer (at least insofar as strategy was concerned) had been created and delivered by Dennis Hart Mahan, whose *Advanced-Guard Outpost and Detachment Service of Troops* (ubiquitously known as *Out-Post*) applied Jomini's analysis of Napoleon to situations that the U.S. Army might be expected to face. While T. Harry Williams' assertion "that many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and a Jomini's *Summary of the Art of War* in the other" is not shared by most historians today, debating the specific impact of Napoleon, Jomini, and Mahan on Civil War operations has been a hot topic for several decades.⁷


Unfortunately, that generalization provides little assistance in understand-

ing Johnston's concepts of war, strategy, and battle, because the Virginian had never studied under Mahan, did not subscribe to Jomini's analysis of the emperor's campaigns, and thought that the realities of the American Civil War precluded direct application of Napoleonic methods. Johnston graduated from West Point in 1829; Mahan did not begin teaching his celebrated class until 1836. Later evidence suggests that the Virginian did not hold an especially high regard for Mahan's teaching. "Decker's *Tactiques des Trois Armes* is, I say it with deference for those who selected the text books now used, more instructive to young students than Jomini's *Art of War*," Johnston argued in 1860, and "it seems to me too that the study of the organization of the French army might be postponed, and the time now employed upon it bestowed upon other military reading." What reading? "I especially recommend for this course three little works by Frederick the Great..."⁸

This surprising preference for the Prussian monarch over Napoleon begins to fix Johnston's military thought into place. His wartime correspondence, sprinkled with references to sieges, fortresses, light cavalry, magazines, camps, and lines of communication, reflected more affinity to the positional warfare of eighteenth-century Prussia than to the rapid marches and lightning concentrations of nineteenth-century France. Johnston considered Napoleonic strategy impractical because of the scale of the



Johnston at First Bull Run: no one ever questioned the general's physical courage.



The Battle of Bentonville was one of only two occasions that Johnston initiated an attack.

American conflict, criticizing "the Government," which "seems to have intended to operate in Napoleon's manner without considering the difference between the extent of front upon which he manoeuvred & the distance from here [middle Tennessee] to Vicksburg." When valid comparisons could be made with Napoleonic campaigns, Johnston pointed out that they should not be made based upon the heyday of the *Grand Armée* that overran Europe, but with the defensive campaigns of 1813-1814 in which the emperor fought with outnumbered armies composed of poorly trained conscripts. In a rare direct reference to military history in July 1861, Johnston lectured President Davis that "all of Napoleon's successes in 1813 were due to his large proportion of artillery. His infantry was as new and far from being equal to ours."⁹

Johnston derived his perspective on war from his original studies at West Point in the late 1820s, where the relevant influence was not Dennis Hart Mahan, but John Michael O'Connor. O'Connor, who had been brevetted for gallantry at the Battle of Chippewa, actually resigned his commission in 1821 and died in 1826; thus neither Johnston nor his contemporaries at the Military Academy (Jefferson Davis, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Leonidas Polk) probably ever met the New Yorker.¹⁰ Despite this absence of personal contact, O'Connor had a profound effect on the development of Johnston's military thought.

After the War of 1812, O'Connor had spent two years in Europe, dividing his time between the *Ecole Polytechnique* and the military academy at Metz. Upon his return, he translated the French engineer Gay de Vernon's *Treatise on the Sci-*

ence of War and Fortifications, which became the standard West Point text for engineering and military strategy until Mahan replaced it with his own two decades later.¹¹ Historians, intent on demonstrating Mahan's impact on military thought in the prewar U.S. Army, pass by O'Connor's work as inconsequential, derivative, or even plagiaristic. A current National Park Service document even argues, regarding future Civil War generals who did not study under Mahan, that "it is safe to assume Mahan still would have had an influence on these Generals through association and professional development during their careers in the Regular Army," though there is absolutely no evidence to support such a contention.¹²

O'Connor's *Treatise* deserves closer consideration, for three reasons. First, he never denied that the bulk of the work was a translation of de Vernon, but he also spent considerable energy annotating the Frenchman's work. His extensive notes provided examples from American military history that either reinforced or contradicted de Vernon's analysis, including detailed references to George Washington's reorganization of the Continental Army outside Boston and the battle of Long Island, as well as the battles of Chippewa, Plattsburg, and New Orleans in the War of 1812. In this, O'Connor anticipated Henry Halleck, whose *Elements of Military Art and Science* is usually seen as the first formal attempt to integrate American military history into the continuum of European thought.¹³

O'Connor also appended over one hundred pages from Jomini to his *Treatise*, insisting in his preface that "no man should pretend to be capable of commanding any considerable body of troops, unless he have studied and meditated on the principles laid down by Jomini." O'Connor's Jomini, however, was not Mahan's Jomini. By 1817, when O'Connor published his *Treatise*, the Swiss baron had not yet written his *Précis de l'art de la guerre* (*Summary of the Art of War*), but was primarily known for his *Traité des grandes opérations militaires* (*Treatise on Grand Military Operations*), from which O'Connor extracted the bulk of the segment on the wars of Frederick the Great. Thus the entire emphasis of the text Johnston used at the Military Academy focused on positional warfare and spared not even a passing nod to

Napoleon. Mahan, on the other hand, viewed Frederick as antiquated, arguing that his "great authority...overshadowed, and kept down, the naturally rebellious promptings of common sense against parts of his system" until the French Revolution and Napoleon set things right.¹⁴

That O'Connor's melding of de Vernon and Jomini represented Johnston's formal introduction to military history is certain, and that the interest sparked by the *Treatise* led the Virginian to seek out the works of Frederick the Great is almost equally sure. Proving that these three writers exercised a decisive influence on Johnston as a Civil War commander is an entirely different proposition. Simply to show that some of his strategic or tactical choices can be interpreted as consistent with Frederick's style of warfare is insufficient, for such an approach is entirely too subjective, and tends to reveal more about the historian's military thought than the general's. It must be demonstrated that Frederick's concepts—even his language—permeated Johnston's correspondence and orders throughout the war. Only then is the historian justified in moving into an analysis of his battle tactics. Fortunately, illustrating Johnston's intellectual debt to de Vernon, Jomini, and Frederick is relatively easy; many of his wartime letters read like paraphrases of their maxims. In researching these congruencies over the past decade, dozens of examples have been found, though space restrictions prohibit reproducing more than a handful within the context of this article.

One of the most noted aspects of Johnston's strategy throughout the war was his insistence on concentration of forces; he abhorred making detachments, and professed a consistent belief that consolidating all available Rebel troops into a large enough army to strike a decisive blow was the key to victory. In pursuit of this strategy the Virginian at various times suggested the voluntary abandonment of the Atlantic coast, the Shenandoah Valley, the State of Arkansas, and the fortifications at Vicksburg. Notice the striking similarities in language below:

DE VERNON: "An army operating upon a frontier, whether offensively or defensively, does not display itself so as to occupy all the points. The absurdity of such a disposition is obvious; its forces would

be so scattered and so weak at all points, that the enemy could at pleasure break its line, and reversing all the unconnected points, vanquish them without resistance."¹⁵

JOMINI: "No maxim can be more indisputable than, that small armies *should constantly act in mass*. 'Tis by the application of this rule that they alone can undertake any important enterprise; they must give up the notion of covering all points, and look only towards the chief object upon which the fate of the campaign depends. If they make detachments, they deprive themselves of all means of acting with vigour when a good occasion offers. A small army should have its eyes constantly fixed upon its adversary...."¹⁶

FREDERICK: "It is an old rule of war, which I only repeat here, that he who divides his forces will be beaten in detail. If you desire to give battle, try to concentrate all of your forces—you can never make better use of them. This rule is so well founded that every general who has neglected it nearly always finds himself in trouble...."

"Defensive warfare naturally leads us to make detachments. Generals with little experience wish to save everything: those who are wise consider only the principal point, seeking to ward off large blows and patiently suffering minor misfortunes in order to avoid large ones. He who attempts to defend too much defends nothing.

"The enemy's army is the most essential object to keep in view. You must divine its plans and oppose it with all of your forces...."¹⁷

JOHNSTON (March 27, 1862): "I received yesterday a letter...in which you [Lee] give the President's orders to be prepared to move to Richmond, on the way to the Peninsula or Norfolk, with all the force I can, after proper dispositions on this line.

"This afternoon I received by telegraph an order to send 10,000 men instead of the effective force named in your letter.

"I beg leave, with all deference, to suggest to the President the expediency of transferring to the point about to be attacked the whole available force of this department. In making such a movement I would leave only such a line of outposts as would serve to mask it.

"The division of the troops of this department made by the telegram of this afternoon leaves on this line a force too weak to oppose an invasion, and furnishes to the threatened point a reinforcement too small to command success.... We cannot win without concentrating."¹⁸

JOHNSTON (April 22, 1862): "I think it anything but expedient to divide these forces.... Should McDowell advance upon the capital, which is certainly probable, the only course for us, in my opinion, is that which I suggested at the time referred to above—to assemble near Richmond as many troops as possible, those from Norfolk, North Carolina, and South Carolina to be joined by this army, then to endeavor to fight the enemy before all his forces are united. To detach troops from this position would be ruin to those left."¹⁹

JOHNSTON (February 16, 1864): "If I detached from this point I ought to send enough to make sure of success.... [and] the small force left here could little impede the enemy's advance on Atlanta, which might be expected as soon as the march toward Mississippi should be known."²⁰

Frederick acknowledged, however, that circumstances occasionally existed which prohibited complete concentration: "You will ask, then, if detachments ought never to be made, to which I will reply: sometimes it is necessary, but always it is a very touchy maneuver which you must risk only for very important considerations." Jomini was more explicit about what those "important considerations" might be: "inducing him [the enemy] to enterprise against fortresses, and to make diversions that weaken his forces by separating them."²¹ A close echo of these precepts is found in Johnston's May 17, 1862, letter to Richard S. Ewell, regarding the disposition of troops between the Shenandoah Valley and Richmond. "We want troops here [Richmond]; none, therefore, must keep away, unless employing a greatly superior force of the enemy," Johnston insisted. "My general idea is to gather here all the troops who do not keep away from McClellan's greatly superior forces."²²

If a detachment had to be made, Frederick specified that the commander "must be steady, fearless, and prudent. The commander gives them general in-

structions but it is for them to decide whether to advance on the enemy or to retire before him, as circumstances dictate. They must always fall back before superior forces, but they must also know how to take advantage of numbers when superiority is on their side.... An officer commanding a detachment must think first for his own safety and then, if he is able, he can make plans against the enemy." What Johnston told Ewell on April 17, 1862, was again too similar for coincidence: "The question of attacking the enemy in front of you is one which must be decided on the ground.... To decide it you have to consider relative forces, the enemy's position, and the facilities for crossing the

river.... If you feel confident after considering these things, attack."²³

Johnston also harped throughout the war on what he considered "the usual error of Confederate engineering," a tendency to build huge armed camps that required entire armies as garrisons. The Virginian commented acidly about the unfortunate extent of the defenses at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Richmond, Vicksburg, and Atlanta. The purpose of such fortifications, as he understood them, was to employ a small force that would require the enemy to invest it with a much larger one (Jomini's conception of "inducing him to enterprise against fortresses"). His relief from army command in Georgia came on the heels of a

July 16, 1864, telegram to Jefferson Davis in which he explained, "We are trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider." Davis interpreted this sentence as evidence that Johnston did not intend to defend the city, but it is far more likely that the Virginian wrote from a perspective influenced by de Vernon decades earlier: "There is no fortress, however high its polygon may be, that cannot be vigorously defended and its siege protracted to the maximum of duration by a garrison of 12,000 men. And this garrison will be able to cope for five or six months with an army of 80,000 men with 200 pieces of artillery."²⁴

Historians have also been struck by Johnston's willingness, especially in Georgia, to take up defensive positions in front of major rivers rather than behind them; he did so at Resaca with his back to the Oostenaula, at Cassville above the Etowah, and along the north bank of the Chattahoochee. Precisely this tactic, however, had been repeatedly emphasized in Johnston's readings. To de Vernon's observation that "an army whose front is covered by a wide and deep river, is not in consequence unassailable," O'Connor added in a footnote: "The great Frederick says, that a river of more than 8 German miles, is indefensible; and to secure one of this extent, there must be one or more redoubts on the bank, and the river must nowhere be fordable."²⁵ When Johnston turned to Frederick's own writings, he discovered the admonition that

You can defend a river that lies behind the army, but it has yet to be shown how a river in front of the armies can successfully be held.... The only way to defend a river is to keep it behind you. You must have good communications established with the other side of the river, you must have at least two bridges, each of which is protected by intrenched bridgeheads, and you must take up your position two or three miles in front, in a camp so well adapted that the enemy would assuredly be defeated if he attacked you there, even assuming that his army was three times the size of yours....²⁶

Many more examples of affinities between Johnston and the writings of

FREDERICK THE GREAT (1712-1786)

Although his wars ended a century before Gettysburg and his reputation had by then been eclipsed by Napoleon Bonaparte, Frederick II of Prussia had a dramatic impact on military history. Inheriting a patchwork kingdom, Frederick spent decades consolidating Prussia's position as a European power. Through the Silesian (1740-1745) and Seven Years Wars (1756-1763) he fought dozens of engagements, and though sometimes defeated (and depressed to the point of contemplating suicide) he compiled an exceptional record of military achievement.

Frederick fought in the pre-Napoleonic gunpowder milieu often characterized as "positional warfare." Eighteenth century armies were ponderous and completely dependent on supply lines stretching back through chains of depots and fortresses. Generals sought to maneuver their armies onto their enemy's communications to force decisive battles on carefully chosen ground. Effective reconnaissance was non-existent; several times Frederick decided his battle plan based on what he could see from the church steeple of a nearby town. Massed firepower and rigid discipline decided battles.

Frederick was primarily a tactician with an excellent eye for terrain, rather than a seminal military thinker. He expanded the highly disciplined army his father had left him, dramatically increased his artillery (introducing horse artillery in 1759), and confounded opponents with his "oblique attack." In battle, Frederick would refuse one wing of his army and concentrate forces to attack the enemy's most vulnerable flank, attempting to roll up his adversary's line piecemeal. When it worked (at Leuthen, in



Antoine Penne's portrait
of Frederick the Great of Prussia.

1757, 33,000 Prussians routed 66,000 Austrians) the results could be decisive; if it failed (Kolin, also in 1757, when Marshal Daun stood firm), the unengaged wing became a shield behind which he retreated.

Frederick was idiosyncratic enough to have made a great Civil War general: coat perennially covered with snuff and capable of both personal bravery and abject cowardice. He allowed his subordinates little latitude for initiative, and held grudges for decades. On the other hand, he devoted the final decades of his life to improving the nation he had consolidated, and, as Dennis Showalter observes, "he was a warrior for the working day and a prince for the long haul."

O'Connor, de Vernon, Jomini, and Frederick could be cited, but the tendency seems clear: the Virginian's concept of war was so heavily indebted to the precepts of eighteenth century conflict that the maxims of positional warfare literally oozed out of his letters. That intellectual dependence, however, does not explain Johnston's apparent aversion to taking the offensive. Frederick the Great, after all, built his reputation on crushing attacks and fought dozens of engagements large and small. If Johnston had consciously taken the Prussian as his guide, what explains this huge discrepancy?

It is critical to understand first the kind of war that Johnston believed he was fighting. Frederick (echoed by de Vernon and Jomini) recognized three main types of war: offensive, war between equals, and defensive. "If a general remain within his own frontier and there await the enemy, to repulse and prevent him from penetrating into his country," advised de Vernon, "he is said to wage a *defensive* war." "There are three times to wage defensive warfare," Frederick observed: "first, when your troops are not numerous enough to act vigorously against the enemy; second, when your troops have been discouraged and weakened by some failure; and third, when you wait for help."

Johnston thought that these conditions applied both generally to the Confederate bid for independence and specifically to his own campaigns in Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia, and North Carolina. He argued that the failure of Lee's incursions north of the Potomac in 1862 and 1863 "proves that the Confederacy was too weak for offensive warfare..."²⁷


Noting that defensive warfare "requires still more skill than offensive warfare or a war between equals, if it is to be well conducted," Frederick laid down several maxims for its conduct, depending on how badly the odds were stacked against the defender. First, "It is a general rule of this kind of war never to limit yourself to a passive defense, and above all, not to lose sight of the idea of changing to the offensive at the first opportunity. Ignorant officers believe that they wage defensive war well when they retreat before their enemies to avoid every battle." If not prohibitively outnumbered (Frederick provided the example of 45,000 defenders facing 60,000 attackers), "you must not be in the least discouraged, because...if you are not strong enough to attack you have sufficient men at least to defend yourself." In such situations, "Often the enemy grows presumptuous.... He treats war as a trifle and no

longer believes in the need to follow the rules of the art rigidly. He decides without reflection, acts without thinking, and gives you openings that you must seize..."²⁸

Outnumbered by two to one or worse the scenario changed dramatically, Frederick cautioned: "if you should destroy even a detachment of 10,000 men, you will still remain inferior by too wide a margin to be able to dictate to the enemy, unless your opposite number is the most inept and biggest imbecile of men." Instead,

The only course left for you, therefore, is to take impregnable posts wherever they are at hand, to maintain for yourself especially the free exits and areas to the rear, to wage war as a partisan rather than as an army commander, to shift posts if it is found necessary, and at the first sign that the enemy makes to attack you, to wage a war of posture rather than a real war, to procure all the small advantages that you can..."²⁹

Such operations, de Vernon noted in his own segment on defensive war, require that "the troops must be accustomed to daily combats in which they should always come off with advantages, be ever



Frederick the Great's classic oblique attack would ideally be delivered with some natural obstacle (like the river pictured) protecting one flank, while a portion of his army enveloped the other enemy flank through the woods. By committing only a part of his army to the attack, Frederick remained ready to reinforce any tactical success before his opponent could react, or to cover a retreat if the assault were repulsed.

Johnston's Inspiration: Frederick the Great's Oblique Attack



Seven Pines (May 31, 1862)


With his left flank refused along the Chickahominy River, Johnston concentrated the divisions of Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Huger against the isolated Federal III and IV Corps near Seven Pines, retaining G. W. Smith's division in reserve. Longstreet's failure to follow the battle plan and Johnston's own bout of indecision caused the plan to misfire.

ready to fight or retreat, and rapidly adopt according to circumstances one or other of these alternatives.” Even with an alert commander and tenacious soldiers, if the enemy were simply too strong Frederick painted a bleak picture of the potential outcome: “As long as the enemy observes the rules of the art, remains vigilant, profits well from the terrain, encamps advantageously, does not easily risk his detachments, covers his marches and makes them in good order, assures his provision, and forages with precaution, it is nearly impossible for the most gifted captain to attack him with any hope of success.”³⁰

Johnston’s correspondence and final report concerning the Atlanta campaign not only make clear that he saw himself as conducting a defensive war, but his writings are also suffused with virtually the same language as Frederick and de Vernon. He presented the Federals as entering the campaign with more than twice as many troops as possessed by the Army of Tennessee, which left him within the more extreme of Frederick’s two scenarios: “The great numerical superiority of the Federal army, made it expedient to risk battle only when position or some blunder on the part of the enemy might give us


counterbalancing advantages,” forcing Johnston to “fall back slowly until circumstances should put the chances of battle in our favor,” while “taking advantage of positions and opportunities, to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements.” Union commander William T. Sherman, however, did not oblige Johnston by committing egregious blunders. On the contrary, as Johnston complained on June 27, 1864, “By his engineering operations (rendered easy by superior numbers and the character of the country, which is densely wooded) the enemy has pressed us back....” Without a costly attack on Federal breastworks, the Virginian admitted on another occasion, “I can find no mode of preventing this.” Johnston took pains to emphasize that his soldiers had nonetheless fought numerous “partial engagements” designed to whittle down Sherman’s strength. Again, there sounded a clear echo of both Frederick and de Vernon: “our troops, always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the enemy’s numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly....” Johnston therefore “expected to cope with the Federal army on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed.”³¹

These selections are not intended to prove or disprove the effectiveness of Johnston’s strategy in Georgia (or even to suggest that his final report accurately represented his operations); they are presented instead as examples of the extent to which the precepts of Frederick the Great dominated the Virginian’s thought and language. Even his most painfully self-serving rationalizations were couched in the concepts of eighteenth century positional warfare. Possibly the most revealing item in Johnston’s Atlanta report was his description of his plan for the decisive battle he asserted would have been fought along Peachtree Creek if his relief orders had not arrived. Johnston insisted that he would have concentrated two-thirds of his own army against less than half of Sherman’s (specifically the Army of the Cumberland) to strike the Yankees crossing the creek. “If we were successful great results might be hoped for, as the enemy would have both the creek and the river to intercept his retreat,” while if repulsed, the Confederates “had a place of refuge in Atlanta too strong to be assaulted and too extensive to be invested.” For Sherman’s army, conversely, “defeat on this side of that river [the Chattahoochee] would have been its destruction.”³²




Cassville (May 19, 1864)

With Hardee’s Corps delaying the Army of the Cumberland, Johnston concentrated the rest of his army against the remainder of Sherman’s forces. Polk’s Corps held the left flank and Hood’s Corps was to initiate the oblique attack, but confused orders and wandering Federal cavalry caused Hood to call off the attack.



Planned Peachtree Creek Attack (July 19 or 20, 1864)

Johnston claimed that with Hood’s Corps holding the refused right flank against the Federal contingent advancing from Decatur, he would have swung Hardee’s and Stewart’s Corps into action against the isolated Army of the Cumberland as it forded Peachtree Creek. Hood later denied that Johnston informed him about any such plan.



Bentonville (March 19, 1865)

Though it occurred far too late to affect the war’s outcome, Johnston’s carefully laid trap inflicted a stinging defeat on the leading XIV Corps, even though the Confederate army by this point was composed of tattered and demoralized remnants of several armies. Again Johnston employed an oblique attack with Hardee’s and Stewart’s Corps, while Bragg held the center of the line.

Implicit within this description of a battle never fought, can be found the four key elements in Johnston's understanding of the nature and conduct of battles. First and foremost, battles should be fought only when a decisive victory could be gained. Johnston argued that beating Sherman near Chattanooga would have served no purpose, because the Federals would simply have retreated into their works, while a reverse deep in Georgia would have spelled their doom. (He used precisely the same reasoning with regard to the Peninsula Campaign of 1862 for allowing the Army of the Potomac to approach so close to Richmond.) Battles—especially attacks—should also be conducted, Johnston believed, on carefully selected ground, where a thorough understanding of the terrain would provide a counterbalance to enemy superiority of numbers. At Peachtree Creek the Virginian expected to catch his adversaries divided by several bodies of water, in almost precisely the same fashion that he had crafted his attack on George B. McClellan's army astride the Chickahominy two years earlier. In his aborted Cassville attack in May 1864, as well as at Bentonville in March 1865, Johnston used high ground to conceal his concentration for an assault. In all four cases, Johnston's attack plan had been predicated on luring the Federals onto a field of his own choosing for a crushing attack.

The third consistent element in all of Johnston's attacks (planned or executed) was the concentration of massive force against one end of the enemy line or one isolated fragment of his adversary's army. He did not engage in wide flanking maneuvers, operate with independent columns, or commit his entire force to the initial attack. Instead, the Virginian attempted to keep his assault elements concentrated and physically connected to the rest of his army (he became noticeably more conservative in this regard after communications difficulties and poor judgments on the part of subordinates robbed him of what he had expected to be a crushing victory at Seven Pines). Finally, Johnston never went into battle without considering beforehand precisely how he would extract his army in case his assault failed. At Seven Pines and Peachtree Creek extensive fortifications were available in case of disaster; at Cassville he would have

escaped across the Etowah; and from Bentonville he had an excellent road net behind his lines.


All four characteristics of Johnston's battle planning came straight from Frederick the Great. "A general of an army will never give battle if it does not serve some important purpose," the Prussian maintained. "When he is forced by his enemy into a battle it is surely because he will have committed mistakes which force him to dance to the tune of his enemy." Distilling Frederick's experience into a series of maxims, Jomini unequivocally held that "battles are only to be fought in the following cases," after which he listed five possibilities, the first of which was "when some great advantage may be gained."³³

Frederick devoted entire chapters of instructions for his generals (replete with sketches and maps) to explaining why an army commander must thoroughly understand and utilize the terrain of his chosen battlefield. "A weak army must always select difficult and mountainous country where the terrain is confined, so that the enemy finds his superior numbers useless and often an incumbrance to him when he cannot go beyond your flanks," while "You must endeavor as far as possible to protect the flank of the attacking wing by a wood, morass, or even a simple pit." Since it was virtually impossible to know ground the enemy had chosen as well as he did, Jomini lauded Frederick for his ability to lure his opponents onto fields of his own selection, finding that true genius "consists in selecting a field of battle possessing all the strategic conveniences and advantages of ground; in order to there await the enemy, and to choose during the very battle the proper moment for assuming the initiative and falling upon the enemy with every chance of success."³⁴

Blasts from Federal artillery upon the Confederate position at Kenesaw Mountain can be seen in the illustration at right. But this Federal attack was the exception: Johnston was continually frustrated by Sherman's refusal to make frontal assaults.

This last comment captured the essence of Johnston's preferred battlefield strategy: set up on excellent terrain, wait for the enemy to advance, and then attack him. If such a stratagem appears naïve in hindsight, it is important to note that the Virginian actually did have a very

good eye for battle positions and luring his opponent toward them. Johnston's retreat across the Chickahominy in 1862 induced McClellan to split his army in half, precisely as the Rebel commander wished. Falling back from Dalton in May 1864, Johnston surprised Sherman by halting north of the Oostenaula at Resaca, persuaded the Union commander to split his forces at Cassville, and beat the Federals to the critical road junction at New Hope Church. Repeatedly during the Atlanta Campaign, Johnston baited his traps, but somehow they never closed. At Resaca a division commander muffed his assignment to contain the Union bridgehead over the Oostenaula, while wandering Federal cavalry convinced Hood to call off the attack at Cassville. The result in both cases: another retreat, another attempt to pick better ground. Between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, Sherman's forces occasionally



obliged Johnston with attacks (Pickett's Mill, Kenesaw Mountain), but never in such fashion as to allow Johnston to precipitate his own counterstroke. Instead, Sherman moved his lines as close as possible, entrenched, and then used his numerical superiority to keep swinging around the Confederate flanks.

Johnston's frustration is easy to understand. The Virginian had once commented on Lee's victory at Fredericksburg, "What luck some people have, nobody will ever attack me in such a place." He wrote to his wife, after having been maneuvered south of both the Oostenaula and Etowah Rivers without a battle, that "I have never been so little satisfied with myself..." When Johnston prepared his Atlanta report, he could not help by being struck by the parallels and differences between his campaign against Sherman and Lee's operations against U.S. Grant. In a much more candid ob-

servation than he was willing to place in an official document, he observed in a private letter that "after his experience in the Wilderness Lee adopted as thoro' a defensive as mine & added by it to his great fame. The only other difference between our operations is due to Grant's aggressiveness and Sherman's extreme caution..."³⁵ This was as close as Johnston ever approached to understanding why the long-held precepts of Frederick the Great had failed him, but he never quite made the final connection. Sherman had no real interest in giving Johnston a stand-up battle; the Federal commander wanted to gain ground more than fight, and the Virginian kept giving it to him. Johnston failed in Georgia not because he was afraid to attack, but because he only understood a single strategy for initiating battle, and when that repeatedly misfired he had no other intellectual weapons in his arsenal.

Throughout the war, Johnston's operations suffered far more from his continued efforts to apply Frederick's principles in a literal-minded fashion than from any psychological fears of the tactical offensive. Aside from the fact that the scale of the Civil War and technological developments like rifle-muskets, the telegraph, railroads, and ironclads changed the conflict into something that neither Frederick nor Napoleon would have understood very easily, Johnston's comprehension of Frederick, Jomini, and de Vernon never penetrated beneath the obvious. He missed entirely the point that, changing tactical conditions aside, Frederick wrote exclusively from the perspective of a monarch commanding his country's armies, not as one army commander in a constitutional republic. Frederick could pursue *any* strategy he favored because he had no civilian superiors to whom he had to answer; Johnston, as a Confederate officer, had no such luxury, though he often acted as if he did.

Johnston also failed to realize that the same Frederick who wrote that "a general of an army will never give battle if it does not serve some important purpose," sheepishly admitted after the Silesian wars that "I am not writing my own panegyric, for out of five battles which my troops have fought with the enemy only three were premeditated, and I was forced into the others."³⁶ In other words, the Prussian monarch was far more aggressive and prone to risk-taking on campaign than on paper. Johnston's temperament (and here it is entirely appropriate to return full circle to his psychological make-up) ran in the opposite direction.

In the end, does it really matter *why* Johnston fought pitched battles so rarely? There will be those who make the case that whether one blames his psyche or his intellect, Johnston still gave up too much ground, let too many opportunities slip past, and that a loser is still a loser no matter what rationalizations are provided by friendly biographers. Jefferson Davis (at least during the war) would not have agreed with that position, for he spent entirely too many sleepless hours trying to fathom the paradox of Joseph Johnston—so well trained, so well-loved by his troops, so capable in many regards, and ultimately so disastrous to his own cause. A government that understood his



limitations could have employed Johnston quite profitably.³⁷

Johnston also serves as a case study in the dangers of historians over-simplifying their subjects. The Virginian was a complex if not especially introspective man, and a highly skilled and educated if flawed commander. To paint him continually as an individual so hag-ridden by the specter of his own defeat that he spent his entire career looking over his shoulder for someplace else to retreat does injustice to the man and violence to historical truth. ■

1862 (Lynchburg VA: 1992) and Steven H. Newton, *Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond* (Lawrence KS: 2000); for Cassville and Peachtree Creek, see McMurry, *Atlanta 1864*; for Bentonville see Mark L. Bradley, *Bentonville: Last Stand in the Carolinas* (Campbell CA: 1996).

4. Gamaliel Bradford, *Confederate Portraits* (New York: 1914), p. 7
5. Jay Luvaas, "An Appraisal of Joseph E. Johnston," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, vol. IV, nr. 9 (January 1966): pp. 55-7; *Report of the Commission appointed under the eighth section of the act of Congress of June*

the certainty of winning." Maury, *Recollections of a Virginian*, 150; Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, *The Politics of Command, Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy* (Baton Rouge: 1973), p. 3; T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," in David H. Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War* (Baton Rouge LA: 1960), pp. 23-46; Hermann Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won, A Military History of the Civil War* (Urbana IL: 1982), pp. 9-17; Craig L. Symonds, *Joseph E. Johnston, A Civil War Biography* (New York: 1992), p. 71; Dennis H. Mahan, *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the manner of handling them in the presence of an enemy, with a historical sketch of the rise and progress of tactics, &c. &c. intended as a Supplement to the System of Tactics adopted for the military service of the United States, and especially for the use of officers of militia and volunteers* (New York: 1861; reprint of 1847 edition) [hereafter cited as *Out-Post*].

8. Johnston specifically recommended *Instruction destinée aux Troupes Légères, Instruction Dérobée, and Instruction Militaire pour les Généraux*, which only appear to have been available in French or German at the time. *Report of the Commission*, 190. There are now English translations of all three books on the Web and in hard copy, but the most readily available compilation is Jay Luvaas, ed., *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (Pennington NJ: 1995). All citations in this article refer to that edition, which is cited as *Frederick*.

9. Robert M. Hughes, "Some War Letters of General Joseph E. Johnston," *William & Mary Quarterly* (October, 1931): p. 319; *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 volumes (Washington DC: 1880-1896): 5, p. 777 [hereafter cited as *OR*; all references are to Series I unless otherwise indicated].

10. O'Connor remains a shadowy and neglected figure. There are two small collections of his papers extant; the twenty-odd documents in the John Michael O'Connor papers at the Clement Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, have more to do with his involvement in William Crawford's unsuccessful 1824 presidential bid than his military service. The O'Connor papers at the U.S. Military Academy throw more (but not enough) light on his relationship with officers like Sylvanus Thayer and his translation of de Vernon.

11. The full—jaw-breaking—citation is John Michael O'Connor, *A Treatise on the Sci-*



The conventional view of Johnston's strategy.

STEVEN H. NEWTON is Professor of History at Delaware State University and the author of *Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond* and *Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in 1864*. He is currently working on a history of the critical 1864 campaigns.

NOTES:

1. C. Vann Woodward, ed., *Mary Chesnut's Civil War* (New York: 1994), p. 268.
2. Stephen Davis, *Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions* (Wilmington DE: 2001), pp. 7-15; Richard M. McMurry, *Atlanta 1864, Last Chance for the Confederacy* (Lincoln NE: 2000), p. 10; Steven E. Woodworth, "Dark Portents: Confederate Command at the Battle of Williamsburg," in William J. Miller, ed., *The Peninsula Campaign, Yorktown to the Seven Days*, vol. III (Campbell CA: 1997), p. 3.
3. For Seven Pines see Steven H. Newton, *The Battle of Seven Pines, May 31-June 1,*

21, 1860, to examine into the organization, system of discipline, and course of instruction of the United States Military Academy at West Point (Washington DC: 36th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Mis. Doc. 3, 1860), p. 190; Dabney H. Maury, *Recollections of a Virginian in the Mexican, Indian, and Civil Wars*, 2nd edition, (New York: 1894), p. 146.


6. Maury, *Recollections of a Virginian*, 154.
7. Archer Jones later (in collaboration with Hermann Hattaway) revised this list of doctrinal influences to include the Mexican War experiences of future Civil War commanders. With respect to Johnston, however, it is germane to keep in mind that all war experiences do not necessarily lead to profound reflections on the general's art. The Virginian's most revealing comment about the Mexican adventure, made in 1856, was "I hope it may never be my lot to fight troops much better than El Senor Mexicano. There is no comfort like that of going into battle with

ence of War and Fortifications: Composed for the Use of the Imperial Polytechnick School, and Military Schools; and Translated for the War Department, for the use of the Military Academy of the United States: to which is added a Summary of the Principles and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations, 2 volumes, (New York: 1817) [hereafter cited as *Treatise*].

12. Almost without exception the officers surveyed in the *Report of the Commission* in 1860 complained that there was in fact no form of professional development available in the Regular Army. See Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, enlarged edition, (Bloomington IN: Indiana University, 1984), pp. 144-51; "A History of Earthworks in the United States," www.nps.gov/phso/sp/eawoch01.pdf.
13. *Treatise*, pp. 40n, 62-63n, 80n, 201n, 302, 379n; Henry W. Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science* (New York: 1862); Wiegley, *History of the United States Army*, pp. 151-52.
14. It should also be noted that the potential impact of O'Connor's *Treatise* on future Civil War commanders did not end when Mahan's *Outposts* replaced it. Ever frugal, the Military Academy sold its stock of O'Connor's book to the Virginian Military Institute, where it saw continued use for at least another decade, and possibly into the 1850s. Whether O'Connor's text had any demonstrable influence on the development of officers like Robert Rodes is an open question, and one that bears investigating. Perhaps even more enlightening, the copy of the *Treatise* acquired in the course of researching this article was borrowed from V.M.I., and had obviously seen at least two or three decades of hard use by cadets. The page margins abounded in doodles, sketches of cannon and soldiers, and even a couple of fairly racy if anatomically incorrect portrayals of young ladies. Those who picture the young Johnstons, McClellans, and Longstreets of later fame sitting in rapt attention to their course in engineering and strategy would do well to remember their own undergraduate days before postulating the great influence of professors like Mahan. *Treatise*, pp. v-vi; Mahan, *Out-Post*, 26-27.
15. *Treatise*, 195.
16. *Treatise*, 412.
17. *Frederick*, 118-20.
18. *OR* 11, pt. 2, p. 405.
19. *OR* 11, pt. 2, p. 456.
20. *OR* 32, pt. 2, pp. 751-52.
21. *Frederick*, 118; *Treatise*, 412.
22. Mahan, it should be noted in passing, never advised against making detach-

ments or advocated such an emphasis on concentration, so arguments that Johnston somehow came under his influence are difficult if not impossible to sustain. *OR* 12, pt. 3, pp. 896-97; *Out-Post*, 14-17.

23. *Frederick*, 119-20; *OR* 12, pt. 3, p. 852.
24. Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations Directed during the late War Between the States* (Bloomington IN: 1959; reprint of 1874 edition), p. 106; *OR* 38, pt. 5, p. 883; *Treatise*, 363.
25. *Treatise*, 319-20.
26. *Frederick*, 328-30.
27. *Treatise*, 192; *Frederick*, 307-08; Johnston, *Narrative*, 62-63.
28. *Frederick*, 330-32.
29. *Frederick*, 331-32.
30. *Treatise*, 192; *Frederick*, 331-32.
31. *OR* 38, pt. 3, pp. 615-19; 38, pt. 4, pp. 736, 777, 796-97.
32. *OR* 38, pt. 3, pp. 618-19.
33. *Frederick*, 139-40; *Treatise*, 451.
34. *Frederick*, 176, 192; *Treatise*, 487.
35. Symonds, Johnston, 192, 296; Hughes, "War Letters," 321.
36. *Frederick*, 139-40.
37. Of course, as the cases of Albert Sidney Johnston, Braxton Bragg, Lucius Northrop and others prove, realistically assessing the strengths and limitations of his generals was not one of President Davis' great strengths.



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"I TELL YOU, SIR, THEY

AFTER THE BATTLE OF SHILOH and the fall of Corinth in the spring of 1862, Major General Henry Wager Halleck dispatched Major General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio across northern Alabama, toward the vital railroad center of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Countering this threat, Confederate General Braxton Bragg's Army of the Mississippi left its camp at Tupelo and, by a roundabout trip through Alabama and Georgia, reached the city ahead of Buell. There Bragg and Major General Edmund Kirby Smith agreed to move their armies into Kentucky. Entering the Commonwealth first, Smith won an overwhelming victory at Richmond, captured Lexington and Frankfort, and then spread his command across central Kentucky. Encouraged by Smith's success, Bragg entered the state near Glasgow, captured a Union garrison at Munfordsville, and moved his army to Bardstown, southeast of Louisville.

Buell meanwhile had reacted to the invasion and rushed his troops from Nashville to Louisville, thus ensuring that the latter, his base and the key to the Midwest, would remain in Federal hands. As tens of thousands of recruits arrived to bolster his command, Buell devised a plan to rid Kentucky of both Bragg and Smith. He sent a diversionary force toward Frankfort to keep Smith busy, and led the remainder of his command, almost 58,000 men, toward Bardstown to attack Bragg. When the Confederates at Bardstown learned that a sizable number of Federals were storming down upon them, they withdrew to Perryville, a key road junction that offered an adequate supply of water in drought ravaged Kentucky. Holding Perryville also ensured that the route to the Confederate supply depot at Bryanstown remained open.¹

ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 7, the brigade of Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell was posted about a mile in front of Perryville on Bottom Hill, south of the Squire Bottom House. Just a little farther west on the Springfield Pike, the tired and thirsty Federal III Corps under Major

General Charles C. Gilbert arrived as night fell. Around midnight, pickets reported that they had found some pools of water over in the bed of Doctor's Creek. However, it was in Confederate hands. Desperately needing water, Gilbert ordered Brigadier General Philip H. Sheridan to take his division forward and claim it. In a series of attacks that lasted well past daylight, Sheridan's division wrestled with Liddell's brigade over the possession of Peters and Bottom Hills, and the water that was contained in the valley between. Not wanting Liddell to be completely unsupported, division commander Major General Simon B. Buckner directed Brigadier General Bushrod Rust Johnson to send a regiment forward across the Chaplin River to occupy the roads in his front, and moved Brigadier General Patrick Cleburne's brigade to support Johnson.²

Some two miles to the northwest, the lead elements of Major General Alexander M. McCook's I Corps had meanwhile arrived at the intersection of the Mackville and Benton Roads, known locally as the Dixville Crossroads. The distinct report of artillery was heard to the front and right and some Confederate scouts were spotted in the woods. Third Division commander Brigadier General Lovell H. Rousseau sent skirmishers forward, closely followed by Colonel William H. Lytle's brigade, minus Captain Cyrus O. Loomis' battery, which was left on the Mackville Road. Soon Colonel Buckner Board of the 2nd Kentucky Cavalry raced back to report to Rousseau that the enemy had been sighted and was advancing. Rousseau immediately halted his column, and he and McCook rode toward the John Russell House.

Riding to the top of the high ground southeast of the Russell House, the two generals had a clear view of Peters Hill about a mile to their front, and the sounds of fighting could be clearly heard. McCook instructed Rousseau to put his division in line of battle north of and perpendicular to the Mackville Road, and called for Loomis to bring up his battery to a commanding ridge "to the left and



near the Russell House." Rousseau then placed Lytle's and Colonel Leonard A. Harris' brigades into line.


From Peters Hill, Captain (acting Brigadier General) Ebenezer Gay, commanding the 1,700-strong Third Cavalry Brigade, observed the dust rising from McCook's I Corps and sent a courier requesting infantry to support his artillery pieces. His tired troopers had been pressing the enemy most of the morning. Responding to this request, Rousseau sent the 42nd Indiana down the hill to support Captain William A. Hotchkiss' two-gun battery, meanwhile ordering Loomis to bring forward a section of his Parrott Rifles to shell the woods. Unlimbering in position on a ridge above the Squire Bottom House, the batteries opened up on Liddell's skirmishers. McCook then had Rousseau advance the skirmishers of the 10th Ohio to the left and front, along with a company of the 2nd Ken-

ARE YANKEES”

JOHN P. WALSH, JR.

IN AN ARTICLE in *North & South*, Volume 4, #7, Kenneth W. Noe told the story of “The Other High Water Mark,” a stone wall defended by Union troops commanded by Brigadier General John C. Starkweather, whose stubborn defense prevented the collapse of the left wing of the Union army at Perryville in October 1862. This article recounts the struggle in the center of the battlefield, where another equally stubborn defense prevented the Confederates from pushing forward, capturing a critical crossroads, and isolating the Federal I Corps—which could then have been cut to pieces, producing a very different outcome to the battle.

*Painting of the Russell House by C.L. Frankenstein,
courtesy Chattanooga-Chicamauga National Military Park.*



tucky Cavalry to support their left. Gay additionally sent forward some of his troopers toward town. It was now about 11:00 a.m., and McCook was fully confident that there was no immediate threat in his front, even though his lead elements now occupied a finger of land projecting toward the Confederate lines. An isolated dwelling, the Squire Bottom House, was situated on the eastern slope of this salient, where the ground fell steeply toward Doctor's Creek. This farm building, with its associated stone walls and rail fences, was to become what Confederate Lieutenant General William J. Hardee later called “the key to the Federal lines.” McCook left instructions to post Brigadier General James S. Jackson's division on the south side of the Mackville Road once it arrived, and galloped off to report to Buell at his headquarters at the Dorsey House, two or three miles to the rear.³

Across the lines General Braxton Bragg arrived in Perryville, expecting to find the attack he had previously ordered underway. To his great displeasure, Bragg learned that Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk and his senior generals had decided to adopt the “defensive-offensive,” allowing them to be ready to counter the moves of the numerically superior enemy, rather than attack. For the second time in just a few weeks, Polk had disobeyed Bragg's orders. Polk's line now lay on both sides of the Chaplin River, Buckner's division on the extreme right, Brigadier General James P. Anderson's in the center, and Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham's on the left. The cavalry was positioned to cover and screen the flanks. Ahead of the main line, Liddell was breaking off his engagement with Sheridan.

Bragg quickly discovered that Polk's right flank was in the air, the cavalry being posted too far away. Bragg's aide, J.

Stoddard Johnston, later recalled that from that flank he could see long lines of the enemy glistening with bayonets; this was Rousseau's division approaching the Russell farm. Determined to prevent his position being turned, Bragg pulled Cheatham's division out of line and sent it on a two-mile march north to anchor the right. He then split Anderson's division in two, sending the brigades of Brigadier General John Calvin Brown and Colonel Thomas Marshall Jones to cover the gap between Buckner and Cheatham, while leaving the brigades of Brigadier General Daniel Weisiger Adams and Colonel Samuel Powell to protect the line of retreat to Danville and Harrodsburg.

The Federals relaxed under the false assumption that Bragg's army had begun a full retreat. Rousseau knew that his men needed water, and that there were some small pools in the ravine-like dry bed of Doctor's Creek in front and to the right



Brigadier General
Sterling A.M. Wood



Brigadier General
Lovell H. Rousseau



Captain
Cyrus O. Loomis



View from the position of Darden's left section toward the Mackville Road.



View from the position of Darden's right section.

of Loomis' guns. He decided to allow his men to move forward a regiment at a time to secure water. The 42nd Indiana went first, down the Mackville road and into the ravine. Major James Maynard Shanklin wrote, "All back of us excepting the road down which we came and which had been cut out was a precipitous rock bluff from 25 to 50 feet high, up which it

was impossible to ride a horse, and only possible for a man to climb; this bluff extended down the creek about a quarter of a mile, where the bank gradually ascended again towards the place where Loomis had his guns." It was there, with their backs to a bluff and their front facing a rising series of fields, that the men were commanded to rest and fill their

canteens with water. Some of them soon stumbled onto a small spring on the right side of the road. They were almost too relaxed, for their arms were stacked and no skirmishers or pickets had been placed.⁴

Meanwhile, around 11:00 a.m., Hardee began putting his wing of the Confederate army into position to attack. He directed Buckner to place Johnson's brigade near the Dye House, with Cleburne in support. On Johnson's right would be the brigade of Brigadier Sterling A.M. Wood, while Liddell's brigade remained in reserve behind Cleburne, poised to counter any possible turning movement from the woods near Bottom and Peters Hills. Anderson's division straddled Buckner, Jones in the first line to the left of Wood with Brown behind him as support, Powell on the far left with Adams just to his right, the two divided by the Springfield Road. Bolstering Adams and Powell was Captain Henry C. Semple's battery of 12-pounders, posted on Seminary Hill, a commanding position overlooking the left.

Johnson's brigade went into line in the backyard of the Dye House, and he sent skirmishers from the 17th and the 25th Tennessee forward to reconnoiter. They advanced cautiously about one half a mile and halted on the crest of a hill that overlooked Doctor's Creek. With Adams' and Powell's brigades not yet having advanced from Perryville, Buckner was concerned about his left, and ordered a section of Captain Putnam Darden's battery to join the 17th Tennessee and protect his flank. The skirmishers of the 25th Tennessee meanwhile had reached the crest of a wooded hill, from which they had sighted the enemy. Learning this, Johnson sent Darden's remaining section to support the 25th.

After some time, Johnson's main line closed up behind Darden's two sections, while Cleburne advanced to take Johnson's former position in the rear of the Dye House. Johnson's line contained from left to right the 17th Tennessee supporting Darden's first section, the 23rd Tennessee, Darden's second section supported by both the 5th Confederate Regiment and the 25th Tennessee, the 44th Tennessee, and on the extreme right was the 37th Tennessee supporting both Swett's Mississippi and Calvert's Arkansas batteries. Johnson later wrote that this position "commanded a fine view of the


cleared land on both slopes on the margins of the Doctor's Fork and of the open fields beyond, which were partly occupied by the enemy." There Johnson's men hunkered down in the woods, to the rear of the guns they were supporting, and waited.⁵

Around 11:30 a.m. Adams' brigade prepared to move out. Adams called for Major John Edward Austin and his battalion of sharpshooters to lead the advance. Cavalryman John W. Headley, having temporarily attached himself to the battalion, remembered that "Major Austin mounted my horse and marched forward two or three hundred yards through a timbered pasture in which there was considerable brush and a good many stumps." Austin deployed his first company as skirmishers, the rest of the brigade following in column.

General Anderson's orders were for Adams and Powell to stay abreast of each other while straddling the Springfield Pike. For reasons still not clear, however, Adams split off from the pike and moved obliquely north though the partially wooded countryside, on a straight course toward the Squire Bottom House. This maneuver, whether intentional or not, hid Adams' brigade from the Federals over on Peters Hill. No sooner had Adams angled north than a message from Anderson arrived telling him to stop or slow down so that Powell could catch up. Adams in fact stopped and started several times, and sent a number of messages to Powell asking him to hurry up. He also called for Captain Cuthbert Slocumb to bring up his 5th Company of Washington Artillery. Receiving the order at 1:15 p.m., Slocumb steadily advanced until he passed Adams' column and fell in behind Austin's battalion.

Moving to their assigned position, the skirmishers of Wood's brigade stumbled across Federal skirmishers in the woods and opened fire. Driving the enemy before them, the Confederates reached the treeline and saw Federal artillery in position across the open fields. Fearing these guns would open fire any minute, Wood dispatched a rider to find some artillery support. Wood's brigade was ordered to hold its position, thus creating a new gap in Buckner's line, that was filled by Brown's brigade.

On the right, Cheatham's artillery opened what became a general artillery fight. While the Confederates on the left



Map Graphics © DLF Group 2002

quietly closed on the Bottom House, an impatient Rousseau decided to advance his division toward the Chaplin River. Later, he justified this move by stating that he supposed he "would be substantially obeying orders by moving on toward the water." Lytle's brigade moved first, its commander sending an order to the 10th Ohio, earlier deployed as skirmishers, to fall in at the rear. Colonel John

Beatty's 3rd Ohio led off, sighting the enemy as the head of the column reached Hotchkiss' artillery. A surprised Colonel Lytle distinctly heard the scattering fire from infantry off to his left, and realized that it originated from the 10th Ohio. A staff officer reported to Lytle that he had discovered the enemy on the other side of the ravine, and Lytle himself soon saw "heavy masses of rebels apparently de-

ARMY OF THE OHIO ORDER-OF-BATTLE



MAJOR GENERAL
DON CARLOS BUELL



MAJOR GENERAL
ALEXANDER M. McCOOK



BRIGADIER GENERAL
LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU

2nd KY Cavalry (6 Companies), Colonel Buckner Board
1st MI Engineers & Mechanics, Major Enos Hopkins
(Companies A, C, & H)



COLONEL
LEONARD A. HARRIS

38th IN Infantry, Benjamin F. Scribner (W)
2nd OH Infantry, John Kell
33rd OH Infantry, Oscar F. Moore (W)
94th OH Infantry, Joseph W. Frizell,
10th WI Infantry, Alfred R. Chapin
5th IN Battery Light Artillery, Peter Simonson
(2; 12pdr + 2; 6pdr + 2; 3.8"R = 6 Guns)



COLONEL
WILLIAM H. LYTLE (W)

42nd IN Infantry, James G. Jones
88th IN Infantry, George Humphrey
15th KY Infantry, Curran Pope (MW)
3rd OH Infantry, John Beatty
10th OH Infantry, Joseph W. Burke
1st MI Light Artillery, Battery "A," Cyrus O. Loomis
(6; 10pdr Parrott Rifles = 6 Guns)

(III CORPS)



GAY'S CAVALRY BRIGADE
CAPTAIN EBENEZER GAY

9th KY Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel John Boyle
(Companies A, B, D, F, H, I, K, & M)
2nd MI Cavalry, Archibald Campbell (W)
9th PA Cavalry, Thomas James
2nd MN Battery Light Artillery, William A. Hotchkiss
(1 Section) (2; 12pdr = 2 Guns)



ARTILLERY
HENRY HESCOCK

1st MO Light Artillery, Battery G
(4; 12pdr + 2; 10pdr Parrott Rifles = 6 Guns)



= infantry = cavalry = artillery; xxxx = army;

xxx = corps; xx = division; x = brigade; I = battery; s = strength;


* = approximate; — = unknown; mw = mortally wounded; k = killed;

w = wounded; m = missing; t = total casualties.

(Only the units involved in
the action in the Squire Bottom
House sector are included.)

2,250s	142k	427w	39m	608t	27%
436s	38k	132w	0m	170t	39%
460s	31k	77w	2m	110t	23.9%
388s	26k	78w	5m	109t	28.1%
500s	7k	17w	25m	49t	9.8%
376s	38k	109w	2m	149t	40%
90s	2k	14w	5m	21t	23.3%
2,580s	187k	614w	35m	836t	32.4%
490s	20k	133w	21m	174t	35.5%
*434s	2k	20w	0m	22t	5%
517s	62k	136w	5m	203t	39.3%
500s	42k	148w	0m	190t	38%
528s	60k	169w	8m	237t	44.9%
111s	1k	8w	1m	10t	9%
1,700s	4k	14w	1m	19t	1%
*760s	0k	1w	1m	2t	—
300s	4k	13w	0m	17t	5.7%
600s	0k	0w	0m	0t	0%
*40s	0k	0w	0m	0t	—
—	0k	3w	0m	3t	—

Source: figures are based on the latest
research by Kurt Holman, manager,
Perryville Battlefield State Historic Site.



Major General Don Carlos Buell



Major General Alexander M. McCook

side of the Mackville Road was the 15th Kentucky, while Loomis' battery was on the opposite side of the road on top of a ridge across and slightly in front of the barn. The 10th Ohio, returning from the skirmish, was ordered to support the guns. The inexperienced 88th Indiana waited in reserve about four hundred feet in front of the Russell House. Seemingly forgotten, the men of the 42nd Indiana were left to fend for themselves in the ravine at the bottom of the bluff.

Harris put his brigade into line on the left of Simonson's guns that were situated next to Loomis. His front line consisted from right to left of the 10th Wisconsin, the 2nd Ohio, and the 33rd Ohio. The 38th Indiana and the 94th Ohio were placed in reserve. On the far right, covering the gap between Lytle's right and the III Corps was Hotchkiss' battery, supported by a portion of Gay's cavalry.

The artillery duel lasted for well over an hour, without major effect. In the bed of Doctor's Creek the men of the 42nd Indiana relaxed. Apparently due to the irregular topography of the land, they did not realize that the "scouts" they had seen


playing into line of battle." A concerned Rousseau rode up, and the moment he put his looking glass to his eye, "they opened some two or three batteries and there was a very rapid and accurate firing of shells." Hotchkiss' gunners jumped to their pieces and returned fire, but their smoothbores did not have the range to reach the Confederate guns. The sudden bursting of shells among Lytle's brigade brought the reality home that Bragg had not retreated.

Under a storm of Confederate shells, Rousseau called for Loomis to bring up the remainder of his guns, had Captain Peter Simonson bring up his 5th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery, and placed his division into line. As the 3rd Ohio crested the hill near the Squire Bottom barn and began descending toward the Bottom House the shells started falling. Beatty promptly countermarched the regiment back up and over the crest to a sheltered position. Supporting them on the south


had chased the 10th Ohio out of the woods. Apart from the artillery fire, all was quiet along the Federal line. Some Confederate cavalry were spotted across the Chaplin, but McCook suspected they only were “threatening my train in the rear.” Then about 2:00 p.m., the silence was broken when skirmishers of the 33rd Ohio were attacked. McCook sent the remainder of the 33rd forward and reinforced them with the 2nd. Cheatham’s attack had begun against McCook’s left. McCook later wrote, “My attention was directed principally to the left, where the attack was most fiercely made. I had no apprehension about my right as it rested near Gilbert’s left.” He did not know that in a few minutes his right would be anything but secure: Hardee’s wing was ready to join the attack.⁶

Austin’s battalion, still covering the front of Adams’ brigade, was the first to stumble upon the enemy. Sharpshooter William Trask’s journal records: “At 2:30 PM we advanced cautiously through a skirt of woods [...] directly in front of us the enemy was discovered drawn up behind a stone wall fence along a ravine or dry run.... On top of a sloping hill beyond a long line of battle could be plainly seen.” Trask had seen Lytle’s and Harris’ brigades lining the hill across Doctor’s Creek. The 5th Company of Washington Artillery, never a unit to miss a fight, raced forward and unlimbered on top of the commanding ridge. Moving down the ridge, Austin’s men silently approached an unsuspecting enemy.⁷

In the sketch below, the Confederates assault Harris’ brigade.



2:30 PM: THE SQUIRE BOTTOM SECTOR



**GENERAL
BRAXTON BRAGG**



**LIEUTENANT GENERAL
WILLIAM J. HARDEE (Left Wing)**



**BRIGADIER GENERAL
JAMES PATTON ANDERSON**



**BRIGADIER GENERAL
JOHN C. BROWN**

1st FL Infantry, William Miller
3rd FL Infantry, Daniel B. Bird
41st MS Infantry, William Feinster Tucker (W)
14th GA Battalion, Light Artillery, Joseph Palmer
Battery "A" (2; 12pdr + 2; 6pdr = 4 Guns)



**BRIGADIER GENERAL
DANIEL W. ADAMS**

13th LA Infantry, Randall L. Gibson
Austin's LA Battalion, Major John Edward Austin
Sharpshooters (aka 14th Battalion)
16th LA Infantry, Daniel C. Gober
20th LA Infantry, August Reichard
25th LA Infantry, Stewart W. Fisk
5th LA Company, Washington Artillery,
Cuthbert H. Slocomb
(2; 12pdr + 2; 6pdr + 2; 3.3" Rifles = 6 Guns)



**COLONEL
SAMUEL POWELL**

45th AL Infantry, James Graham Gilchrist
1st AR Infantry, John W. Colquitt
24th MS Infantry, William F. Dowd
29th TN Infantry, Horace Rice
Barret's MO Battery, Overton W. Barret
(2; 6pdr + 2; 12pdr = 4 Guns)



**COLONEL
THOMAS M. JONES**

27th MS Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel James L. Autry
30th MS Infantry, George G. FallsNeill
34th MS Infantry, Samuel (W) Benton
2nd AL Battalion Light Artillery, Charles L. Lumsden
Battery "F" (4; 12pdr = 4 Guns)

Source: figures are based on the latest research
by Kurt Holman, manager, Perryville Battlefield
State Historic Site.



View looking east from above the Chatham farm.

Just across the road, hidden by the hills and woods, Johnson's brigade waited their turn to fight. Johnson recalled, "the slope in front of my brigade was broken by slight spurs and by an undulation running nearly parallel with the general direction of the brow of the hill." In front of his right wing was a "farm-house, with outhouses, orchard, and inclosed grounds." A rail fence ran parallel to the crest of the undulation and extended from the left of the farmhouse (Chatham House) to the road. About two hundred

yards beyond the rail fence was the bed of Doctor's Creek, "along a portion of which in front of my [Johnson's] brigade was a stone fence, and the bank itself was nearly vertical, of solid rock, and from 3 to 5 feet high." More stone walls lined the opposite side of Doctor's Creek, these and additional stone and rail fences enclosing the Bottom House. Rail fences lined the Mackville road as it went uphill on a slight northward angle into the heart of Lytle's line. Above the house on the ridge was a barn. Three successive stone walls,

parallel to one another and the creek, were spaced out like steps leading up the ridge. "The position was a very strong one," Johnson wrote. "There was perhaps none stronger in the enemy's lines." Resting on the east side of the creek, along the rail fence near the Chatham house, was the unsuspecting 42nd Indiana.⁹

At around 2:30 p.m. Buckner ordered Johnson's brigade forward, telling its commander to "change his front to the left about twenty degrees." On Buckner's right a sole brigade, that of Jones, ad-



ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI ORDER-OF-BATTLE (LEFT WING)

(Only the units involved in the action in the Squire Bottom House sector are included.)

3 **BRIGADIER GENERAL SIMON B. BUCKNER**

1st **BRIGADIER GENERAL ST. JOHN R. LIDDELL**

2nd AR Infantry, John Gratiot
5th AR Infantry, Lucius P. Featherston
6th AR Infantry, Alexander T. Hawthorn
7th AR Infantry, D. A. Gillespie
8th AR Infantry, John H. Kelly
Swett's MS Battery, Lieutenant Tom Havern
(2; 12pdr + 6; 6pdr = 8 Guns)

2nd **BRIGADIER GENERAL PATRICK R. CLEBURNE**

13th /15th AR Infantry, Lucis E. Polk (W)
2nd TN Infantry, Captain C. P. Moore
35th TN Infantry, Benjamin J. Hill
48th TN Infantry, George H. Nixon
Calvert's AR Battery, 2nd Lt. Thomas J. Key
(1 Section) (2; 12pdr = 2 Guns)

3rd **BRIGADIER GENERAL BUSHROD R. JOHNSON**

5th CS Infantry, James A. Smith
(8 Companies)
17th TN Infantry, Albert S. Marks
23rd TN Infantry, Richard H. Keeble
(8 Companies)
25th TN Infantry, John M. Hughes
37th TN Infantry, Moses White
44th TN Infantry, John S. Fulton
Darden's MS Battery, Putnam Darden
(2; 6pdr + 2; 12pdr = 4 Guns)

4th **BRIGADIER GENERAL STERLING A. M. WOOD (W)**

3rd GA Cavalry (Companies G & F);
Captain Reuben L. Hill
16th AL Infantry, William Basis Wood
33rd AL Infantry, Samuel Adams (W)
3rd CS Infantry, Lt. Colonel Henry V. Keep
15th MS Battalion, Major A. T. Hawkins
Sharpshooters (Companies A & B)
32nd MS Infantry, Mark P. Lowrey (W)
45th MS Infantry, Aaron Bascom Hardcastle
Semple's AL Battery, Henry C. Semples
(4; 12pdr + 2; 3.8" Rifles = 6 Guns)

—	15k	57w	0m	72t	—
—	1k	—	—	—	—
—	4k	—	—	—	—
—	2k	—	—	—	—
300s	1k	—	—	—	—
—	6k	—	—	—	—
70s	1k	1w	0m	2t	3%
900s	25k	325w	0m	350t	38.9%
—	16k	—	—	—	—
188s	2k	—	—	—	—
270s	4k	—	—	—	—
250s	3k	—	—	—	—
—	0k	—	—	—	—
1,540s	32k	164w	9m	205t	13.3%
240s	6k	4w	5m	45t	18.8%
200s	4k	20w	0m	24t	12%
201s	8k	43w	2m	53t	26.4%
375s	0k	8w	1m	9t	2.1%
230s	0k	28w	1m	29t	12.6%
229s	14k	29w	0m	43t	18.8%
65s	0k	2w	0m	2t	3%
—	41k	—	—	—	—
—	0k	—	—	—	—
600s	0k	—	—	—	—
380s	14k	153w	0m	167t	44%
—	0k	—	—	—	—
57s	2k	10w	1m	13t	22.8%
—	7k	—	—	—	—
—	17k	—	—	—	—
109s	1k	—	—	—	—

—	47k	190w	2m	239t	—
—	13k	19w	2m	34t	—
247s	12k	90w	0m	102t	41.3%
472s	21k	69w	0m	90t	19.1%
125s	1k	12w	0m	13t	10.4%
1,920s	7k	78w	67m	152t	7.9%
328s	1k	*15w	*16m	*32t	7.8%
150s	1k	11w	2m	14t	9.3%
422s	1k	14w	0m	15t	3.6%
360s	1k	*15w	*16m	*32t	8.9%
*510s	3k	*18w	*20m	*41t	8%
150s	0k	5w	13m	18t	12%
—	13k	—	—	—	—
600s	2k	—	—	—	—
—	0k	2w	0m	2t	—
—	10k	11w	0m	21t	—
—	1k	—	—	—	—
—	0k	0w	0m	0t	—
—	42k	—	—	—	—
350s	15k	—	—	—	—
—	2k	—	—	—	—
300s	24k	125w	1m	150t	50%
125s	1k	—	—	—	—

 = infantry; xxxx = army; xxx = corps; xx = division; x = brigade;
l = battery; s = strength; * = approximate; — = unknown; k = killed;
w = wounded; m = missing; t = total casualties.

vanced. It remains a mystery who ordered Jones forward, but the fact is his unseasoned troops moved out minutes before Johnson received word to advance. Supported by Captain Charles L. Lumsden's Alabama battery they advanced up the hill and crested the top, only to come face to face with Harris' brigade, posted on a ridge across the valley. Jones' pell-mell attack swiftly fell apart, accomplishing little except for dislodging Simonson's battery and keeping Lytle's attention focused on the left. Jones lost almost fifty percent of

his men. Johnson received the order to advance from Buckner, silenced his battery, and prepared his brigade to move, unaware that Adams had arrived across the road on his left.


Still in the creek bed, the 42nd Indiana's Major Shanklin commented to H Company commander Captain James H. Bryant that the Confederate guns were no longer firing. The silence was then broken by the verbal commands of a regiment going into line. Confident there was no enemy present,

Shanklin told Bryant, "that is one of our regiments taking position on our right." On the Confederate side, Major Austin reported to Adams that he had sighted the enemy, but Adams did not believe him and ordered Austin to hold his fire. Austin's men, however, knew better, and fired "a few shots at a party getting water from the spring in the ravine, killing five of them at the first volley." Adams was shocked, and accused Austin of firing on fellow Confederates. To this Austin replied, "I tell you, sir, they are Yan-

kees!" The next moment, Adams, who was standing next to the Washington Artillery's Captain Slocomb aiming one of the guns, was startled when a stray shot came crashing through the woods narrowly missing his head. "By God," he exclaimed, "they are Yankees—Fire!" At 2:35 p.m., Slocomb's guns opened fire on the Chatham Farm.⁹

Mounted on his horse, the 42nd Indiana's Colonel James G. Jones reacted quickly to the dire situation his regiment faced. He swung his right wing around and ordered them to open fire, but since "the enemy was completely hidden by the woods...our firing at them was very ineffectual." Austin's battalion reported receiving a "tremendous volley from behind a stone wall, completely filling the air with bullets," and in response, advanced with a yell, dodging the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters as they opened up from behind trees and stumps. The 42nd Indiana "fired at us once more and then ran," Headley remembered "We were halted to fire, and after one shot the battalion was formed in line within a hundred yards of the creek." Ordered to fall back, Jones told Lieutenant Colonel Denby to retire the right wing up the Mackville Road, and then rode to check his left.¹⁰

Simultaneous with Austin's attack, Johnson's brigade emerged from the woods, spotted the enemy below, and was ordered to charge. The brigade tumbled down the hillside, all order lost as it encountered the numerous fences. The center of the brigade consisted, from left to right, of the 5th Confederate, 25th Tennessee, and 44th Tennessee regiments. The 44th advanced through a corn field into an open meadow and found itself taking fire on both flanks. Simonson's battery had spotted them as they rolled down the hill and opened fire, and another battery played on their left flank. Trying to minimize the fire's effects, they obliques to the left. Doing so more than they should have, however, they "suffered terribly from the fire of the batteries to the right and left of us and the sharpshooters of the enemy posted in the orchard and behind the rock fence on our right." Having orders to move in unison with the regiments on his right and left, Colonel Hughes of the 25th Tennessee thought he was "compelled to change my course more to the left than I thought we ought to go." In fact the 44th Tennessee moved so much to the left that they




KENTUCKY HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Major General
Simon B. Buckner



GENERALS IN GRAY

Brigadier General
Daniel W. Adams



NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Colonel
William H. Lytle




BOTH AUTHORS COLLECTION

Johnson's route to the Bottom House.

crossed in front of the 25th. Meanwhile, the 5th Confederate Regiment had temporarily disappeared, most likely becoming entangled in the fences. This led the 25th to believe they were now the left of the line. The true left of the brigade was in fact farther behind, Colonel R.H. Keeble's 23rd Tennessee having had to halt several times to pull down fences. On the far right of the brigade, not wheeling as ordered, Colonel Moses White's 37th Tennessee was well in front of the others and headed straight toward the Chatham House. White's men advanced about two hundred yards, encountered a heavy volley from the 42nd Indiana, and were stopped in their tracks. White recalled that "the small-arms of the enemy, shells and grape from their batteries swept around us in perfect showers."

Meanwhile, Colonel Jones had found the 37th Tennessee firing into his left. Shanklin remembered that Jones rode past him but he "could not hear any thing he said but seeing the right wing

giving away, I supposed the intention was to get the regiment out of the ravine if possible." Jones continued along the bed of Doctor's Creek about two to three hundred yards and managed to escape up the hill where the bluff ended. Faced with ever hotter small arms fire from Johnson's Tennesseans and shells from the Washington Artillery, Shanklin climbed the bluff. Looking back he saw "Capt French's and a part of Capt Eigelman's companies still down in the ravine; behind a little island in the bed of the creek still firing." Deciding to return to his men, he climbed down the bluff. After a few minutes, one of Lytle's staff rode to the edge of the bluff and yelled down. Unable to hear the aide, Shanklin took this to be the order to retire, and moved the remaining men up the ravine, while the 37th Tennessee advanced along the creek on their flank. Shot and shell struck the bluff as the men climbed to safety. Shanklin later wrote, "It was a miracle how the regiment ever did get out alive." Looking desperate and



Brigadier General
Patrick Cleburne



Brigadier General
Bushrod Rust Johnson



Colonel
John Beatty



The Squire Bottom House.

determined, the surviving men clambered up the bluff and hill to form their line adjacent to the 10th Ohio. The 42nd's loss was heavy considering they were engaged less than fifteen minutes: "seven or eight men killed, thirty or forty wounded, and 21 taken prisoner including Capt Myler."¹¹

Over on Bottom Hill, Adams' brigade formed into line on Austin's men, concealed from the eyes of both Federals and their fellow Confederates. Due to the wooded and irregular terrain, Slocomb was not aware that the 42nd had retired, and kept up his fire on the Chatham Farm as Johnson's men advanced. Simonson's battery had been withdrawn as a result of Jones' attack, and the Hoosiers were in full retreat up the bluff. With the retreat of both the Indiana infantry and Simonson's battery, the 44th Tennessee's Colonel John S. Fulton could now focus on the last remaining threat to his regiment—the annoying battery to his left. With bayonets glistening, the 25th and

44th Tennessee and 5th Confederate regiments charged up the hill—only to discover that the battery that had been firing on them was friendly! Fulton's men arrived first and harshly informed the Washington Artillery that they had been firing on their comrades. Hughes' 25th Tennessee, on the heels of the 44th, reached the crest of the hill and was met by General Adams. Fearing that his left might be threatened, Adams moved the 25th Tennessee to support his guns. Colonel Hughes reached his position and discovered the enemy advancing toward the battery. The Washington Artillery, now having a definite enemy target, engaged in a short but spirited duel with Hescok's battery over on Peters Hill. Lasting for possibly only ten minutes, the duel did not cause any significant damage, though it stirred up a good deal of dust.

Colonel James A. Smith's 5th Confederate Infantry, not needed to support Adams, advanced straight down the hill to the bed of Doctor's Creek into the po-

sition previously held by the 42nd Indiana. Smith glanced up at the steep bluff and decided not to ascend it, but instead moved by the left flank, stone walls on his right and a rail fence on the left. Coming down the hill in their wake, Keeble's 23rd Tennessee, having finally cleared the fences, reached the ravine in the Chatham farm in time to watch the 5th Confederates march across their front. Keeble moved his men to the left into another field and orchard, so as to remain on the left of the brigade and to clear his front.

Across the creek, Lytle eyed a large Confederate force approaching, and ordered the 3rd Ohio to retake their former position along the rail fence lining the ridge above the Squire Bottom House. Under a steady fire from Darden's and Slocomb's batteries they advanced and lay waiting for the Confederates. Federal artillery located near the Russell House opened up, Loomis' and Simonson's batteries, along with Hotchkiss' section, pouring shot and shell into the advancing Tennesseans, fortunately for whom most of the shots went high. Not so fortunate were Smith's Confederates, who had advanced into the sights of the 3rd Ohio along the rail fence one hundred fifty yards above the creek bottom. As the Confederates cleared the bluff, the men of the 3rd Ohio stood up and delivered a devastating volley, shortly followed by one from the 10th Ohio. Captain C. W. Frazer of the 5th later wrote, "the shock was terrific—the line swayed as one body, leaving a track of dead and wounded to mark its former position." Smith's men reacted quickly. With a "yell that burst almost simultaneously from officers and men," they fronted and charged over their wounded to gain a position behind a stone wall. The 23rd Tennessee moved forward and also received a volley from the 10th Ohio. Then, from the security of their respective stone walls, the Ohioans and Tennesseans continued to slug it out.

Released by Buckner, Marks' 17th Tennessee came under heavy artillery fire as it advanced down the hill. Not knowing the location of the remainder of the brigade, Marks acted on prior instructions that in the absence of orders he should move toward the Bottom House. Emerging from the woods as he advanced toward the creek bottom, Marks spotted the 5th Confederates moving across his front. The 37th Tennessee, also separated

from the remainder of Johnson's brigade, moved through the Chatham orchard and spotted the 17th Tennessee emerging from the woods. Marks, like Smith, realized that the bluff was too steep to ascend, and moved his regiment to the left, but then, shocked by the sudden volleys that struck Smith and Keeble, he had his regiment double-quick to the cover of the stone wall above the creek. He now was on the right of the 5th Confederates, with a clear view of the Bottom front yard.

A furious firefight ensued. Johnson's Tennesseans, hunkering behind stone walls, unloaded volley after volley into Beatty's Buckeyes. "It seemed as if all hell had broken loose; the air was filled with hissing balls; shells were exploding continuously, and the noise of the guns was deafening," Beatty recalled. Shot through the head, Captain H. Cunard, Company I, was one of the first to fall, and a little while later Captain Leonidas McDougal, Company H, waved his sword to rally his men and fell as a ball pierced his chest.

White's 37th Tennessee, having arrived, sought to break the stalemate, and filed right to take position along a rail fence that ran diagonally to the wall held by the 17th Tennessee. Meanwhile, Marks' men were being shot to pieces, and eyed the cover of a stone wall about thirty yards beyond their position, parallel to the rail fence White was making for. With a cheer Marks' Tennesseans charged through a hailstorm of lead toward the second wall. Upon reaching the rail fence, White's men were hit by "an almost overwhelming storm of lead from a corn or cane field near by," most likely coming from the 10th Ohio on the ridge to their right. White, realizing he could not stay where he was, ordered his men to mount the fence and charge about fifty yards through the Bottom yard to a second stone wall. They gained the wall after a short but spirited hand-to-hand fight that sent the 3rd Ohio reeling back. At about the same time that the Buckeyes fled, the six companies of the 17th Tennessee reached the fence. Johnson now bolstered the 17th and 37th by sending the 23rd Tennessee and the 5th Confederates forward. The 5th made their way to the left of the 17th Tennessee, while the 23rd moved under heavy fire through an open field and advanced to the second fence. Reaching it, they "commenced a heavy and terrific fire"

against the 3rd Ohio and the right flank of the 10th Ohio.

The 3rd Ohio was in a bad situation. Johnson's men were behind stone walls, while Lytle's men only had the protection of a rail fence and a mix of cut and standing corn. Nevertheless Captain Frazer of the 5th Confederates recorded that, "All along our front a solid line of dead and wounded lay, in some places three deep, extending to the right from the barn, which served as a temporary hospital." W.L. Trask of Adams' brigade, observing the fight from across the creek, wrote that this was "the grandest but the most awful sight, ever looked upon.... [T]he enemy stood firm...pouring heavy fire into our lines with considerable effect." Johnson's attack had run out of steam.¹³

Buckner, observing the fight from the rear, realized that Johnson had engaged "a heavier force of the enemy than when it first conjectured." Tapping his reserve, Buckner called up Pat Cleburne's brigade, and told Liddell to move his exhausted men up to safeguard his left and occupy Cleburne's vacated position. As Cleburne began moving, Buckner discovered that Adams' brigade had advanced through the woods and was on his left. Riding over to Adams, Buckner came across the 44th Tennessee and sent them forward to relieve the 23rd behind the Bottom House. Buckner then set about assembling a makeshift battery of 12-pounders, taking a section each from the Washington Artillery and Calvert's and Semple's batteries. He placed this ad hoc battery in the bottomland between Bull Run and Doctor's Creek, with the intention of enfilading the stubborn Federal line. Next Buckner directed Adams to advance two of his regiments to try and take the right of the Federal line in reverse.

Austin's men being on Adams' right, led the advance, moving quickly northwest toward the Federal flank. As they crossed Doctor's Creek, they sighted the enemy and fired a volley into them as they sought the cover of a stone wall on the opposite bank. The Ohioans returned fire. "A perfect storm of bullets was rained on us," John W. Headley remembered, "or rather on the fence."¹⁴


At roughly the same moment that Adams' line advanced, a shell from the improvised battery struck Bottom's barn. Filled with wheat, oats, and several of Lytle's wounded, the barn quickly ignited, the wounded men shrieking in agony. "A

flag of truce would have been respected, but none was raised," wrote Captain Frazer of the 5th Confederates. The fight continued. The wind shifted direction and smoke from the inferno soon enveloped the Federal line.¹⁵

Colonel Curran Pope of the 15th Kentucky had twice previously requested permission to exchange places with the 3rd Ohio, but had been turned down by Beatty. Faced with a shortage of ammunition, lack of men, and general confusion caused by the burning barn, Beatty had no choice this time but to let the "Paper Collar Regiment" take his place. With bayonets fixed, the 15th Kentucky crested the ridge as the Ohioans relinquished their bloody fences.

Almost immediately Pope's men began to fall, losing several flag bearers as their colors were shot to pieces. Pope's horse fell dead, and he himself was hit in the left shoulder. "Lt. Col. Jouett was shot in the leg," Pope wrote after the battle, "and Lieut. [James A.T.] McGrath went to his assistance. After raising him, he himself was shot dead through the head. Major [William P.] Campbell was shot through the body about the same time, and was borne from the field to a house where he died immediately afterwards." Throughout the carnage the stubborn Kentuckians continued to fire disciplined volleys, and as the Confederate fire died down, they believed they "had succeeded in driving the enemy entirely beyond the stone fence."¹⁶

The barn quickly ignited, the wounded men shrieking in agony.
Painting by William Travis.



In fact, the Confederate fire had slackened because they were low on ammunition, and because they thought they were about to be attacked from the rear. Colonel Smith, stunned by the arrival of "a long line of blue-coats, coming down the hill at our rear," passed the word for a "white handkerchief." However, there was no need to surrender, for the "blue-coats" were Cleburne's brigade, clad in contraband uniforms from their victory at Rich-

mond. Arriving around 4:00 p.m., Cleburne was informed by Johnson that several of his regiments were down to the last cartridge. Johnson prepared his regiments to retire, clearing the path for Cleburne to take his place.¹⁷


As Cleburne arrived, Brown's brigade, following the same path as Jones, assaulted Harris' brigade. Despite having expended most of their ammunition earlier fighting Jones, the blueclads braced

themselves for yet another attack. Lytle, worried about his right-most regiments, issued orders for his precious 10th Ohio (he had been their colonel) to lie down and conserve their ammunition, and then headed to check his right. This left only the 10th Wisconsin and 38th Indiana to deal with Brown's three fresh regiments. A hot fight ensued, causing the cartridge-less 10th Wisconsin to pull back, leaving the 38th Indiana isolated. Their colonel, Benjamin F. Scribner, sent several requests for assistance from the 10th Ohio, but they remained with their faces planted on the ground. Running low on ammunition, the 38th Indiana fixed bayonets and waited. Fortunately for them Brown's regiments slowed their attack as they also ran short of ammunition.

Cleburne sent the 13th and 15th Arkansas forward along the Mackville Road, past and at an angle to the 37th Tennessee's stone wall. The irregular topography of this position shielded them from the view of the 10th Ohio above. Firing into the left flank of the 15th Kentucky, they covered Johnson's withdrawal. As Johnson reformed in the rear, Cleburne recalled the 13th and 15th Arkansas. Learning the makeup of the Federal line from a captain of the 15th, Cleburne devised an unconventional tactic. He placed the colors with his skirmishers several yards in advance of his main line and moved forward at an angle toward Harris. Lytle's right-most regiments now found themselves in a dire situation—Adams on their right, Cleburne to their front, Brown on their left. Lytle's brigade was about to become the "nut" in a giant Confederate "nutcracker."⁴⁰

Moving to flank the 15th Kentucky, Major Austin rallied his men; galloping to his left he ordered them to "double-quick straight down to the left and right-face to the enemy." Austin's men charged forward into a clear spot of ground behind the farm, from which they could enfilade the enemy. Pope, looking to his left, saw the flanking movement and responded with a volley. "We went yelling about half way, aiming to flank the enemy at a large barn," recalled Confederate cavalryman Headley. "Major Austin was right along on my horse. I did not see how he escaped. The fire in front of us and from both flanks was too hot."

Headley's comment about fire from both flanks suggests that Austin's men



might have received some sort of friendly fire. Austin retired his line back behind the stone wall, having lost several men in a matter of minutes. They would not be there long; Adams with his four other regiments had just crossed the creek on their left. Adams formed on the sharpshooters, creating a brigade line running roughly east-west, almost parallel to the Mackville Road, and extending well beyond the 15th Kentucky's position. Attempting to counter the new threat, three companies of the 3rd Ohio and two from the 15th Kentucky changed front and formed along a rail fence.¹⁸

With a yell Adams' line advanced. "The enemy broke on the left of the barn from us and General Adams pushed his men forward," recalled Headley. "We pressed the enemy back. Their line was still standing from the barn on to the dwelling-house, but our whole line was right up against them." The remainder of the 3rd Ohio and 15th Kentucky fell back into a makeshift line along the Mackville Road. But Adams was too much for them, and they retired down the road toward the Russell House. Following close behind, the Washington Artillery unlimbered in the back of the Bottom House yard and opened up on the Federals. Major Austin, seeing an advantage, broke his men off Adams' main line and turned toward the right. He was headed toward the unsuspecting flank of the prone 10th Ohio. Witnessing the flanking maneuver, a member of the 42nd Indiana later wrote, "Great heavens! Will no one tell the 10th of their fearful peril?"¹⁹


Brown's brigade, in the meantime having gathered enough cartridges to continue the fight, pushed forward. Watching a battery to his left fall and Lytle's line crumble on his right, Harris retired his brigade to the eastern edge of a cornfield near the Russell House. This left the 10th Ohio as the sole Federal regiment on the ridge. With no word from Lytle, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Burke of the 10th took matters into his own hands. Ordering his men to rise up and charge downhill into Brown's advancing Confederates, he temporarily checked their advance. Then, faced with Austin's men to the rear, Brown to his left front, and Cleburne's brigade ascending the hill, the 10th Ohio retired down the Mackville Road.

Lytle halted the 10th Ohio in a ravine just north of the road, behind the

recently abandoned line of the 3rd Ohio and 15th Kentucky. Grabbing the 88th Indiana and what remained of the 15th Kentucky, he attempted to form a new line. He never had the chance. Cleburne's skirmishers topped the ridge formerly held by the 10th Ohio and fired into Lytle's makeshift line. Just as Cleburne expected, the Federals, fooled by the colors, fired into the widely spaced skirmishers. Before Lytle's men could reload, Cleburne's main line crested the ridge and delivered a massive volley. With Cleburne to the front and Adams to the right, Lytle's line fell back westward in confusion toward the Russell House. Lytle managed to rally about one hundred men before he was shot in the head,

reportedly saying, "You may do some good yet, I can do no more, let me die here." In fact Lytle did not die. Austin's men took the wounded general to the rear, where he was treated by Johnson's surgeon.²⁰

Adams and Cleburne continued advancing, and a short but spirited fight ensued as Adams encountered the rookie 88th Indiana and the 42nd Indiana posted behind rail fences lining the boundary between the Bottom and Russell farms. Bolstering Adams and Cleburne, Buckner massed all available artillery on the ridge formerly held by the 15th Kentucky. Supporting the guns were the re-supplied 17th and 37th Tennessee. Rousseau rode among the Hoosiers, ral-



lying them. Perhaps seeking revenge for the disruption of their coffee break, the 42nd Indiana rose from behind the fence, fired a volley, then charged the 13th Louisiana with bayonets. Adams' men had had enough; one by one his regiments retired to the safety of the massed battery, where they reformed under the safety of the guns. As Adams retired, Cleburne's brigade advanced on the 88th Indiana, planning to envelop them. Having no choice, the 88th Indiana retreated to Loomis' battery, posted behind the Russell House. Cleburne's men then turned and fired a destructive volley into the 42nd Indiana, sending them, too, to the rear. Cleburne was now far in advance of the other Confederate units and halted about a hundred yards from the Russell House and Dixville Crossroads. The battle of Perryville was not yet over, but the key to the Federal line was now firmly in Confederate hands.

W.L. Trask of Austin's battalion wrote of the Bottom House fight that the dead lay "in two straight lines as they had fallen.... I could have walked on their bodies without touching the ground several hundred yards. Scarcely a man could be seen out of his place in line." The cost for the Federals holding the Bottom House was high. Lytle's brigade had gone into the fight with 2,580 men and sustained 32.4% total casualties, 187 of whom were killed where they fought. The figures for the Confederates paled in comparison; even though they were attacking, they had the advantage of better cover, and the total killed in Adams', Cleburne's and Johnson's brigades was only sixty-four. Nevertheless, Rousseau's division had performed admirably. By holding the Bottom Farm as long as they did, they saved McCook's I Corps, which might otherwise have been wrecked, resulting in a Confederate victory.²¹ □

JOHN P. WALSH, JR. is a Systems Engineer in the IT Computing Services Department of Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. He has served as a trustee and vice president of the Northern Illinois Civil War Roundtable, as well as a volunteer to both the Perryville Battlefield State Historic Site and Perryville Battlefield Preservation Association. Previously he contributed to Kenneth Noe's book, *Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle* (Lexington, Kentucky: 2001).

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NOTES:

1. The standard works on the battle are Kenneth W. Noe, *Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle* (Lexington, Kentucky: 2001); Kenneth A. Hafendorfer, *Perryville: Battle for Kentucky*, 2nd Edition (Louisville: 1991); James Lee McDonough, *War in Kentucky: From Shiloh to Perryville* (Knoxville: 1994).
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3. *The War of the Rebellion: Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880-1892), Series I, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, pp. 1121, 1124 (hereafter cited as OR).
4. OR I, 16, pt. 1, p. 1045; James Maynard Shanklin, *Dearest Lizzie* (Evansville: 1988), pp. 226-27; S.F. Horrall, *History of the Forty-Second Indiana Volunteer Infantry* (Chicago: 1892), p. 150; George Morgan Kirkpatrick, *The Experiences of a Private Soldier of the Civil War* (Chicago: 1924; reprint, Indianapolis: 1973), p. 14.
5. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1125, 1128-130, 1133; OR Supplement I, 3, pt. 1, p. 279; John Berrien Lindsley, *The Military Annals of Tennessee. Confederate. First Series: Embracing a Review of Military Operations, With Regimental Histories and Memorial Rolls, Compiled from Original and Official Sources*, Vol. 1 (Nashville: 1886; reprint, Wilmington, NC: 1995), p. 502; Neither Swett nor Calvert were in command of their batteries at Perryville—1st Lt. H. Shannon commanded Swett's and 2nd Lt. Thomas J. Key commanded Calvert's section. Somewhere in this area the detached section of 3.8" Rifles from Semple's AL Battery was posted.
6. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 90-91, 1040, 1120-121; OR Supplement I, 3, pt. 1, p. 279; *War in Kentucky*, 233.
7. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1122-123; OR I, 52, pt. 1, p. 53; W.L. Trask Papers 1861-1865 #380, Special Collections, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga., 66.
8. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1124, 1128-129, 1131; OR Supplement I, 3, pt. 1, p. 280.
9. *Dearest Lizzie*, 224, 227-29; *Forty-Second Indiana*, 150-51, 153; *Private Soldier*, 14; OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1122-123; Trask Journal, 66, 67; John W. Headley, *Confederate Operations in Canada and New York* (New York: 1906), pp. 56-57; *New Orleans Bee*, Nov. 1, 1862; *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, Morning Edition, Nov. 1, 1862.
10. *Dearest Lizzie*, 228-29; Trask Journal, 66-67; *Confederate Operations*, 57.
11. *Private Soldier*, 14; *Dearest Lizzie*, 229-30; OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1056-058, 1126, 1129-133; *Military Annals*, 502; *Forty-Second Indiana*, 151; *Grand Havoc*, 219-22.
12. OR I, 16, pt. 1, p. 1058; John Beatty, *The Citizen-Soldier; or, The Memoirs of a Civil War Volunteer* (Cincinnati: 1879, reprint, Alexandria, VA: 1983), p. 178.
13. *Grand Havoc*, 224-25; *Citizen-Soldier*, 178; *Military Annals*, 148; Trask Journal, 67-68.
14. *Confederate Operations*, 57; OR I, 16, pt. 1, p. 1056.
15. OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 70, 1046-047, 1056-058; *Citizen-Soldier*, 178; *Military Annals*, 148.
16. *Daily Evansville Journal*, Oct. 18, 1862; *Louisville Daily Journal*, Oct. 11, 21, 1862; *Grand Havoc*, 229; William P. McDowell, "The Fifteenth Kentucky," *Southern Bivouac*, Vol. V (1886; reprint, Wilmington, NC: 1993), p. 248.
17. *Military Annals*, 148; OR I, 16, pt. 1, pp. 1127-130, 1132; OR Supplement I, 3, pt. 1, pp. 280-81; *Grand Havoc*, 264-65; W.E. Yeatman *Memoirs*, Confederate Collection, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN.
18. *Confederate Operations*, 57-58; OR I, 16, pt. 1, p. 1058; *Citizen-Soldier*, 179; *Grand Havoc*, 230.
19. *Confederate Operations*, 58; *Daily Evansville Journal*, Oct. 16, 1862.
20. OR I, 16, pt. 1, p. 1127; OR I, 52, pt. 1, p. 52; Trask Journal, 69; *Daily Evansville Journal*, Oct. 16, 1862; *Confederate Operations*, 58-59; Irving A. Buck, *Cleburne and his Command* (New York: 1908), pp. 69-70; *Military Record*, 9-10; *Grand Havoc*, 268-69.
21. Trask Journal, 69; Kurt Holman, "Known strengths and Casualties at the Battle of Perryville." Unpublished paper, n.d., in possession of the author, Perryville, KY.

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
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"WE HAD ONLY TO STRETCH FORTH OUR HANDS": In the aftermath of Gettysburg, Lincoln thought he could see the end of the war.—*Frank J. Williams*

"BAD FAITH SOMEWHERE": George Gordon Meade and the Committee on the Conduct of the War.—*Bruce Tap*

ERRORS THAT DOOMED A CAMPAIGN: It might have been possible to trap Lee north of the Potomac.—*Keith Poulter*

VOLUME 2, #7

TACTICAL STALEMATE: The way in which the armies of the Civil War were raised, organized, and led, practically guaranteed that most battles would be indecisive.—*Gerald J. Prokopowicz*

A QUESTION OF FAITH: WAS LINCOLN A CHRISTIAN?: Despite several attempts to falsify history, the record is clear.—*Edward Steers, Jr.*

"NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT": In 1860, coffee was an expensive rarity. The Civil War changed all that.—*Gregory W. Baxter*

CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY PREPARES FOR PICKETT'S CHARGE: The artillery plan for July 3 was the most detailed and complex ever devised by the Army of Northern Virginia. On its success would hinge the success of the infantry assault.—*Richard Rollins*

FAILURE BEFORE KNOXVILLE: James Longstreet's assault on Fort Sanders was regarded by his own soldiers as "a useless slaughter of men."—*Terry A. Johnston*

FORGOTTEN WARRIOR: William Payne rose to command a brigade under Stuart, yet until now has largely been lost to history.—*John Coski*

VOLUME 3, #1

MOSBY IN THE VALLEY: Just what impact did "Mosby's Confederacy" have on the Civil War?—*James A. Ramage*

ALL THE TRUMPETS SOUNDED: An appreciation of Bruce Catton.—*Stephen Sears*

"SHOOT IF YOU CAN BY ACCIDENT": Union death lists included the names of both men and women suspected of aiding Tennessee guerrillas.—*Michael Bradley and Milan Hill*

"THEY FOUGHT CONFOUNDED PLUCKY": For green troops of the

Heavy Artillery, the Battle of Harris Farm was a bloody initiation into combat.—*Gordon C. Rhea*

EVERY CONDITION OF HORROR: During McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, the army's provision for the wounded was woefully inadequate.—*Nancy S. Garrison*

TRUE TO THE UNION: Men had mixed motives for joining the 1st and 2nd Texas (Union) Cavalry.—*James Marten*

VOLUME 3, #2

MONTANI SEMPER LIBERI: The creation of West Virginia.—*Ed Steers, Jr.*

MR. DAVIS' MAILBAG: Jefferson Davis received letters from cranks, critics, patriots, and poltroons....—*Lynda Crist*

ORDNANCE AND LOGISTICS: THE FAILURE OF CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG: In relying on the artillery to pave the way for Pickett's Charge, the Confederates faced problems both with the guns themselves and with logistics.—*Richard Rollins*

REASON DETHRONED: Loyalty to the Union could be a dangerous thing, in Texas.—*Karen Gerhardt*

A REFLECTION OF THEIR OWN IMAGE: Not all the contacts of the 154th New York with the enemy were hostile.—*Mark H. Dunkelman*

VOLUME 3, #3

NUMBERS AND LOSSES IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA: During May and June of 1864, Robert E. Lee received over 30,000 reinforcements; but he also suffered far higher losses than previously believed.—*Alfred Young*

"SHANKS": PORTRAIT OF A GENERAL: Alcoholic, arrogant, and insubordinate. Was this a fair picture of Nathan Evans?—*Jason H. Silverman, Samuel N. Thomas, and Beverly D. Evans IV*

THUNDER AT CHANTILLY: Did the counterattack at Chantilly really save the Union army?—*John Hennessy*

THE SECRET YANKEES: Deep in the heart of the Confederacy, in the city of Atlanta, there existed a secret circle of Union loyalists.—*Thomas Dyer*

REVERE THE EMPEROR, EXPEL THE BARBARIANS: In mid-1863 a naval action off Japan threatened to embroil the U.S. in a foreign war.—*Theodore P. Savas*

VOLUME 3, #4

TREACHERY IN FLORIDA Nowhere were loyalties more confused than in Taylor county, Florida....—*Pat Imbimbo*

THE FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY IN PICKETT'S CHARGE: No amount of heroism could overcome the shortcomings of the Confederate artillery on July 3, 1863.—*Richard Rollins*

"FORMIDABLE ONLY IN FLIGHT?": Joe Johnston's Atlanta Campaign strategy was based on a false premise. But that does not mean he was a bad general.—*Steven H. Newton*

"MANY ARE ...DELIGHTED": The last days of the Confederacy in North Carolina.—*John Coski*

INTO THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH: The Corcoran Legion at Cold Harbor.—*Kevin M. O'Beirne*

VOLUME 3, #5

ROBERT E. LEE SPECIAL ISSUE

THE GENERALSHIP OF ROBERT E. LEE: Lee's offensive strategy was vital to the maintenance of the South's morale.—*Gary W. Gallagher*

DEMOLISHING THE MYTH: Lee's offensive style of operations bled the Confederacy of men and lost the South its chance of independence.—*Alan Nolan*

LEE, PRESCIENCE, AND THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: The Overland Campaign reveals clearly that prescience was not one of Lee's strong points; but decisive action in the face of the unexpected was.—*Gordon C. Rhea*

LEE'S QUEST FOR THE BATTLE OF ANNIHILATION: Lee's offensive strategy was appropriate up until Gettysburg, but he failed thereafter to adapt to the new situation facing the Confederacy.—*Peter Carmichael*

"AS STUPID A FELLOW AS I AM...": The real genius of Lee was that he clearly grasped the Confederacy's strategic needs.—*Joseph L. Harsh*

HOW GREAT A CAPTAIN?: To what extent can we now draw up a balance sheet of Lee's strengths and weaknesses? —*Keith Poulter*

VOLUME 3, #6

THE RIGHT OF SECESSION: The states did have a right of secession.—*Kent Masterson Brown*

AN EARLIER BRIDGE TOO FAR: The Battle of Staunton River Bridge.—*Philip Bolté*

THE VEILED LADY The spotlight seldom shines upon *successful* spies, a point made by the history of the mysterious Sarah Slater.—*James O. Hall*

CUT TO PIECES AND GONE TO HELL: The aftermath of the Battle of Poison

Spring was a gruesome reminder that "war is hell." —*Gregory J. W. Urwin*

LEE: THE TWILIGHT YEARS: Robert E. Lee's behavior in the years remaining to him after the Civil War cast a revealing light on the the man.—*Pat Brennan*

FIRE IN THE STREETS: The preliminaries to the Battle of Fredericksburg included a vicious fire fight in the streets.—*George C. Rable*

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VOLUME 3, #7

"REBELLION THUS SUGAR-COATED" In 1860 secessionists claimed a unilateral right to withdraw from the Union. Lincoln denounced this as an "ingenious sophism." —*John Y. Simon*

GLORY DENIED: FIRST DEEP BOTTOM: In July 1864 U.S. Grant entrusted an important operation to Winfield Scott Hancock and Philip H. Sheridan. The result was a grave disappointment.—*Bryce Sudarow*

THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION REVISITED: New evidence regarding the assassination of Abraham Lincoln should not be lightly dismissed.—*William Hanchett*

BLACK SLAVERY, WHITE LIBERTY: The prewar conflict in "Bleeding Kansas" was not so much about black slavery, as about the liberty of whites.—*Nicole Etcheson*

RISKING THE WRATH OF GOD: During the Civil War Dr. Luke Blackburn attempted to create yellow fever epidemics in northern and northern-occupied cities.—*Edward Steers, Jr.*

GALLOPING THUNDER The Stuart Horse Artillery Battalion carved for itself a record that could stand with that of any unit north or south.—*Robert J. Trout*

VOLUME 4, #1

WHAT CAUSED THE CIVIL WAR? Subsequent "political correctness" notwithstanding,

standing, contemporary evidence makes it quite clear what caused the Civil War.—*James M. McPherson*

COMRADES OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS In the aftermath of the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Confederate Major General Patrick Cleburne came up with an imaginative way to reinforce the *esprit de corps* of his division.—*Mauriel Joslyn*

BREVET MAJOR GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH: THE STUFF OF LEGENDS: For some, no sacrifice was too great.—*Wayne Mahood*

"BUTCHER" GRANT AND THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: The ghost of "Grant the butcher" haunts Civil War lore. But what of the facts? —*Gordon C. Rhea*

"GIVE 'EM HELL": The Battle of Fayetteville, April 18, 1863, pitted Unionist Arkansans and Confederate Arkansans against one another.—*Russell L. Mahan*

ONE OF THE MOST GALLANT MEN: From Gettysburg to Petersburg, Irish color guard Patrick De Lacy of the 143rd Pennsylvania appeared to have a charmed life.... —*Kevin O'Brien*

A NOSTALGIC PANORAMA The Kurz and Allison Civil War illustrations.—*Harold Holzer and Mark Neely*

VOLUME 4, #2

"ONLY A MIRACLE CAN SAVE US" Early in August 1864 U.S. Grant resolved to try again to crack the rebel defenses north of the James. The result was the Second Battle of Deep Bottom.—*Bryce Suderow*

HONOR REDEEMED: Criticized for his poor performance at Shiloh, Lew Wallace redeemed his honor at the Battle of Monocacy.—*Gloria Baker Swift and Gail Stephens*

ONE WHO GOT AWAY: John Surratt was a key player in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Yet he was never found guilty.—*James E. T. Lange and Katherine DeWitt, Jr.*

MY OLD KENTUCKY HOME-AT WAR: For the women of war-torn Kentucky, the Civil War was often literally right at their door.—*Susan Lyons Hughes*

THE INNER FLORIDA BLOCKADE: The U.S. navy battle against rebel steamers operating on the St. Johns River.—*George E. Buker*

VOLUME 4, #3

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC?: Why was it that the army seemed unable to get it together on the battlefield?—*Gordon Rhea, Richmond*

Rollins, Stephen Sears, and John Y. Simon

"THE BEST HATED MAN IN THE ARMY": The brilliant, stormy career of Major General William Babcock Hazen.—*James R. Furquerson*

RACE IN THE CIVIL WAR: Just as race had helped to cause the war, so attitudes toward—and definitions of—race helped shape it.—*Mark Grimsley*

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT SNAKE CREEK GAP?: Did William T. Sherman really bamboozle Johnstons-ton at Snake Creek Gap?—*Steven H. Newton*

THE OTHER DAHLGREN: Union Admiral John Dahlgren had a Confederate brother.—*Bruce Allardice*

LAST CHANCE FOR VICTORY: At the conclusion of the first day's fighting at Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee had a number of options. Did he choose wisely? —*Scott Bowden and Bill Ward*

VOLUME 4, #4

IN THE SHADOW OF WASHINGTON: How far did Lee shape his role on that of Washington? —*Rick McCaslin*

APOSTLES OF SECESSION: What were the arguments of secession commissioners in the winter of 1860-1861?—*Charles B. Dew*

"THE HOTTEST PLACE I WAS EVER IN": The seven-hour Battle of Haw's Shop would show what Wade Hampton was made of.—*Gordon C. Rhea*

DESPAIR, HOPE, AND DELUSION: Even as their military effort collapsed, the morale of many Southerners continued to be high.—*George C. Rable*

TWO TALES OF TENNESSEE: Two actions, one from 1862 and one from 1863, demonstrate the importance both of the commander on the spot and of the overall organization of cavalry to its success.—*Laurence Schiller*

VOLUME 4, #5

PICKETT'S CHARGE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR: Pickett's Charge is often seen as a bad move on Lee's part. In fact there were cogent reasons for making the attempt.—*Richard Rollins*

CHARLIE BELL: UNION SCOUT: One of the most successful scouts of the war, Bell carried out no fewer than thirty-seven missions behind enemy lines, and made an important contribution to the Vicksburg Campaign.—*William B. Feis*

"IT HAUNTS ME NIGHT AND DAY": Fate brought Major General James G. Blunt's wagon train and William Quantrill's guerrillas together on the Kansas prairie on October 6, 1863, setting the scene

for one of the war's bloodiest episodes. —*Kip Lindberg and Matt Matthews*

"A PERFECT PICTURE OF HELL": Captured *en masse* several times during the war, the men of the 12th Iowa were in a unique position to observe the deterioration of prison camp conditions. —*Ted Genoways and Hugh H. Genoways*

THE "BEST HATED MAN" IN THE ARMY: PART II: From the opening of the Cracker Line to service on the western frontier, General William Babcock Hazen was an outstanding, and outspoken soldier. —*James R. Furquerson*

VOLUME 4, #6: SPECIAL INFANTRY TACTICS ISSUE

THE INFANTRYMAN IN COMBAT: What was it like to be an infantryman in the Civil War? —*Reid Mitchell*

BACKGROUND TO BLOODSHED: In many ways the lessons the U.S. Army learned in the Mexican-American War were highly misleading. —*Perry Jamieson*

THE CHANGING FACE OF BATTLE: Technological changes rendered frontal assaults more often than not suicidal, but some commanders were slow to learn. —*Herman Hattaway*

ARMS AND THE MAN: Exactly what were the changes that took place in infantry small arms, and what was their effect on the battlefield. —*Louis A. Gara-vaglia and Charles G. Worman*

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS: Did the extensive use of field fortifications truly usher in a "new species of warfare?" —*David Lowe*

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE EVOLUTION OF INFANTRY TACTICS: How did the evolution of Civil War infantry tactics relate to what had gone before and what came after? —*Keith Poulter*

VOLUME 4, #7

CONFEDERATE STRATEGY CONSIDERED: Was there a coherent Confederate strategy? Whose strategy was it? And what were its shortcomings? —*David Eicher, Joe Harsh, Richard McMurry, Robert Tanner, Russell Weigley, and Steve Woodworth*

A HOT TIME IN ASHLAND: Three and a half weeks into the Overland Campaign, a Union cavalry brigade found itself surrounded and in acute danger of being destroyed. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

WHY DID ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHOOSE WAR?: Slavery had little to do with Lincoln's determination to crush the secessionist states. —*Jeffrey R. Hummel*

BATTLE FLAG: The Confederate battle flag in historical perspective. —*John M. Coski*

THE OTHER HIGH WATER MARK: Four hundred and fifty miles southwest of Gettysburg, a stone wall runs along a ridge line. Lacking monuments, unmarked, and hardly visited, it nevertheless marks the high tide of the Confederacy in the west. —*Kenneth W. Noe*

"A REGULAR SLAVE HUNT": Perhaps as many as several hundred free blacks and contrabands—men, women, and children—were seized by the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, and taken into slavery. Was this the action of a few undisciplined units, or was it the settled policy of the army's high command? —*Ted Alexander*

VOLUME 5, #1

LEE'S LOST OPPORTUNITY: THE BATTLE OF GLENDALE: Robert E. Lee "had only that one day for a Cannae, and the army was not ready for it." —*Stephen W. Sears*

UNDERSTANDING LEE'S AUDACITY: Lee's audacity was rooted neither in biology nor in emotion, but in a cool analytical, professional expertise. —*Richard Rollins*

AFTER THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: Abraham Lincoln's role in the ending of slavery. —*William C. Harris*

STONEWALL JACKSON AT FRONT ROYAL: Traditional accounts of the battle are sharply at variance with the historical facts. —*Gary L. Ecelbarger*

"POISONOUS TECHNIQUES AND DRESSING": A study of U.S. General Hospital #1 in Frederick, Maryland, through which more than 30,000 patients passed, sheds important light on the practice of medicine in the Civil War. —*Terry Reimer*

SULTANA: A CASE FOR SABOTAGE: New evidence suggests that foul play may have been the cause of the 1865 river disaster. —*D.H. Rule*

VOLUME 5, #2

WHY CIVIL WAR MILITARY HISTORY MUST BE LESS THAN 85 PERCENT MILITARY: In *North & South*, volume 4, #6, editor Keith Poulter described military history as the "meat" of Civil War studies. Historian William W. Freehling ripostes that without the "potatoes" of social history, we cannot have a satisfying meal.

BECOMING JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN: Nothing in Joshua Chamber-

lain's life prior to the Civil War suggested that he would one day become known as "The Hero of Little Round Top." In fact, his life during the antebellum years took him about as far afield of military matters and heroism as a man could get. —*Glenn W. LaFantasie*

COLD HARBOR: ANATOMY OF A BATTLE: Why was the attack launched? How many casualties were there? Which units suffered most, and why? And did General Robert E. Lee really have not so much as one man in reserve? Contemporary records reveal that much that we thought we knew about the battle is fiction. —*Gordon C. Rhea*

THE CAVALRY FIGHT AT SAMARIA CHURCH: After Phil Sheridan's defeat at Trevilian Station, his cavalry retreated toward the James River, accompanied by a wagon train filled with seriously wounded men and prisoners. A single division was detached to act as rearguard at Samaria Church, and that unit swiftly became the target of the entire Confederate cavalry command. —*Eric J. Wittenberg*

REBEL RAID ON THE WATER WITCH: "We are Rebels! Give way boys! Three cheers and board her!" The dramatic capture of a Union blockade ship off Savannah. —*Derek Smith*

VOLUME 5, #3

THUNDER ON THE PLAINS OF BRANDY (PART I): "Jeb" Stuart was caught napping when Union troopers burst across Beverley's Ford, but he still fought them to a standstill in the war's greatest cavalry battle. —*Patrick Brennan*

BLACKS IN GRAY: Did blacks really serve in the Confederate army? And if so, who were they and how many of them were there? —*Jason H. Silverman*

STONEWALL JACKSON'S FOG OF WAR: Sandwiched between the victories of Port Royal and Winchester, May 24, 1862, was a day of "order, counter-order, disorder." A step-by-step examination of the day's events can help us understand the confusion that is part and parcel of any campaign. —*Gary L. Ecelbarger*

"IF EVER WAR WAS HOLY": Young Quaker Unionists faced a wrenching dilemma when war broke out: was the cause such as to override their traditional pacifism? —*Jennifer L. Weber*

PORTRAIT OF AN HISTORICAL DETECTIVE: James O. Hall has added more to our knowledge of Abraham Lincoln's assassination than any other man. Who is Hall, and how did he come to put his

unique stamp on the study of this defining moment in American history? —*Kieran McAuliffe*

VOLUME 5, #4

TERROR—1860S STYLE: Sabotage, arson, and chemical and biological warfare were all features of a campaign intended to demoralize Northern civilians. —*Edward Steers, Jr.*

"BETTER OFF IN HELL": The grim history of the Kansas Red Legs. —*Matt Matthews and Kip Lindberg*

THUNDER ON THE PLAINS OF BRANDY (PART II): Assailed in front and rear, Jeb Stuart pulled out all the stops to halt the Yankee cavalry incursion across the Rappahannock. —*Pat Brennan*

"WE SHOULD ASSUME THE AGGRESSIVE": What were the arguments and counter-arguments put forward at the strategy meeting between Robert E. Lee, James Seddon, and Jefferson Davis, which led to the Gettysburg Campaign? —*Stephen W. Sears*

FIGHTING FOR TIME: Desperate to slow the advancing Union juggernaut, the Confederate cavalry fought skilful delaying actions as their enemy advanced up the Red River. —*Curtis Milbourn*

VIRGINIA'S RELUCTANT SECESSION: Even after Fort Sumter had been fired upon, Virginians were divided as to whether to secede. —*William W. Freehling*

VOLUME 5, #5

THE ARMY COMMANDER WHO NEVER WAS: The life and death of Isaac Ingalls Stevens. —*Patrick Brennan*

IN DEFENSE OF BRAXTON BRAGG: Bragg's detachment of James Longstreet prior to the Battle of Missionary Ridge was by no means as eccentric as it is usually portrayed. —*Edward C. Franks*

GUESTS OF THE YANKEES: A reevaluation of Union treatment of Confederate prisoners. —*James Gillispie*

MANAGEMENT IN WAR: THE CASE OF CIVIL WAR RAILROADS: The Confederate government's failure to utilize its railroads effectively was symptomatic of its broader failure to mobilize its forces for war. —*John E. Clark, Jr.*

THAT DAM FAILURE: Two little known skirmishes inflicted a significant delay on George McClellan's march toward Richmond. —*J. Michael Moore*

LEE'S GRAND STRATEGY AND PICKETT'S CHARGE: Lee's actions as commander of the principal army of the Confederacy were shaped by his overall understanding of the war. —*Richard Rollins*

Cold Harbor and Brandy Station Battlefield Tours

Two Society battlefield tours have recently taken place—one covering Cold Harbor and the North Anna, the other Brandy Station. The Cold Harbor tour was a follow up to last year's Wilderness/Spotsylvania tour, and was again led by Gordon Rhea, whose articles on the campaign are familiar to regular readers of *North & South*.

Gordon was his usual informed and entertaining self, and he was ably assisted on the Saturday and Sunday by National Park service ranger Ed Sanders. The well preserved trenches attested to the close range of the fighting at Cold Harbor, and personal acquaintance with

the steep bluffs above the North Anna—at the apex of Lee's defensive "V"—underlined the tactical excellence of that position. Stops included Massaponax Church, where Grant and Meade and their staffs paused on May 21, 1864.

The Brandy Station tour was led by Pat Brennan, Virginia Morton, and Greg Mertz. As with the Cold Harbor tour, parts of the battlefield not generally accessible were visited, and on Sunday time was found to fit in a visit to nearby Cedar Mountain. Virginia Morton is not only an authority on the battlefield, but also, being a local resident, on the area's cuisine. Members of the tour were thus able to enjoy not the usual hotel fare, but instead the delights of the Hazel River Inn and Culpeper's Luigis. A good time was obviously had by all, and members of both groups expressed their intention to take part in future Society tours.

Annual Conference, October 18-20 Could the Confederacy Have Won?

The first annual conference will be held the weekend of October 18-20 at the recently renovated Comfort Inn Conference Center in midtown Richmond. The theme will be the most fundamental question of all—"Could the Confederacy have won?"—and leading historians will give presentations and lead discussion groups on the politics of the Confederacy, its military effort, its economy, and the home front, and on how well the nascent nation mobilized its resources.

Taking part will be Gary Gallagher, John Simon, William Freehling, and John Clark; other names will be announced shortly. The conference will be the first major get together of society members for three years, a great opportunity to spend time with fellow buffs. The weekend will include a visit to the Museum of the Confederacy. Call or write for booking details and more information.



(559) 855-8636

The Civil War Society
33756 Black Mountain Road
Tollhouse, CA 93667



Above: Gordon at the Massaponax Baptist Church.
Color photographs courtesy Elaine and Bill Pease.



Left: Union troops photographed by Timothy O'Sullivan at the church, which served as temporary headquarters for Grant and Meade.
Library of Congress.



Gordon Rhea with a group at the North Anna River.




Trenches at Cold Harbor.



Lunch break at Henagan's redoubt, North Anna.

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
THE FEUD BETWEEN EDMUND KIRBY SMITH



BLUNDER"

AND RICHARD TAYLOR

Jeffery S. Prushankin



ON MAY 18, 1864, THE FINAL BATTLE OF THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN TOOK PLACE AT YELLOW BAYOU,


a small sluggish tributary of the Atchafalaya near Simmesport, Louisiana. The action enabled a Federal force of 30,000 to escape the tenacious pursuit of Louisianan Richard Taylor's 5,000-man Confederate army. For the Northerners, the battle ended six weeks of torturous retreat that followed Southern battlefield victory just below the Trans-Mississippi capital of Shreveport. Although the campaign is one of the great Confederate successes of the war, Taylor, the son of a United States president and the brother-in-law of the Confederate president, considered the army's response inadequate. During his pursuit, Taylor and his small force of Texas cavalry and Louisiana infantry had numerous opportunities to destroy the enemy and, at Alexandria, a chance to capture the large Federal fleet that had accompanied the invasion up the Red River. Taylor did not blame these failures on his own tactics but rather on the constraints on the strategy imposed by his commanding officer, Edmund Kirby Smith, and specifically on a key element of that strategy: the disposition of John G. Walker's division of Texas infantry.¹

Taylor was justified in his anger. Smith removed Walker from the Louisianan's command to pursue political goals and to seek battlefield glory. This decision ignited a smoldering personal dispute between Smith and Taylor over campaign strategy and the disposition of the troops. Taylor maintained that had Smith allowed him to retain Walker's division, the Confederates would have captured a large quantity of much needed supplies, destroyed the Union fleet on the Red River, and prevented Federal forces in the Trans-Mississippi from reinforcing the Union armies in the East. According to Taylor, Smith's decision reduced the impact of the Red River Campaign on the prosecution of the war, and in doing so hastened Confederate defeat.

Frontise: "Giant Steamboats at New Orleans" c. 1843. *Courtesy Special Collections, Tulane University Library, New Orleans, LA.*

Insets: Major General Richard Taylor (left) and General Edmund Kirby Smith. *Both courtesy Alabama Department of History and Archives, Montgomery.*

TULANE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, NEW ORLEANS




Major General John G. Walker

TAYLOR HAD ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE DISTRICT OF WESTERN LOUISIANA IN AUGUST 1862.

His orders were two-fold. First, to marshal fresh troops for service in Virginia, and second, to prevent the Federals from gaining access to the Louisiana interior. President Jefferson Davis and Secretary of War George Wythe Randolph hoped that Taylor could "confine the enemy within the narrowest limits and recover . . . any and all positions in the State" that had fallen into enemy hands. Although written orders did not specify which Federal positions warranted consideration for recapture, a meeting between Taylor, Davis, and Randolph, held just before the general's departure for Louisiana, established New Orleans as the priority. For several months, Taylor carried out modestly successful operations in the Lower Mississippi Valley, with a vigilant eye toward the Crescent City. From Arkansas, Trans-Mississippi Department commander Theophilus Holmes offered Taylor little advice. In fact, Holmes was not even aware of Richmond's plans to recover New Orleans. Thus, Taylor conducted the affairs of his district with a tremendous degree of autonomy. By the time of Smith's arrival, in March 1863, the District of Western Louisiana operated essentially as an independent command.

In February 1863 Davis and the Confederacy's new secretary of war, James A. Seddon, had selected Smith to replace the ineffectual Holmes as Trans-Mississippi departmental commander. A Floridian by birth, Smith was a West Pointer whose role at First Manassas made him one of the South's first war heroes. He seemed a solid choice to command the vast Trans-Mississippi region. Although Smith was not apprised of

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Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton

plans for New Orleans, he received explicit instructions for handling the department. In direct contrast to the policies of Holmes, Seddon directed Smith to develop and implement a strategy for the defense of the Lower Mississippi before addressing the needs of Arkansas. Smith, however, felt beholden to Missouri politicians and to the Arkansas contingent of the Confederate Congress that had lobbied for his appointment as commander of the Trans-Mississippi. Consequently, he remained in Louisiana only ten days before traveling to Arkansas. In doing so Smith inadvertently endorsed a policy of defacto autonomy for Taylor and undermined the Confederate command structure in the Trans-Mississippi theater.

On April 1 in Little Rock, Smith conferred with Holmes, Thomas C. Reynolds, Confederate governor of Missouri, and Missouri political general Sterling Price. A paramount topic of discussion was the recapture of Arkansas and the conquest of Missouri. Smith approved in principle a plan to secure Arkansas as an invasion route to Missouri. Pursuit of this objective served as both a political payback to the Arkansans and Missourians, and a means by which Smith could repair the damage to his reputation suffered during the star-crossed Kentucky Campaign of 1862. Prior to the conference, according to Chief-of-Staff William R. Boggs, Smith planned to send Walker's 4,000 man division from Arkansas to Taylor in Louisiana. After the meeting, Smith reversed himself and ordered Walker to remain in Little Rock, ostensibly for summer campaigning in Arkansas and Missouri.²

While the foundation for the Smith and Taylor dispute lay in these conflicting strategic interests, the seeds of acri-


mony between the generals were sewn in Louisiana during a Federal incursion along the Bayou Teche. The campaigning began in April 1863, when a large Federal force under Nathaniel P. Banks brushed Taylor's Confederates out of the Lafourche region and swept up the Teche toward the Red River. Taylor put out an urgent call for reinforcements, but Smith hesitated to redeploy troops within the department. Instead, on April 14, he requested aid from John C. Pemberton, in command of Confederate forces at Vicksburg. Pemberton refused to send reinforcements, and Smith reluctantly shifted Trans-Mississippi troops to within supporting distance of Taylor. This redeployment included sending Walker from Arkansas to Louisiana. For the time being, the crisis in Louisiana outweighed Smith's aspirations of glory in Arkansas and Missouri.

surely fit Taylor's orders from Richmond to reclaim territory in Louisiana that had fallen under Federal control. Further, the plan renewed Taylor's de facto status as an independent commander, a status that he enjoyed before the Teche Campaign.

Smith operated under a different set of priorities. To him, instructions from the War Department to defend the Lower Mississippi rendered Taylor's plan to recover New Orleans immaterial. He considered direct support for Pemberton at Vicksburg "*terminus ad quem* of all operations in the west" and characterized Confederate recapture of New Orleans as providing only a "minor advantage." Further, in a correspondence dated May 20, Smith blamed Taylor for allowing the Federals to ravage the Louisiana interior as far as Alexandria. He insinuated that Taylor aspired to take New Orleans to

Vicksburg" and the strong presence of Union gunboats on the river rendered the plan unfeasible. Unbeknown to both generals, Grant no longer depended upon these bases for supply, and even if successful, the attack would have had little effect on Federal attempts to reduce Vicksburg. Smith, however, was responding to mounting pressure from Confederate authorities east of the river, and insisted that Taylor take action. Although Taylor continued to protest, his "remonstrances were of no avail," and on June 7 the operation resulted in Confederate defeat at Milliken's Bend, Young's Point, and Lake Providence.³

Three days after the defeat along the Mississippi, Taylor proceeded to Alexandria and returned his attention to the Teche and the Lafourche. At the same time, Smith received a request from Johnston for assistance from the Trans-



On June 7 the operation resulted in Confederate defeat at Milliken's Bend, Young's Point, and Lake Providence. In this drawing, black troops battle Confederates at Milliken's Bend.

Walker's division reached Taylor in mid-May. By that time, Banks had abandoned the Teche region and turned east toward Port Hudson. Taylor prepared to resume operations in the Lafourche with the expectation that he would retain Walker's division. From the Lafourche, he hoped to cut Banks' communication with New Orleans, threaten enemy control of the city, and draw the Federals away from Port Hudson. He also reasoned that the Rebel garrison at Port Hudson would move to unite with Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston in Mississippi and attack the Federals under Ulysses S. Grant east of Vicksburg. This bold strategy as-


make up for his tactical failure in the Teche Campaign. Smith's inability to grasp Taylor's strategy for the Lafourche fostered tension between the generals. The accusation that Taylor's interest in New Orleans was personal rather than professional undermined the working relationship between the two.

Smith vetoed the proposed operation in the Lafourche. He ordered Taylor to take Walker and strike Federal supply depots in northeastern Louisiana, along the West bank of the Mississippi opposite Vicksburg. Taylor challenged the prudence of this strategy. In his opinion, a combination of the "peculiar position of


Mississippi to aid Port Hudson. Following the failure of his own plan to relieve Vicksburg, Smith could not object to reviving Taylor's plan for relieving Port Hudson by threatening New Orleans. He authorized Taylor to return to the Lafourche and pursue the strategy that he had originally vetoed.

Initially, Taylor instructed Walker to join Thomas Green's Texas cavalry and Louisiana infantry under Alfred Mouton in the Teche region. Before Walker began the march, however, Taylor reversed himself and held the division in northern Louisiana until the "condition of affairs around Vicksburg are more fully devel-

oped." Consequently, Taylor established two precedents. First, Taylor implied that he, not Smith, would determine the strategic situation and the disposition of troops in the District of Western Louisiana. Second, he had claimed operational control over Walker's division. Outwardly, Smith agreed to neither of these points, but Taylor interpreted his failure to reverse them to imply consent. These elements became increasingly important to Taylor's strategy in Louisiana, and each helped exacerbate the tensions between him and Smith.⁴



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



TEXAS STATE ARCHIVES, AUSTIN

Major General Thomas Green (left) and Brigadier General Alfred A. Mouton.

By late June, Mouton and Green had pushed into the Lafourche region and secured Brashear City, just fifty miles west of New Orleans. On June 27, Taylor directed Walker to proceed south to Berwick Bay where the division would join the campaign. Smith countermanded the orders and held the Texans in place. "I shall order Walker's division to you when operations . . . permit," he scolded Taylor, and dismissed the Louisianan's plan as folly. The commanding general justified his decision by citing a message from Johnston suggesting that Smith send troops to Pemberton at Vicksburg. As the department's disposable force, Walker's division was the reasonable choice for the assignment. When Smith broached the subject with Walker, the Missourian balked. "Unless the enemy are blind and stupid" he bristled, "no part of my command would escape capture or destruction if such an attempt were to be made." Still, Smith insisted Walker stay in northeastern Louisiana. As Taylor pushed to the outskirts of New Orleans, the Texans remained mired along the Mississippi bottoms between Monroe and the river.⁵

While Taylor's plan to relieve Port Hudson did not appeal to Smith, it had become a cause for consternation at Banks' headquarters. As the Federal commander pondered his situation, General William Emory, stationed in New Orleans, advised him to "choose between Port Hudson and New Orleans" for he could not realistically hope to hold both. This was precisely what Taylor had hoped to accomplish. Moreover, Taylor's agents in New Orleans predicted a civilian uprising against Federal occupation if the Confederate advance continued. By early

July, Taylor had captured Boutte Station and moved to within twenty miles of the city. He notified Smith of preparations to advance on New Orleans at the slightest opportunity and added sarcastically, "I trust the lieutenant general commanding will not feel disappointed at these results."⁶

The point became moot following the fall of Vicksburg on July 4 and the capitulation of Port Hudson five days later. Taylor acknowledged that his position in the Lafourche was no longer tenable and began to pull his army back toward Alexandria. The Louisianan was bitter and placed the blame for having to abandon his strategy squarely on Smith. "The plan I had arranged for an attack," Taylor reported, "fell through as soon as I was advised that . . . Walker's division would not join me." Meanwhile, since the action at Milliken's Bend, Smith had used Walker to raid plantations in northeastern Louisiana that had fallen under enemy control. These operations, which consisted of burning crops and catching runaway slaves, squandered one of the Trans-Mississippi's strongest divisions on non-essential targets. During this time,

Walker lost one third of his troops to disease, more than he lost to the Federals in battle. Taylor referred to Smith's use of the Texans as "wasted on . . . absurd movements." Walker agreed, writing that the movements "wasted Confederate strength and dispirited the troops."⁷

During this time, Smith had seen things differently. He had hoped to lure the enemy away from Vicksburg by ordering an attack against Federal fortifications at Helena, Arkansas. By holding Walker in northeastern Louisiana, Smith expected to send the division to support Holmes' 8,000 men at Helena or Taylor's 5,000 in the Lafourche, depending upon which operation warranted reinforcements. However, on July 4 Holmes botched the attack and Confederate forces suffered a demoralizing defeat. By the time word of the battle reached Smith, it was too late to send Walker to Taylor. Thus, Smith made two mistakes. First, following Milliken's Bend, he failed to allow Taylor to take Walker for concentration in the Lafourche. This would have brought the Louisianan's numbers to 9,000 and provided him with a better opportunity to threaten New Orleans and elicit a Federal response from Port Hudson. Second, Smith failed to coordinate Taylor's operations in Louisiana with the strike against the Federals at Helena. Had he done so, Smith could have drawn Federal troops away from both Vicksburg and Port Hudson and given the Confederates east of the Mississippi an opportunity to reformulate their strategy. Walker later reflected that a "golden opportunity had been allowed to pass."⁸

★ ★ ★

ALTHOUGH LOUISIANA REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET DURING THE LATE SUMMER, the Confederate situation in Arkansas worsened considerably. The fall of Vicksburg allowed the Federals to transfer troops to Arkansas for a campaign against Little Rock. The city fell on September 10, and by autumn the Confederates controlled only the southwest portion of the state. The situation in Arkansas, along with fears of a Federal attempt to invade Texas, prompted Smith to place the department on high alert.

Louisiana governor Thomas O. Moore feared that Smith would abandon his state to the Federals. He implored the general not to detach troops from Taylor for service in other districts. Moore speci-



fied the potential removal of Walker's division as one of his greatest concerns. Smith responded bluntly. He blamed the loss of Little Rock on the presence of Walker in Louisiana. "But for its [Walker's division] transfer our troops would probably now be in possession of the Arkansas Valley," he chided Moore. Yet Smith assured the governor that he was not contemplating the removal of Walker from Taylor's command. In doing so Smith acknowledged that he no longer considered the division a part of the department's disposable force, but rather an integral part of Taylor's army.⁹

Despite his attempt to calm the governor, Smith's determination to blame Louisiana for failures in Arkansas exacerbated tensions. He chastised Moore for questioning troop movements within the department and insisted that if the Federals advanced south from Little Rock, Arkansas was the place for concentration. Then, just one week after Smith pledged not to remove Walker from Taylor, he ordered the division to march north from Alexandria to Natchitoches. Smith planned to concentrate forces near Shreveport. From there, he could direct operations against the Federals in Arkansas or, if necessary, defend the Red River valley to the south. Taylor protested the redeployment and cited reports of a renewed enemy troop buildup at Berwick Bay in the Teche region. Although Smith quickly suspended Walker's movement, the commanding general's intentions were clear. He had begun preparations for an Arkansas campaign and meant Walker to play a role. As the Federal numbers in the lower Teche continued to grow, Smith left Louisiana to Taylor and traveled to Arkadelphia to confer with Holmes.


Smith indicated that he was prepared to gather Louisiana forces in the Red River valley and move them through Shreveport to support the Arkansans. Taylor had no intention of waiting for orders to abandon his state, and instead took the initiative along the Teche. On September 29 Confederate infantry under Mouton crushed a Federal division near Opelousas, and fourteen days later Green's cavalry routed the enemy at Vermilionville (modern day Lafayette). Aside from prisoners and supplies, the strikes netted important intelligence: Taylor learned that Union General William B. Franklin was moving in large force toward Alexandria. According to the in-

formation, Franklin's ultimate goal was Texas. Taylor relayed the news to Smith and Moore. "If the Yanks still mean Texas they will have the devil's own time getting there" he vowed to the governor.¹⁰

Smith disputed the reliability of the captured intelligence. He replied that the enemy had "not sufficiently developed his [plans] to decide certainly upon [a] true line of operations." Smith warned his lieutenant, "You must restrain your impulses," and insisted that Taylor fall back into the Red River valley rather than challenge the Federal advance. Smith was trying to make events in lower Louisiana fit with his own plans for concentration in northwest Louisiana. A withdrawal to Shreveport would give the Federals a clear path across southern and central Louisiana to Niblett's Bluff, the Sabine River, and Texas. This strategy, however, unnecessarily surrendered much of Taylor's district: Smith's desire to make Arkansas the theater of operations clouded his judgment and jeopardized the security of the remainder of the department.

praised Taylor for his efforts to thwart the Federal invasion. He characterized the Louisianan as "cautious, yet bold; always prepared for and anticipating the enemy; concentrating skillfully upon his main force, holding it in check, and crippling its movements; promptly striking his detached columns, routing and destroying them." The report did not give any hint of a disagreement between the generals over troops or strategy.¹¹

Privately, Smith accused Taylor of trying to turn the citizens of Louisiana against him. He cited an editorial in an Alexandria newspaper accusing the commanding general of planning to abandon Louisiana, and calling for his resignation. Smith charged that Taylor's headquarters was the source for the article and held his lieutenant accountable for the content. Taylor denied responsibility and sent the paper a rebuttal in defense of his commander. Smith seemed somewhat mollified and assured Taylor that the incident would not "influence my feelings or effect [sic] the cordial relations existing be-



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



TEXAS STATE ARCHIVES, AUSTIN

Lieutenant General Theophilus H. Holmes (left) and Major General Sterling Price, who replaced Holmes in Arkansas.

Taylor faced a dilemma. If he retreated toward Shreveport, he risked the loss of his state. But if he resisted the Federals, he would be in violation of Smith's orders. Despite the warning from Smith not to hazard an engagement without "strong hopes of success," Taylor decided to hit Franklin's column near Washington, thirty miles south of Alexandria. One of Walker's men recalled that "Taylor was determined to give battle" if the enemy continued to advance. Astonishingly, Franklin declined to fight and instead ordered a withdrawal back down the Teche. Within days, the Federals abandoned the operation altogether and went into winter quarters. Publicly, Smith

tween us." Three weeks later, on December 2, he withdrew Green's cavalry from Taylor and sent the division to Texas. On December 12, Smith traveled to Arkansas and began to map out a campaign to recapture Little Rock. To expedite the strategy he planned to transfer Mouton's division from Louisiana to Arkansas. In keeping with his promise to Moore several weeks earlier, Smith left Walker with Taylor.¹²

By the close of 1863, Smith had weakened Taylor's army by shuttling troops across district lines. His confusion regarding Federal movements in Taylor's district hampered the commanding general's ability to grasp the strategic im-

portance of Louisiana, and his fixation on Arkansas led Smith to underestimate the impact Taylor had on Federal strategy. This hindered Confederate operations to recover New Orleans and aid Southern forces east of the Mississippi. In effect, Taylor had emerged as Smith's rival rather than his ally. The following year, Smith and Taylor found themselves caught between a Federal advance from both Little Rock and New Orleans; Walker's Texans found themselves caught between Smith and Taylor.

for immediate reinforcements to bolster Walker's and Mouton's infantry divisions, and stressed that without the return of Green's cavalry he could not monitor the enemy movements precisely. Smith declined to send a significant number of reinforcements to Taylor. Instead, he directed his subordinate to strengthen the defenses at Fort DeRussy, a water battery between the mouth of the Red River and Alexandria. Taylor chaffed at the decision but sent Walker to fortify the installation. Smith also ordered Sterling Price, who

ever claw of the Federal pincer emerged as the more immediate threat. Yet Federal objectives, as well as the size of Banks' army, made a strong defense of Taylor's district the key to the security of the department. Nonetheless, as reports of enemy activity along the Southern front mounted, Smith failed to deliver the resources needed to provide detailed intelligence of Federal movements along the Red River. He also refused to furnish the manpower necessary for Taylor to impede the enemy advance.¹⁵

Once the campaign began, Smith acquiesced in Taylor's bid for additional troops, and ordered Green from Texas to Alexandria. By the time the Texans crossed the Sabine River, Taylor had suffered defeat at Fort DeRussy, been forced to evacuate Alexandria, lost his entire cavalry force at Henderson's Hill, and begun a withdrawal up the Red River toward Shreveport. By late March, Green had not yet reached Taylor, and without cavalry the Louisianan could do little more than yield the countryside to the enemy. As the Federals sacked Southern towns, imprisoned civilians, and seized Confederate cotton, Taylor lamented his compliance with Smith's strategy and vowed not to repeat the mistake. "As soon as Green joins me I shall assume the offensive" he announced to the commanding general. Intelligence reports indicated, however, that Green would not reach him until early April.

Taylor's melancholy resulting from the piecemeal surrender of his home state turned to anger on March 28, when he discovered that Smith had been holding 4,000 reinforcements in Shreveport for nearly a week. A letter from Taylor's brother-in-law, Louisiana congressman Duncan Kenner, revealed that Smith had not decided whether to send the troops to Taylor or return them to Price. With the Federals in Arkansas twice as far from Shreveport as those in Louisiana, and marching with half the number of men, Taylor understood Smith's strategy of rapid concentration to assure him command of the reinforcements. Yet Smith refused concentration along the Southern front. To make matters worse, Kenner recounted a meeting with Smith during which the general insisted that Taylor did not want the additional troops. Smith had interpreted Taylor's threat to take the offensive as soon as Green arrived to mean that he no longer desired additional



By the time the Texans crossed the Sabine River, Taylor had suffered defeat at Fort DeRussy. In this drawing Union forces supported by bombardment from Porter's fleet, storm Fort DeRussy and overwhelm the Confederates.

AS EARLY AS JANUARY 1864, Taylor's intelligence sources reported that the Federals proposed a spring campaign along the Red River with Shreveport as the immediate objective. By the end of February, Confederate agents in New Orleans confirmed that the operation was about to begin. The campaign called for a massive pincer movement, with Banks leading 30,000 troops up the Red River while another 15,000 under Frederick Steele moved south to Shreveport from Little Rock. Plans also included a powerful fleet of warships, under Admiral David Dixon Porter, that would accompany Banks on the Red River and provide support. If successful, the Red River Campaign would not only reduce the Trans-Mississippi capital, but also garner thousands of bales of cotton for the starving textile mills of New England and provide a staging ground for a Federal invasion of Texas.¹³

Taylor communicated the information to Smith but charged that department headquarters did not react with any sense of urgency. The Louisianan called

had replaced Holmes in Arkansas, to send four of his infantry brigades to Shreveport. From there these troops would be in supporting distance of either Taylor or Price. Smith maintained that "with the superiority of cavalry" that Price enjoyed, the Confederates in Arkansas, unlike Taylor in Louisiana, held "a great advantage over an invading force." To both Taylor and Price, he issued orders to "retard the enemy's advance . . . if practicable [and] fall back towards reenforcements."¹⁴

Smith's responsibility was to defend not just Taylor's district but the entire department, and he developed his plans accordingly. He later described the rationale behind his strategy: "Occupying a central position at Shreveport, with the enemy's columns approaching from opposite directions, I proposed drawing them within striking distance, when, by concentrating upon and striking them in detail, both columns might be crippled or destroyed." The plan to use interior lines and trade territory for time was strategically sound. By seeking concentration at Shreveport, Smith could strike which-

reinforcements. The communication left Taylor enraged and in an indignant letter to headquarters he demanded an explanation.



GENERALS IN GRAY

Brigadier General William R. Boggs.

According to Boggs, the commanding officer and Dr. Smith devised a scheme that would solve the predicament.

Smith insisted that he had detained the reinforcements in Shreveport in order to resupply and reorganize the brigades. Although he did not deny that he had misconstrued Taylor's vow to take the offensive, Smith dismissed Kenner's letter as a blatant distortion and sought to shift the blame to the congressman. "I do not regard myself responsible" for the misunderstanding, he insisted, and condemned Kenner for daring to disclose the substance of their meeting. In addition, Smith relayed news from Arkansas indicating that the Federal column was moving rapidly and concentration against Steele seemed likely. As to the hostility of Taylor's correspondence, Smith added sharply, "I object to the tone of your letter which is an unjust complaint." These letters began a vitriolic exchange between the generals that intensified along with the military campaigning and would continue to rage long after the battles had ended.¹⁶

Taylor shot back immediately on the confusion over reinforcements and his earlier pledge to take the offensive with Green. "I can scarcely conceive how this could be interpreted into a declaration that I did not want re-enforcements," he argued. Taylor ridiculed Smith's explanation and announced, "I certainly would have been the first commander possessing ordinary sense who voluntarily declined re-enforcements while retreating before a superior force." He also placed the blame for the Federal success in Louisiana on Smith's failure to deliver

reinforcements. Referring to the 4,000 troops at Shreveport, Taylor ridiculed the execution of the general's strategy as irrational. "To decline concentration when we have the means, and when the enemy is already in the vitals of the department is a policy I am too obtuse to understand," he scoffed. Taylor then flaunted his intention to engage the enemy in battle without orders. "When Green joins me, I repeat, I shall fight a battle for Louisiana."¹⁷

With Banks massing above Alexandria, Smith's reluctance to support Taylor seemed motivated by something other than military concerns. Taylor suspected that a prominent member of Smith's staff had convinced the general to return his focus to Arkansas at the expense of Louisiana. Dr. Sol Smith, a longtime friend of the Kirby-Smith family, had served with the general since First Manassas and, according to Taylor, acted as Smith's confidant and personal advisor. William Boggs, Smith's chief-of-staff, concurred and asserted that Dr. Smith directly influenced the decision to withhold reinforcements from Taylor. Yet, as conditions along the Southern front worsened, Smith could not simply ignore the situation. According to Boggs, the commanding officer and Dr. Smith devised a scheme that would solve the predicament. Taylor was to "harass Banks up to the last moment and then General Smith was to move down with additional troops, take command, and carry off the glory." Afterward, he would turn the department's resources to the Northern front and lead the troops personally on a campaign through Arkansas. Smith's strategy had evolved from one based on military necessity, to one driven by a quest for glory.¹⁸

Unaware of Smith's covert plan, Taylor continued to remind the commanding general of his intention to attack Banks once Green arrived. Certainly, Taylor was aware that to offer battle against orders was insubordination. But, addressing Smith's charge that his threats and his demeanor were inappropriate, Taylor contended that he had reviewed recent correspondence and disagreed with the allegation of impropriety. "I can find nothing disrespectful or improper," concluded Taylor, "and am fully impressed with what is due from a subordinate to his military superior." By refusing to yield, Taylor had thrown down the

gauntlet and chosen to accelerate the war of words between the generals.¹⁹

Meanwhile, as his army moved slowly to a forage depot outside Natchitoches, Taylor hurried to the little river town. There, on March 30, he welcomed the overdue arrival of advance elements from Green. As the tattered, ill-equipped horsemen straggled into town, Taylor's temper again flared. "Sixteen days after the fall of Fort Derussy and the opening of the campaign by the enemy," he seethed, "only 250 re-enforcements have reached me." That afternoon, Taylor escaped Natchitoches just ahead of Federal cavalry. "Expecting every hour to receive the promised re-enforcements, I did not feel justified in hazarding a general engagement with my little army," he reminded Smith. "I shall never cease to regret the error."²⁰

Smith restated his strategy to Taylor, and emphasized that to suffer defeat in a pitched battle "would be fatal to the whole cause and to the department." He insisted that forces in Louisiana must continue a strategic defensive and a tactical retreat. Taylor rejected the plea unconditionally. "It would have been better to lose a State after a defeat than surrender it without a fight," he decried, and repeated his pledge to take the offensive.

From the area surrounding Natchitoches, the Confederates marched away from the Red River and toward a supply depot at Pleasant Hill, sixty miles below Shreveport. Increasingly, the destruction in Louisiana and grumblings from within the ranks weighed on Taylor's mind. One of Walker's field officers, Elijah P. Petty, reflected the mood of Taylor's command. "We have run already unconscionably and the country has been devastated," he confided in a letter to his wife. "We have run until our patience has oozed out." The citizens of Taylor's home state, too, had lost confidence in the army's ability to protect them from danger. "Inhabitants all along the route of our retreat," reported Private Joseph P. Blessington, "were hurriedly quitting their homes and flying before the approach of the invader. Consternation and alarm everywhere prevailed among the citizens." Perhaps only Robert E. Lee felt the same degree of pressure from civilians and soldiers of his home state that burdened Taylor in Louisiana. Unlike Lee, Taylor had little recourse but to obey orders, fall back, and hope for reinforcements.²¹

By April 3, Taylor's retreat had carried him a few miles beyond Pleasant Hill to the crossroads town of Mansfield. From Mansfield, roads heading east allowed him to monitor the Federals on the Red River while roads to the west gave Green's riders a direct path to the army. Three separate overland routes to Shreveport lay just beyond Mansfield and made control of the town a tactical necessity. Taylor resolved to use Mansfield as a base for an attack against the Federal columns approaching Natchitoches. He notified Smith of his intentions and declared, "I have been compelled to surrender mile after mile of territory . . . without a general battle. The problem now is how to take the offensive."

mand to Arkansas and support Price. "Action, prompt, vigorous action, is required," Taylor insisted and reminded Smith, "While we are deliberating, the enemy is marching." Smith admitted that the fate of the department rested with his decision on where to meet the Federal invasion, and determined that a council of war was in order. On April 5 he left for Mansfield to confer "clearly and unreservedly" with Taylor. Before he left Shreveport, however, Smith contacted Thomas J. Churchill and Mosby Parsons in command of the reinforcements. He instructed the generals to prepare to counter-march their divisions to Arkansas.


At Mansfield, Smith reiterated his strategy of concentration. He argued

rity of the department but also threatened to destroy the Confederate command structure in the Trans-Mississippi.


Before returning to Shreveport, Smith gave Taylor discretionary control over the infantry at Keatchie. Although he still refused to sanction anything more than a strategic retreat, Smith knew that Banks controlled a larger force than Steele and presented potentially a greater danger. He also knew that Taylor wanted desperately to move against Banks. Smith may have speculated that Taylor would fall back to Keatchie, where he would offer battle. But, by giving Taylor discretionary control of the 4,000 reinforcements, Smith inadvertently provided him with the means to take action. In combination with Green's division, Taylor's numbers would swell to nearly 13,000. Smith's decision bolstered his subordinate's confidence that he could, indeed, thwart the Federal invasion of Louisiana by assuming the offensive. Smith had unwittingly empowered Taylor to disobey his orders and to bring on a general engagement.

By dusk, as the meeting ended, Taylor's threat remained unchanged. A crucial decision by Banks at Grand Ecore, however, lessened the weight of Smith and Taylor's strategic differences. That evening, as Smith rode north to Shreveport, Banks marched his army away from the Red River and toward the Confederates at Mansfield. To save time, Banks chose to abandon the winding river road in favor of the old stagecoach road, a more direct route to Shreveport. It was the most significant decision of the campaign and one that Banks would pay for with the blood of his army.

Throughout the night of April 6, Taylor greeted the bulk of Green's cavalry. The following morning, he sent Green to probe the Federal position beyond Pleasant Hill. At Wilson's Farm, three miles west of the town, the Texans tangled with Federal cavalry but, unlike previous engagements during the campaign, the Confederates refused to fall back. As the Federals brought up reinforcements, Green realized that this was not a cavalry screen but the advance guard of Banks' entire army. Taylor rode to the scene and agreed with Green's assessment: Banks had abandoned the river and was moving on Shreveport by way of Mansfield. That night, Taylor called a council of war and resolved to stop the



VIRGINIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY



MUSEUM OF THE CONFEDERACY

Major General Thomas J. Churchill and Major General Mosby Parsons.

On April 1, Smith acknowledged the crisis at Taylor's front and rescinded his earlier pronouncement that Arkansas was the primary theater of operations. He reasserted that Federal movements would determine where to concentrate the department's force and where to engage the enemy. On April 4, Smith acknowledged the direct threat to Taylor's front and ordered the 4,000 troops at Shreveport to advance toward Keatchie, twenty miles from Mansfield. The restoration of strategy came too late for Taylor. On the same day that two divisions of reinforcements marched out of Shreveport, Taylor belittled Smith's character and questioned his courage. "Like a man who has admitted the robber into his bedchamber instead of resisting him at the door, our defense will be embarrassed by the cries of women and children," he declared. To Taylor, the security of the department called for an immediate response. In what must have shocked Smith, Taylor then suggested that if Steele presented the greater threat, he would march his com-

again that Steele's advance presented a substantial threat and cautioned Taylor that a premature strike against either Federal column would jeopardize the Confederate advantage of interior lines. However, he went on to make suggestions that belied the strategy that he had just outlined. First, he considered ordering Taylor's army to Shreveport and forcing the Federals to lay siege to the city. Second, as an alternative to a siege, Smith proposed that Taylor abandon Louisiana entirely and retreat across the Sabine into Texas. Both options left Taylor aghast. He predicted that a siege would result inevitably in the loss of manpower and *materiel*, both of which were irreplaceable at this stage of the war. The consequences of retreat into Texas, warned Taylor, would result in waves of desertions among the Louisiana and Arkansas troops. Taylor countered the proposals by restating his intention to fight Banks as soon as Green reached him in force. The generals had arrived at a strategic standoff that jeopardized not only the secu-

Federals before they reached Mansfield, regardless of Smith's instructions. He ordered Walker and Mouton to move their infantry into position near a clearing along the Sabine crossroads and sent instructions for Churchill and Parsons to march to Mansfield at once.

Taylor knew that these reinforcements would not arrive from Keatchie until late the following day. Without them, he could muster just 8,800 men to face the enemy. According to Green's intelligence, however, the Federals were advancing along a narrow road, hemmed in on either side by thick piney forests. In addition, each corps was moving separately with its train, hindering rapid concentration. These factors assured Taylor of a numerical advantage at the point of attack. Of perhaps greater concern was Smith's reaction to the decision to offer battle. Following the council of war, Taylor notified the commanding general of the Federal advance on Mansfield and asked for permission to engage the enemy the following day. In the message Taylor specified that he needed an answer before morning. The dispatch implied that without orders to the contrary, he would assume the right to offer battle. It was a dangerously thin line, a mere technicality, upon which Taylor based his commitment to violate Smith's orders and take the offensive.

A response from Smith was not forthcoming. Instead, the commander elected to honor a congressional decree issued weeks earlier that designated April 8 as a day of national reflection. The observance included a suspension of military activities. Smith did not reply to Taylor until noon and his message did not reach the front until after the battle at Mansfield was under way. He suggested that Taylor fall back and "compel the enemy to develop his intentions." This non-specific command underscored that Smith did not comprehend the gravity of the situation that confronted Taylor. The enemy had already developed his intentions to move through Mansfield and Taylor solicited instructions, not advice. Smith's message also revealed that he was prepared to come to the front with additional reinforcements and lead the army into battle. This confirmed suspicions that Smith's concern for glory had influenced his strategic judgment. Despite Taylor's bravado in the earlier stages of the campaign, the Louisianan realized

at Mansfield that by fighting without orders, he risked his command, his state, and his career. At 4:00 p.m., as the battle got underway, Taylor conceded to Colonel Xavier DeBray that he was "fighting with a rope around his neck."

The battle of Mansfield raged in great chaos until well after dark, when Taylor's forces secured a stunning victory. The battle halted the enemy advance and sent the Federals reeling back toward Pleasant Hill. The following day, strengthened by reinforcements from Keatchie, Taylor did something that was rare in the Civil War: he followed up a victory and pursued a beaten foe. At Pleasant Hill, Taylor attacked the Federals again in an attempt to consolidate the gains from Mansfield. Although the Confederates failed to overrun Banks' army as they had at Mansfield, at nightfall the Federals abandoned the field to Taylor and withdrew from Pleasant Hill. Taylor's decision to seize the initiative at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill sent the shocked blue columns retreating toward the Red River.²²

Before dawn on April 9, a courier woke Smith with the first in a series of

messages from Taylor notifying him of the battle at Mansfield. After reading the dispatches, Smith assumed that Taylor had encountered only the advance elements of Banks' army. In Smith's opinion a decisive engagement still loomed and, in accordance with his scheme to lead the troops into battle, he rode swiftly to the front. Smith expected to find Taylor at Mansfield, but upon his arrival that afternoon found only casualties and prisoners. Only then did he realize that Mansfield had indeed been a major battle and that Taylor had launched a pursuit of Banks' army. Smith rushed to Pleasant Hill and arrived late that night. There he learned that Taylor had fought another important battle and again had driven the enemy from the field.

"Bad Business, bad business," grumbled Smith when he found Taylor resting by an officer's campfire. "Banks will be upon you at daylight" he warned. Taylor hesitated momentarily before responding. "I don't know, General . . . If you will listen, you will hear Banks's artillery moving out now on their retreat." Taylor was right. Although the Federals won a narrow tactical victory at Pleasant

Sketch of the Battle of Pleasant Hill on April 9. Arriving late that night, Smith learned that Taylor had fought another important battle and again had driven the enemy from the field.



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Hill, Taylor gained a strategic victory by compelling Banks to halt his advance. Taylor had effectively broken one claw of the Federal pincer movement. The news left Smith dumbfounded. His plans to draw Banks toward Shreveport before riding down to carry off the glory of victory lay in ruins along the Red River road. Later, Taylor observed smugly, "General Kirby Smith had a wonderful plan for the destruction of the enemy, which I had disturbed by rashly beating his army at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill." Smith ordered Taylor to return to Mansfield for an inquiry into the battles and to plan the strategy for the rest of the campaign.²³

During the April 10 meeting, Taylor summarized the events of the past three days. He took full responsibility for initiating the fighting at Mansfield and shouldered the blame for the failure to destroy Banks at Pleasant Hill. Smith did not hold Taylor responsible for an intentional violation of orders at Mansfield. Rather, he blamed "the rare intrepidity of Mouton's division" for precipitating the fight. Likewise, he did not condemn his subordinate for pursuing the Federals, but charged that Taylor risked the security of the department by attacking Banks at Pleasant Hill. To Smith, it was

Banks' decision to retreat, not Taylor's decision to attack, that had saved Shreveport. Nevertheless, Smith conceded that Mansfield and Pleasant Hill had left Banks "so crippled that he cannot soon take the offensive."

With the Confederates concentrated in Louisiana, albeit against Smith's wishes, Taylor outlined plans to follow up his success. In accordance with Smith's overall strategy for the campaign, Taylor proposed to crush the isolated Federal column before it could rejoin Porter's fleet on the river. Smith rejected the proposal. He reasoned that Banks no longer presented a threat to Shreveport and insisted that the Confederates turn their attention to Arkansas. Smith ordered Taylor to pull the greater part of his army back from Pleasant Hill in anticipation of a movement to Arkansas. On the morning of April 11, Smith returned to Shreveport to organize the campaign against Steele. While Taylor's audacity in Louisiana had shattered Banks' hopes, it also served to revive Smith's ambitions.

For the next several days Taylor continued to present his case to Smith and sought to placate concerns over the Federal threat from Arkansas. He argued that not only was Steele farther from Shreve-

port than Banks, but that the Federals in Arkansas would abandon the campaign and return to Little Rock once they learned of events in Louisiana. Smith remained unconvinced and stressed that Steele's advance put the Federals in position to destroy the military-industrial complex around Shreveport. Consequently, a campaign in Arkansas was necessary for the security of the department. The overthrow of Steele also carried with it the potential reoccupation of Arkansas and the subsequent opening of a pathway to Missouri. These were goals that Smith had pursued since his arrival in the Trans-Mississippi. Further, by personally leading the Arkansas campaign, Smith saw an opportunity to capture the battlefield glory that he had sought since the beginning of the war. On April 13 he returned to Mansfield and ordered Taylor to prepare all Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas infantry in Louisiana for a campaign in the Arkansas theater. In doing so, Smith reduced Confederate strength in Louisiana by two-thirds and removed Walker's division from Taylor's command.

In his communications to Taylor dated April 12, Smith acknowledged that "were Steele in retreat the prompt pursuit of Banks would be wise." Taylor took this to mean that should the Federals in Arkansas begin to fall back, Smith would return Walker to Louisiana for operations against Banks. Confident that this would soon be the case, Taylor ceased his protests and volunteered to accompany the Texans to Arkansas and serve under Price. Smith accepted this offer. When he arrived at Smith's headquarters three days later, however, Taylor discovered that Steele had already begun to retreat. To his chagrin, Smith refused to countermand Walker's orders, and summarily instructed Taylor to remain behind in Louisiana. The sudden breach of faith left Taylor stunned and he recalled that Smith delivered the news "with the curt manner of a superior to a subordinate, as if fearing remonstrance." On April 16, Smith rode out of Shreveport toward Arkansas at the head of Parsons' Missouri division. That same day, Steele marched his army into Camden.

Upon reaching the Arkansas line, Smith decided to hold Walker at Minden, Louisiana, in case Banks resumed the advance on Shreveport. On April 20, he notified Taylor of the decision. Smith's



change in plans was a pragmatic adaptation of the strategy he had exercised throughout the campaign. Walker could operate along interior lines in much the same way that Churchill and Parsons had earlier. Smith also indicated that he might return discretionary control of Walker's division to Taylor to support operations against the Federals on the Red River. Taylor received the message the following day and the prospect of Walker's return revitalized him. At once, he sought to reassert authority over the division and sent instructions for Walker to advance to Campiti, a position from which the Texans could move quickly to the Southern front. In a letter to Smith, Taylor included a report that the Federals had begun a gradual withdrawal down the Red River. Rather than hasten Walker's arrival, word of this development alleviated Smith's fears of a renewed threat from Banks. As a result, on April 22, he ordered Walker to Arkansas. Taylor did not receive this news for several days and, expecting Walker's return, devised his plan to destroy Banks' columns.

Without Walker, Taylor had little more than a skeleton force. Despite this, he took advantage of good terrain, and bad luck on the part of the enemy, to contest the Federal retreat. On April 23, at Monett's Ferry, twenty-five miles below Natchitoches, Taylor devised a trap that enabled a force of 2,000, from a position on top of the bluffs overlooking the Cane River, to challenge the Federal crossing. The inexperience of Hamilton Bee, the Confederate field commander, played a deciding role in allowing the Federals to escape Taylor's trap. Significantly, the absence of Walker reduced not only Taylor's troop strength, and thus restricted his tactical options, but also depleted his officer corps and consequently forced him to assign a less capable subordinate to a crucial strategic position.

Taylor's anger over the debacle at Monett's Ferry paled in contrast to his outrage at Alexandria, two days later. Here, on April 25, the Federal infantry halted their retreat to offer protection for the Union fleet that lay ensnared above the falls by the low level of the Red River. With the entire enemy force trapped, Taylor prepared to order Walker to Alexandria. On the same day, however, he received word from Smith that Walker was no longer in Louisiana but had been summoned to Arkansas for the pursuit


of Steele. Smith rationalized the decision by claiming that "in both a political and military point of view everything is to be gained for the department" by concentration against Steele. Taylor was livid and issued an angry rejoinder. He denounced the "inscrutable purpose" for which Smith had deprived him of the greater part of the army and issued a searing indictment of the commander's strategy. "I cannot conceive what political and military points of view are to be obtained . . . by abandoning the certain destruction of an army of 30,000 men, backed by a huge fleet, to chase after a force of 10,000 in full retreat with over 100 miles the start."²⁴

Taylor's attack focused on the removal of Walker. He condemned Smith for "having placed the division in a useless position . . . and [having] kept it idle for fifteen days" following Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. This was similar to the criticism that Taylor leveled in 1863 following the engagement at Milliken's Bend. Further, Taylor accused Smith of misleading him during their meetings at Shreveport by agreeing that Walker's division "would not be taken from my command,

but...[for] a few days, when it would be returned to me" in time for operations against Banks. By halting Walker at Minden, Smith had given Taylor the impression that the division would soon be available for campaigning in Louisiana. "My plans for driving the enemy were to a great extent based upon the assurance that Walker's Div would be kept at my disposal," he argued scornfully. Taylor accused Smith of meddling in the affairs of his district and issuing orders "which conflict with my arrangements and render my plans for the future . . . uncertain."²⁵

Without Walker, Taylor watched the opportunity to destroy Banks and capture the fleet slowly fade away. Still, he held out hope that Smith would return the Texans in time to take action. Taylor recalled bitterly that "day after day we strained our eyes to see the dust of our approaching comrades." For the next three weeks, he watched helplessly as the Federals, after constructing a series of dams to free the fleet, resumed their retreat and left Alexandria a smoldering ruin. "Nothing but the withdrawal of Walker's division from me has prevented the capture of Banks' army and the de-

Federal infantry halted their retreat to offer protection for the Union fleet that lay ensnared above the falls. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey led the construction of temporary dams to float the gunboats over the rapids. In the illustration below, Porter's fleet passes through Bailey's dam. At right, the USS *Signal* tows material for construction of the dams. The *Signal* was later disabled on May 5, and ran aground in the Red River while engaging enemy batteries near Alexandria.



struction of [the] fleet," he admonished Smith.

Meanwhile, as Taylor struggled in Alexandria, Smith took command in Arkansas. On April 26 he "issued orders for the troops to pursue Steele to his fortifications at Little Rock." That evening, he learned that Steele had evacuated Camden, crossed the Ouatachita River, and was in full retreat. Chief-of-Staff Boggs recalled a meeting with his commander in which the officers discussed their options. During the conference, Smith acknowledged that continued pursuit of Steele was indeed troublesome. Boggs concluded that Smith "ought to have known that his army should have been pushed across country toward Alexandria." In fact, before Smith left Shreveport he had promised Taylor "that should Steele retreat across the Ouachita" he would countermarch Walker and send the infantry to Louisiana "in time to operate against Banks." Once in Arkansas, however, Smith ignored his commitment to Taylor and disregarded the counsel of his lieutenants. Instead, he chose to pursue the glory that had eluded him in Louisiana and ordered pursuit of Steele's column to continue.

On April 30 Smith caught the Federals at Jenkins' Ferry, along the Saline River. In the ensuing battle, Walker's Texans suffered heavy casualties, including all three brigadiers. Strategically, the battle of Jenkins' Ferry accomplished little. The Federals crossed the river successfully and continued their retreat, while Smith, apparently "satisfied with the laurels . . . won," called off his pursuit and declared victory. Three days later he ordered Walker back to Louisiana, announcing to the Texans "the path of glory is still open to you." A private in Walker's

division mocked the idea. "The path of glory," he explained, "leads to the grave."²⁶

Twelve days after the battle of Jenkins' Ferry, Smith returned to Shreveport and notified Taylor that reinforcements were finally on the way. On May 19, four days after the Federals had burned Alexandria, Walker reached the outskirts of the town. That same day, the final remnants of Banks' invasion force escaped across Yellow Bayou. Exhausted, Taylor reestablished his headquarters near Alexandria and prepared to rebuild his district. Within days he received a letter from Smith urging him to begin preparations for a summer campaign to Arkansas. Taylor did not respond directly to Smith's suggestion. Instead, he dispatched a succession of denigrating letters to Smith that would end in his removal from command.

Taylor escalated the intensity of his earlier criticism and expanded his critique to include Smith's handling of the Trans-Mississippi department. He lectured Smith on everything from the poor distribution of supplies to the strategy for an invasion of Missouri and demanded "radical change" in a system "liberal in promise and utterly barren in performance." The department under Smith was "all ruffles and no shirt," he later contended, adding that "hydrocephalus at Shreveport produced atrophy elsewhere." Taylor had drawn battle lines between himself and Smith, and the latter, who had shown some restraint in his response to earlier criticism, chose to cross them.²⁷

In two separate letters, written ten days apart, Smith angrily addressed each of Taylor's accusations. He portrayed Taylor's analysis of the department as "inaccurate and unjust," and reprimanded his subordinate for the "objectionable and improper" tone of the correspondence. The issue that had precipitated the dispute elicited Smith's most passionate response. "You complain bitterly of the withdrawal of Walker's division and say it has robbed your army of the just measure of its glory," he stated. In Smith's mind, the criticism was groundless because, at their April 10 meeting at Mansfield, Taylor had endorsed the Arkansas campaign. In what surely angered Taylor, Smith concluded that "complete success of the campaign was determined by the overthrow of Steele at Jenkins Ferry," and not by the defeat of Banks at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill.²⁸

On June 5 Taylor fired back by pointing out inconsistencies in Smith's account. He called Smith a liar and charged that approval of the Arkansas campaign was conditional. He had based his support on Smith's pledge that once Steele began to retreat, Walker would be returned to Louisiana. Moreover, Taylor accused Smith of misrepresenting the campaign as "an affair of a few days" and assuring him "positively that Walker's division was not to be removed from my command." He then lashed out at Smith's rationalization that "the fruits of victory at Mansfield were secured by the march of the column against Steele." Taylor reminded his commanding officer that "Banks was driven into his works [at Alexandria] . . . two days before the fight at Jenkins' Ferry" and thus the fruits of Mansfield had no connection with the fight in Arkansas. Further, Taylor argued that the Confederates held not "one foot more of Arkansas than if Jenkins' Ferry had never been," and yet, referring to Walker's Texans, had a "jaded army and 1,000 less soldiers." To Taylor, the likely destruction of the Union army and navy were the fruits of Mansfield. "How then" he asked sarcastically, was the "complete success of the campaign determined by . . . Jenkins' Ferry?"²⁹

The most damaging evidence against Smith was his own orders, issued following Jenkins' Ferry, which sent the Texans back to Taylor rather than in pursuit of Steele. Taylor trumpeted that this strategy showed "even in your opinion the Red River was the theater of events." He augmented this argument to encompass war efforts east of the Mississippi. The escape of Banks would allow the Federals to reinforce William T. Sherman in Georgia and Grant in Virginia while the destruction of Porter's fleet would have done much to dampen Northern morale before the upcoming election. Taylor complained that the opportunities of the Red River Campaign "were all thrown away, to the utter destruction of the best interests of the country, and in their place we have Jenkins' Ferry."³⁰

Many, including Walker, supported Taylor's contention that "the fruits of Mansfield [had] been turned to dust" by Smith's strategy. "Doubtless it was to have been expected that the whole Confederate force would have thrown itself upon the track of [Banks'] flying army," Walker acknowledged. The fruits of Mansfield,



the capture of Porter's fleet and reduction of the Federal column, were ripe for Taylor's picking at Alexandria. Of Smith's decision to detach his division, Walker concluded: "To this fatal blunder Banks was indebted to his safety."³¹

The escalation of the quarrel, from a strategic disagreement over Walker's division to a barrage of vitriolic personal attacks, signaled a grave deterioration in the relationship between Smith and Taylor. Smith could not conduct the affairs of his department while the behavior of a key district commander bordered on insubordination. Likewise, Taylor understood that his extraordinary attack against Smith's integrity carried with it potentially severe consequences. Taylor concluded his June 5 letter with a request that Smith replace him as commander in Western Louisiana. Five days later, Smith accommodated his lieutenant and ordered him to "proceed to Natchitoches [and] await the pleasure of the President of the Confederate States." Ironically, Smith assigned Walker to district command in Western Louisiana. On the same day, the Confederate Congress passed a joint resolution thanking Taylor for his

"brilliant successes . . . and particularly for the victories at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill."³²

On June 11 Smith sent three of Taylor's most inflammatory letters to Richmond and turned the matter over to Davis with a brief note of explanation. The same day, he composed a lengthy account of the campaign in which he explained and defended his strategy. Smith also cautioned Davis that supporters of Taylor in Richmond would try to influence the president. "I know facts will be misrepresented and distorted by certain parties . . . who are waging a bitter war against me," he revealed. In both messages, Smith offered to resign if Davis thought it best.³³

The president did not ask Smith to resign. In late July, however, Davis returned Taylor to duty with a promotion to lieutenant general and an assignment to lead the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana. Before Taylor assumed command, his transfer initiated a renewal of hostilities with Smith. Taylor sought to cross the Mississippi at once and take command in his new department. "This I positively forbid,"

Smith announced on August 15. He insisted that Taylor could not cross the river without the Trans-Mississippi troops that Richmond had requested for the armies in the East. Taylor refused to recognize Smith's authority and threatened to cross at his own discretion. As the confrontation deteriorated into another war of words, Smith received a dispatch from Richmond informing him that orders to cross the troops were discretionary. Angered and embarrassed by the confusion, Smith ordered Taylor to cross at once. Taylor obliged willingly and on August 26 he left the Trans-Mississippi and escaped Smith's control.³⁴

Smith, however, did not escape Taylor's influence. That fall, in an election to fill a vacant Louisiana congressional seat, the ballot box emerged as a battlefield for Smith and Taylor partisans. In October, candidate John L. Lewis suffered a lopsided defeat at the hands of Henry Gray, a staunch opponent of the Smith administration and a popular political general who had served under Taylor. Gray took his anti-Smith views to Richmond and used his influence to help pass legislation directed at curbing

NOTES:

1. For an account of the Red River Campaign see Ludwell H. Johnson, *The Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War* (Baltimore: 1958). For a compelling biography of Taylor see T. Michael Parrish, *Richard Taylor: Soldier Prince of Dixie* (Chapel Hill: 1992). A thorough but uncritical study of Smith is Joseph H. Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith C.S.A.* (Baton Rouge, 1954). For primary accounts of the Red River Campaign written by the two generals see Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Civil War* (New York: 1995 reprint), and Edmund Kirby Smith, "The Defense of the Red River," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buell, eds., 4 volumes (New York: 1965 reprint), IV, pp. 369-74. Walker was a Missourian and a veteran of the Mexican War.
2. William R. Boggs, *Military Reminiscences of General William R. Boggs, C.S.A.* (Durham, 1913), pp. 55-56; Thomas C. Reynolds to Edmund Kirby Smith, May 13, 1863, Thomas C. Reynolds Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. For an analysis of Smith and the campaign in Kentucky consult Kenneth W. Noe, *Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle* (Lexington, Ky., 2001).
3. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 137-39; *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 Vols. (Washington D.C.: 1880-1901), Series I, vol. XXVI, pt. 2, pp. 12-13, 15 (hereinafter "OR," all references are to Series I); OR, XXIV, pt. 2, pp. 459-61, pt. 3, p. 846; Joseph P. Blessington, *The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division* (New York: 1875), pp. 112-15; John D. Winters, *The Civil War in Louisiana* (Baton Rouge: 1963), pp. 198-202; Parrish, *Richard Taylor*, 286-91.
4. Contrary to Taylor's reminiscences, it was he rather than Smith who first ordered Walker back to northeastern Louisiana. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 139; OR, XXIV, pt. 2, p. 461.
5. Brashear City, located near the confluence of the Teche and Atchafalaya, served as the Western terminus of the New Orleans and Opelousa rail line. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 140, 143; OR, XXVI, pt. 1, p. 211, pt. 2, p. 107, XXIV, pt., 3, p. 979, XXII, pt., 2, p. 916; Blessington, *Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, 113-16.
6. Richard B. Irwin, "The Capture of Port Hudson," *Battles and Leaders*, III, p. 597; U.S. Congress, *Report on the Conduct of the War 1865*, 3 vols. (Washington, DC, 1865), II, pp. 313-14; OR, XXVI, pt., 1, pp. 213-14; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 145.
7. OR, XXVI, pt., 2, p. 110-11; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 139; John G. Walker, *The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River During the Years 1863-4-5* (n.p. n.d.), United States Army History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 28; Blessington, *Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, 110-17.
8. OR, XXII, pt. 1, pp. 406-11; Walker, *The War of Secession*, 28; Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 278-80.
9. OR, XXVI, pt. 2, pp. 221-22
10. Richard Taylor to Thomas O. Moore, October 23, 1863, Thomas O. Moore Papers, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; OR, XXII, pt. 2, pp. 1034-036, XXVI, pt. 1, pp. 328-30, 386-87, pt., 2, p. 293; Parrish, *Richard Taylor*, 308-10. For more on the Federal campaign see Richard Lowe, *The Texas Overland Expedition of 1863* (Fort Worth: 1996).
11. Blessington, *Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, 136; OR, XXVI, pt., 1, pp. 384-85, 390, pt., 2, p. 341.
12. OR, XXVI, pt., 2, pp. 221, 394-95, 439, 468, 508, XXII, pt., 2, pp. 1110-11; Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 339-43; Parrish, *Richard Taylor*, 314-15. After he examined the situation at Little Rock, Smith decided to hold Mouton in northeastern Louisiana.

Smith's authority in the Trans-Mississippi. By the time the war ended, government investigators had linked Smith to irregularities in the Cotton Bureau and illegal trade with the enemy. Although never proven, the allegations damaged Smith's prestige in Richmond and tarnished his reputation across the country.

Fourteen years after the war, Taylor published his memoirs, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, and again leveled harsh criticism at Smith. He depicted Smith's strategy during the Red River campaign as one of "sheer stupidity and pig-head obstinacy." Smith never responded to the denunciation. Instead, he wrote a brief but uncritical synopsis of the campaign for publication in the *Century Magazine* series "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." During the post war years Trans-Mississippi veterans tended to side with Taylor's interpretation of events. H.T. Douglas discussed the campaign in *Confederate Veteran* and confided to readers that "all generals make mistakes" and Smith "may have made one." Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell, who despised Taylor personally, acknowledged that Smith should have continued to press the

Federals after Pleasant Hill and admitted that Smith "will always be censured for this neglect." Walker also articulated support for Taylor in his analysis. The officer who had been caught between Smith and Taylor affirmed that "if the whole force of the Confederates had been thrown upon [Banks'] shattered and demoralized army, its escape as an organized force would have been almost impossible."³⁵

Despite their enmity during the Red River campaign Smith and Taylor were successful. The generals stopped the extensive enemy invasion and in doing so thwarted the Federal attempt to seize Confederate cotton and to plant the Union flag on Texas soil. This triumph may appear to vindicate Smith's strategy, but at this stage of the war the Confederates could not afford to play it safe. The South needed bold, sweeping victories to stem the growing tide of defeat. Taylor's strategy carried with it the potential for such victory, but Smith chose to err on the side of caution. Had he allowed Taylor to keep Walker's division for use against the Federal army and navy in Louisiana, Confederate victories there

may have had even greater impact. Destruction of the Federal army would have prevented over 10,000 troops from joining Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, while capture of the fleet would have impaired Federal control of inland waterways. Both would have severely undermined Union morale in the field and on the home front. Combined with the heavy casualties suffered by Federal armies in Virginia, these events could have adversely affected Lincoln's reelection effort. Ironically, had Smith supported Taylor he might have found the glory along the bayous of Louisiana that eluded him in the marshes of Arkansas. "But unfortunately for the Confederates," Walker later concluded, "Gen. E.K. Smith was not the leader to comprehend the true line of action."³⁶

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13. OR, XXXIV, pt. 2, pp. 879, 1024; Richard B. Irwin, "The Red River Campaign," *Battles and Leaders*, IV, pp. 347-49. For insight into the political and economic origins of the Red River Campaign consult Johnson, *Red River Campaign*, 3-78.
14. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 479-80, 489, pt. 2, pp. 919, 977, 988, 1059-060, 1070, 1095; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 154. Taylor had but one regiment of cavalry under William G. Vincent, an officer of questionable military acumen. See OR, XXXIV, pt. 4, p. 654.
15. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 479-80; Edmund Kirby Smith, "The Defense of the Red River," *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 370; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 154-57.
16. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 513, 517, 519.
17. *Ibid.*, 514-15, 519.
18. *Ibid.*, 519; Boggs, *Military Reminiscences*, 75-76; Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 202, 346-47.
19. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, p. 519.
20. *Ibid.*, 515.
21. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 157; Blessington, *Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, 179; Norman D. Brown, ed., *Journey to Pleasant Hill: The Civil War Letters of Captain Elijah P. Petty, Walker's Texas Division*, 2 vols. (San Antonio: 1982), II, pp. 386-87.
22. Xavier DeBray, "A Sketch of DeBray's Twenty-Sixth Texas Cavalry," *Southern Historical Society Papers*, (hereinafter cited as SHSP), XIII (1885), p. 158; OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 528, 564, pt. 2, p. 1057; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 161; Boggs, *Military Reminiscences*, 76.
23. Sliger, "How General Taylor Fought," *Confederate Veteran* XXXI, p. 458; Hamilton Bee, "Battle of Pleasant Hill-An Error Corrected," *SHSP* VIII (1880), p. 185; OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 568-69, 608; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 190. After the war, Smith asserted that his arrival at Pleasant Hill stemmed Confederate retreat and helped convert defeat into victory. See Smith, "The Defense of the Red River," *Battles and Leaders*, IV, p. 372. Smith's report written during the war contradicts this claim. See OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 480, 485.
24. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 534, 541, 581-82; Taylor, *Confederate District of West Louisiana Record Book*, 26 April, 1864, Tulane University, New Orleans.
25. *Ibid.*; OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 541, 582-83. Taylor also accused Smith of taking part of St. John Liddell's command. *Ibid.*, 582 and Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 189.
26. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 816-18; Blessington, *Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, 247-59. Generals William R. Scurry and Horace Randal were mortally wounded in the fighting.
27. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 543-45; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 153.
28. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 538-40, 545-46.
29. *Ibid.*, 546-47.
30. *Ibid.*, 542, 547; Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 189-95.
31. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 546-47; Walker, *The War of Secession*, 56-57.
32. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 548, 597, pt. 4, p. 664. This was not the first time during the campaign that Taylor had asked to be relieved. See *Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 543.
33. OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, pp. 478-82, 540-41. The letters that Smith sent to Davis are found in *Ibid.*, 541-48.
34. OR, XLI, pt. 1, pp. 90-92, 102, 109-12, 117; Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 420-431. Smith recommended Taylor for advancement immediately following Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. See OR, XXXIV, pt. 1, p. 476.
35. Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 190; H.T. Douglas, "The Trans-Mississippi Department," *Confederate Veteran* XXV (1917): pp. 153-54; Nathaniel C. Hughes, ed., *Liddell's Record* (Dayton: 1985), p. 181; Walker, "The War of Secession," 47, 57.
36. *Ibid.*, 56-57.



SHADOWS OF BLUE & GRAY The Civil War Writings of Ambrose Bierce

Edited by Brian M. Thomsen (New York: Tom Doherty Associates LLC, 2002. Pp. 288, \$24.95, ISBN 0-765-30244-6).

"Rear, n. In American military matters, that exposed part of the army that is nearest to Congress." The pen of Ambrose Bierce produced many such sardonic and darkly humorous musings, and *Shadows of Blue & Gray* provides a selection of some of his best writing. 'Bitter Bierce,' as he was called, wrote some of the most chillingly effective pieces in American literature. Although reminiscent of the earlier *Ambrose Bierce's Civil War*, this new collection contains some seldom seen pieces not in the earlier anthology. *Shadows* includes both selections of his fiction and his valuable Civil War reminiscences.

Bierce served in the Civil War, first as a private, then sergeant-major of the 9th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, in which he saw action at Cheat Mountain and at Shiloh. Promoted to second lieutenant in 1862 he participated in the Perryville Campaign and fought with his regiment at Stones River. In February 1863 he was promoted to first lieutenant and assigned as topographical officer to the staff of General William Babcock Hazen. Bierce idolized the redoubtable Hazen and served him well through the Tullahoma Campaign, the Battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, and through half of the Atlanta Campaign. He was wounded in the head at Kennesaw Mountain in June 1864 and did not return to duty until the fall of that year. His final big battle was Franklin, Tennessee, on November 30, 1864. As one biographer put it, "War was the making of Bierce as a man and a writer."


The reminiscences contained in this anthology include "What I Saw of Shiloh," "A Little of Chickamauga," and "The Crime at Pickett's Mill." They are all incisive and provide a unique perspective. "The Crime at Pickett's Mill" is a particularly compelling and instructive recollection. "Way Down in Alabama" is a seldom seen piece dealing with reconstruction in Alabama.

The tales of fiction all have a Civil War setting with the exception of "A Jug of Sirup" and "The Spook House," which is a particularly graphic tale of terror. "An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge" is a well celebrated piece, but some of Bierce's lesser known gems are here: "A Tough Tussle"; "Two Military Execu-

BRIEFINGS *Reviews*

tions"; and "Killed at Resaca." He later wrote for Willaim R. Hearst's *San Francisco Examiner*, where his style was described as "the most scorching wit, irony, satire and bludgeoning ever printed by an American newspaper." The power of this uncelebrated giant of American letters is evident in this collection.

Bierce always looked back on his Civil War service with pride. Of his former enemy, the Confederate soldier, he wrote: "They were honest and courageous foemen, having little in common with the political madmen who persuaded them to their doom and the literary bearers of false witness in the aftertime." This is from "A Bivouac of the Dead" which is contained in this collection.



Ambrose Bierce disappeared in revolution-torn Mexico in late 1913. In a letter to a lady friend, written just before his disappearance, he penned, "May you live as long as you want to, and then pass smilingly into the darkness, the good, good darkness." Whether one's interest is in the Civil War or in short fiction dealing with terror and the macabre, this collection will take the reader into the dark and memorable world of Ambrose Bierce.

—Ron Furqueron
Richmond, Virginia

CAMPAIGNING WITH THE IRISH BRIGADE

Pvt. John Ryan, 28th Massachusetts

Edited by Sandy Barnard (AST Press, 2001. Pp. 197, \$21.95, paper, ISBN 09618087-9-9).

In the 141 years since the beginning of the Civil War, few units have received as much press and are as surrounded by myth and legend as the Irish Brigade. Despite the myths and legends, the common soldier of the Irish Brigade is, curiously, fairly sparsely documented.

Only the letters of 28th Massachusetts Color Sergeant Peter Welsh (published in 1986 as *Irish Green and Union Blue*), 116th Pennsylvania Private William McCarter's memoir (published in 1996 as *My Life in the Irish Brigade*), and 116th Pennsylvania Private Daniel Chisholm's diary are readily available for those who wish to read the words of enlisted men who served in the Irish Brigade. As good as these books are, McCarter's marvelous memoir covers a period of only a few months in late 1862 and Chisholm's diary covers only 1864-1865. Welsh's letters are quite good but end with his mortal wounding at Spotsylvania Court House in May 1864.

On the other hand, Sandy Barnard's new book—the post-war memoir of teenaged Private John Ryan of the 28th Massachusetts—spans nearly the entire war, from early 1862 through the summer of 1865.

Ryan enlisted in the 28th Massachusetts in January 1862, and served with the regiment until the expiration of his enlistment in December 1864, after which he re-enlisted for six months with the 61st Massachusetts Volunteers. The 28th Massachusetts served in the Ninth Corps in coastal South Carolina in 1862, followed by two stints in the Irish Brigade (November 1862 through June 1864, and November 1864 through the end of the war). After the Civil War, Ryan enlisted in the 7th U.S. Cavalry and saw action against the Plains Indians, including the battle of the Little Bighorn. In an earlier book, editor Barnard published Ryan's memoirs of his service in the 7th Cavalry.

Campaigning with the Irish Brigade covers the entire period of Ryan's Civil War service, albeit with gaps for a lengthy period when he deserted (July 1863 through June 1864) after a dispute with his sergeant, and following his wounding at the battle of Reams Station in late August 1864.

Ryan was born in the United States to immigrant parents. Not surprisingly, his memoir contains few Irish anecdotes (common Irish-Americans of the period appear to have seldom written about their ethnicity), so readers looking for an "Irish" account will be disappointed.

Ryan's memoir presents a private's-eye-view of the war and, among other things, includes detailed descriptions of rations on campaign and while in fixed camps, how bivouacs were constructed in the field, pontoon trains, and many other things that caught the eye of a boy in blue from eastern Massachusetts.

Campaigning with the Irish Brigade is profusely illustrated with a large number of period photographs and engravings, together with battle maps and modern photographs of many of the battlefields where John Ryan saw action.

The book is ably edited by Sandy Barnard, who provides well-written text to present to

the reader more historical detail than is included in Ryan's own text. Barnard's editorial notes are also well written and informative.

The only criticism that can be leveled at Barnard's editorial work is his frequent references to Ryan's post-war service on the plains. Why this is done the reader—particularly those readers who are principally interested in the Civil War—can only guess.

Overall, while it does not rank with such classic enlisted accounts as *The Civil War Journals of John Mead Gould*, *The Rebel Yell* and *Yankee Hurrah*, *Eye of the Storm*, and even *My Life in the Irish Brigade*, Sandy Barnard's *Campaigning with the Irish Brigade* is nevertheless a very good, well-edited addition to both the history of the Irish Brigade and to the shelves of people who enjoy first-person accounts by enlisted men.

—Kevin O'Beirne
Hamburg, New York

GRANT'S SECRET SERVICE: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox

By William B. Feis (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2002, pp 330, \$39.95, ISBN 0-8032-2005-7).

"The art of war is simple enough," said Ulysses S. Grant. "Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can and keep moving on." Much has been written about Grant, but nobody has zeroed in on the first part of his dictum—"find out where your enemy is." Until now. The outlines of Grant's wartime career are, of course, familiar. But here they are examined from the perspective of what he knew, or thought he knew, at the time, how he came by that knowledge, and how it interacted with his developing philosophy of war.

Feis reveals Grant as a general who valued military intelligence, and often took great pains to acquire it, yet one who recognized that uncertainty in war is inevitable. Refusing to be paralyzed by lack of information, he frequently transferred the burden of uncertainty to the enemy by seizing the initiative. The author also chronicles those occasions when luck, both good and bad, played a part in determining the outcome of operations, and is not afraid to catalog Grant's intelligence failures—at Shiloh, Holly Springs, and during Early's 1864 raid on Washington. On the other hand he highlights the part played by Grenville Dodge's far flung network of agents in the West, and Grant's successful use of the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Intelligence to thwart Robert E. Lee.

The book contains many fascinating accounts of Union intelligence operations, for example the penetration of Confederate General Joe Johnston's headquarters by Charlie Bell, late of the 19th Illinois Cavalry, which

played a crucial part in the Vicksburg Campaign. And how many of us knew that a Union spy rode at one point with Forrest?

There are occasional errors in the background material, as when Bruinsburg, where Grant's army crossed the Mississippi, is referred to as a "town," or Pemberton's army during the siege of Vicksburg is said to have been less than 18,000 strong (it was around 30,000). But these are incidental to the main story.

Eminently readable and altogether original, this book throws new light on events we thought we understood, and adds to our understanding of the Civil War's most successful general. Highly recommended.

—Keith Poulter

WARNER CIVIL WAR CAVALRY CARBINES

By Col. J. Alan Hassell, edited by Roy A. Marcot and Edward A. Hull (Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 2000. Pp. xii, 81. \$19.95 Paperback, ISBN-1-57747-063-X).

Eye-catching because of its brass frame, the Warner is one of the lesser-known carbines used in the Civil War. First patented by James Warner in February 1864, it was a single-shot piece with a longitudinally hinged breechblock, chambered for a rimfire cartridge. The Union contracted for only 4,000, and deliveries did not start until the spring of

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1864, making it a latecomer to the conflict. In all, fewer than 3,000 actually reached cavalry units in the field—not many compared with the thousands upon thousands of Sharps, Spencer, and Burnside carbines that went into battle. Nevertheless, the Warner saw combat use in such places as Georgia and Tennessee, with such units as the 1st Wisconsin and the 3rd Massachusetts.

Warner Civil War Cavalry Carbines tells the full story of these guns. Based largely on primary sources, the book starts with Warner's prewar efforts in firearms development, briefly sketching his manufacture of percussion revolvers and revolving rifles during the 1850s. It then discusses the process of patenting and building the carbines, providing details about their physical characteristics as well. Chapters on government contracts (with lengthy quotes from official correspondence), ammunition, tests/evaluations (both in and out of the field), and postwar sales follow. Included are numerous photographs of carbines and carbine components, cartridges and cartridge box labels, and reproductions of patent drawings, advertisements, and handwritten documents. Seven brief appendices, footnotes, and a bibliography complete the book.

As the bibliography shows, the greater part of the research rests on material from the National Archives (Record Group 156), but also

on city directories and studies of the arms collections at the Springfield Armory and West Point Museums. Altogether, then, this is an excellent work—well researched, well laid out, and well illustrated.

—Louis A. Garavaglia
Melbourne, Florida

CIVIL WAR COMMODORES AND ADMIRALS: A Biographical Directory of All Eighty-Eight Union and Confederate Navy Officers Who Attained Commissioned Flag Rank During The War

By Kenneth E. Thompson, Jr. (Boone, NC: C. Clayton Thompson, 2001. Pp. 207, \$24.50.)

Kenneth Thompson has produced a useful source on senior naval officers of the Civil War. Intended as the naval counterpart to *Generals in Blue* and *Generals in Gray*, the heart of the book is its biographical sketches of flag officers. During the war there were sixty-eight commodores, twenty-eight rear admirals, and one vice-admiral. Eighty-five of these were Union officers and three were Confederates, although some individuals held more than one rank. The entries are arranged alphabetically, irrespective of which side the individual was on.

Most individuals receive only a page or less, but some receive several pages; David G. Farragut, the only vice admiral of the war, draws the most, at six pages.

The 207 pages of text and sixteen appendices contain much useful information. Among this is a discussion of the history of flag rank in the U.S. Navy and the organization and development of flag officers in both the Union and Confederate navies. The appendices include seniority lists and details of squadron organization.

The chief drawbacks to this book are the lack of evaluation of the officers—the author confines himself largely to service records—and the absence of bibliographical citations and index. While not possible in all cases, it would be useful to have a listing of books on key individuals, such as Farragut or Franklin Buchanan. These shortcomings aside, this book belongs in the library of anyone interested in the naval history of the Civil War.

—Spencer C. Tucker
Virginia Military Institute

ALSO RECEIVED

Prang's Civil War Pictures: The Complete Battle Chromos of Louis Prang (The North's Civil War, No. 16). By Louis Prang, Harold Holzer, ed. (New York, Fordham University Press, 2002. Pp. 184, \$50.00, ISBN 0-8232-2118-0). Here for the first time in more than a century Prang's "chromolithographs" of the Civil War (first published in the 1880s) and the original descriptive texts are brought together. The set includes many illustrations that will be familiar to Civil War buffs.

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
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Clark's Regiments: An Extended Index to the Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War 1861-65. By Charles C. Davis (Pelican Publishing Company, 2001. Pp. 512, \$40.00, ISBN 1-56554-938-4).

With Sheridan in the Final Campaign Against Lee. By Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Newhall, ed. Eric Wittenberg (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. Pp 344, \$39.95, ISBN 0-8071-2756-6). Newhall was a cavalry officer on Sheridan's staff during the Appomattox Campaign, who set down his reminiscences in 1866. Long out of print, this edition, skillfully edited by Eric Wittenberg, once again makes this valuable reference available to a wide audience.

Images From the Storm: 300 Civil War Images. By Private Robert Knox Sneden (New York: The Free Press News, 2001. Pp. 263, \$50.00, ISBN 0-7432-2630-8).



Civil War St. Louis. By Louis S. Gerteis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Pp. 410, \$34.95, ISBN 0-7006-1124-X).

The Civil War and Reconstruction. By William L. Barney (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 368, \$45.00, ISBN 0-19-511559-7).

Civil War High Commands. By John H. Eicher and David J. Eicher, foreword by John Y. Simon (University Press Stanford, CA, 2001. Pp. 1,009, \$59.95, ISBN 0-8047-3641-3).

Crossfire *(continued from page 7)*

Aggressive" piece most interesting and informative in explaining the "Why" of Gettysburg.

I do, however, have one very small bone to pick with Sears. In his article he asserts that General Robert E. Lee's first year in command of the Army of Northern Virginia was "dazzling" by any measure. He quotes Longstreet in describing Lee's five major battles or campaigns—Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville—as "fruitless victories." Sears then elaborates, claiming "Sharpsburg, on September 17, could be claimed by Lee as a narrow tactical victory, but the army was too weakened, and McClellan's Federals too numerous, to continue the fighting to a showdown."

First of all, that is a bit like saying, "If I had some bread, I'd have bread and jam, if I had some jam." Secondly, McClellan left Union territory and went into Virginia to attack the CSA capital at Richmond. Lee stopped him and forced him to retreat back to Union territory. Lee left Confederate territory and went into Maryland to attack the USA capital at Washington, D.C. McClellan stopped him and forced him to retreat back to Confederate territory. The two campaigns are so analogous that even a complete Robert E. Lee fan ought to admit that he won one of the campaigns tactically and lost the other. I suppose Lee "could have claimed Sharpsburg as a narrow tactical victory," but I doubt he did. He was too insightful and too honest for that.

—Clark Larsen, Holladay, Utah

REENLISTMENTS

The item in Knapsack in vol. 5, #2, stating that over 136,000 *time-expired* Union veterans reenlisted in January 1864 caught my attention. We have two discharge certificates for my wife's great-grandfather, Charles S. Moore of New Egypt, New Jersey, who enlisted on August 17, 1861, for three years in Company I, 4th New Jersey Volunteers. The writing in places is faded or otherwise unreadable but careful examination of both documents and copies of returns from the National Archives reveals the following story.

On Dec 25(!), 1863 Private Moore was discharged "by reason of reenlisting" and on Dec 26, 1863, reenlisted for three years, having served approximately 28 months of his initial term. (Not "Time-Expired.")

On January 9, 1864, apparently on furlough, Moore had the Oath of Identity section of his discharge certified by a Justice of the Peace in his home town of New Egypt.

The company muster roll for "Dec 26/63 to Feb 29, 1864" lists Moore as "Teamster."

Notations on subsequent returns indicate that Moore received a \$400 "Bounty" almost half of which was still owed him when he was again discharged on July 9, 1865.

Following South Mountain and Antietam the returns indicate that Moore deserted. He was apparently absent from October 14, 1862, to March 14, 1863, when he was arrested and returned to his unit under guard. According to the returns, he "claims benefit of President's Proclamation." I have not been able to learn more about that "defense" and all I can think of, given the timing, is the Emancipation Proclamation, but I am at a loss as to how Mr. Moore applied that to himself.

His court-martial sentence was to "forfeit \$10.00 of his monthly pay for four months" and also pay "\$9.75 for apprehension from Desertion."

I find all of this fascinating. Apparently the desertion did not materially damage his mili-

tary standing. He reenlisted, received a bonus, a furlough, and perhaps a promotion.

But my reason for writing is to ask if the total number of reenlistments quoted in "Knapsack" included those which took place prior to January 1864, or if that is a "catchall" figure for the general period. Baquet, in his *History of Kearny's First New Jersey Brigade*, states that several hundreds accepted the terms and that "the Fourth Regiment re-enlisting in a body" retained its organization. Is it possible that the total number of reenlistments was even larger?

Finally let me say how much I enjoy your publication. It's usually read through the first day or two after receipt and then reexamined for several days before being passed on to one of our sons, one of Moore's great-great-grandsons.

—John T. Born, Absecon, New Jersey

AL NOFI RESPONDS: I should have worded it "In January 1864 over 136,000 soon to be time-expired Union veterans reenlisted." Most of them were due for discharge in the early spring of 1864. As for the December date, the recruiting drive began then.

ED.: The proclamation referred to is Lincoln's of March 10, 1863, which provided that absent soldiers who returned voluntarily to their regiment on or before April 1, might do so without punishment except for loss of pay and allowances for the period of their absence.

BLACK REBELS

My great-great-grandfather, Joseph Clark Jones, enlisted in the Company D, 3rd Alabama Cavalry, in 1863. He took with him as a body servant a young slave named Hardy Dulaney. Hardy stayed with his master until the end of the war and returned home to Oak Hill, Alabama, with Joseph Clark. Whether he engaged in combat or simply acted as a servant is unknown. The interesting aspect of this story is the relationship that developed between Hardy Dulaney and the Jones family. Hardy stayed with the Jones family for the rest of his life, living in a small house in the backyard and caring for the horses and mules on the farm. When Joseph Clark died, his son, Dr. J.H. Jones, inherited the home place and Hardy



took special pride in keeping the doctor's horse "Spaniard" ready for his sick calls. Years later when "Uncle Hardy," as he was called by the family, died, Dr. Jones planned to bury him in the family plot at Bethel Presbyterian Church Cemetery in Oak Hill. Bethel was an all white congregation with an all white cemetery. Despite opposition from members of the congregation, Dr. Jones persisted and buried "Uncle Hardy" with the rest of the family at Bethel. To this day, Hardy Dulaney remains the only African American buried in Bethel Cemetery. His gravestone is inscribed, "Hardy Dulaney, faithful servant of Dr. J. H. Jones."

Too often today the issue of black Confederates seems to be used to prove the point of those with this or that agenda. Perhaps we should more profitably focus on the relationships that developed between these black and white Confederates.

—Howard F. Williamson, Jr., M.D.
Cullman, Alabama

GATLING GUN

In Jack Coggins' book *Arms & Equipment of the Civil War*, he says of the Gatling Gun, "General Butler bought twelve...and used them at Petersburg." (p. 45). He does not indicate where this information came from.

Can any reader provide more detailed information please?

—John Winterbottom, UK CWS Member

STATES IN REBELLION

I'm a devoted reader of *North & South* and thoroughly read each issue.

In Volume 5, #5, July 2002, a letter from C.F. Eckhardt posed a question about the ratification of the 13th and 14th Amendments, for which I would like an explanation. That is, were the states in rebellion permitted to return to the Union only if they ratified those amendments or, if not, how was the ratification handled legally?

On another matter, in Volume 3, #7, September 2000, page 13, it was stated, "Davis should have carefully read Lincoln's Inaugural Address. Lincoln quoted and reaffirmed an earlier speech 'I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.'" How does this square with the statement in the next to last paragraph, page 5, Volume 5, #4, May 2002, "Lincoln said the Republican Party considered slavery to be a moral, social and political wrong. The party would use every constitutional method to prevent the evil from becoming larger..."

Thank you for a great publication.

—B. von Hoffmann,
Hilton Head Island, South Carolina

ED.: The U.S. position was that the states had never left the Union, so there was no question of their "return." In the case of the 14th

Amendment, states had to ratify it as part of the settlement by which they regained representation in Congress. As for Lincoln's statements, they are simply squared. Lincoln distinguished between his own wishes, on the one hand, and his presidential rights and duties on the other; he also distinguished between slavery where it was already established, and slavery in the territories.

SOUTHERN RAILROADS

I was pleased to see John Clark's "Management in the War" in the July 2002 issue. I had finished reading his book on the same subject only a few days before.

Mr. Clark attempts to show how the South's lack of high quality managers caused it to severely underuse the resources it had. He makes his case by focusing on the railroads.

I think it quite clear that the South did not yet have managers able to handle the big issues that faced it—national and war finances, the prioritization and flow of raw materials to support the war, the control of the critical elements of national war power (manpower, food, armaments, transportation), and government leadership of the government and the nation.

I would love to see other articles exploring those weaknesses and their impact on strategy and the actual fighting.

While Mr. Clark does a good job using the Southern railroads to make his point, he included several errors of fact while developing his case. Almost all Southern railroads had upgraded to T-rail and its average weight was 55 to 65 pounds, not 35. The primitive strap rails could be found on only about one percent of the South's railroad mileage.

I invite *N&S* readers interested in the Confederacy's railroads to visit my web site: www.csa-railroads.com.

—David Bright, davebrt@aol.com

JOHN CLARK RESPONDS: I defer to Mr. Bright's expertise regarding rails. I cited Robert Black's classic, *Railroads of the Confederacy*. On Page 13 he indicates that southern railroads used 35-68 pound (pounds per yard) wrought iron "T" rails. He also mentions over eleven miles of strap rail on the Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac (I used the word "some"). I appreciate Mr. Bright's clarification.

FAZE OR PHASE?

In Richard Rollins' article "Lee's Grand Strategy and Pickett's Charge" [*N&S*, vol. 5, #5], the comment was made in the next to last paragraph that "The attack would be a gamble, but did not phase Robert E. Lee."


Should this be "faze" and not phase? There are two different meanings here and faze more closely fits the context.

—Steven D. Pyle, Cleveland, Ohio

ED.: *Mea Culpa*.

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
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
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
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